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Abstract
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are suitable platforms for implementing cryp-
tographic algorithms in hardware due to their flexibility, good performance and low power con-
sumption. Computer security is becoming increasingly important and security requirements
such as key sizes are quickly evolving. This creates the need for customisable hardware designs
for cryptographic operations capable of covering a large design space. In this thesis we explore
the four design dimensions relevant to cryptography – speed, area, power consumption and
security of the crypto-system – by developing parametric designs for public-key generation and
encryption as well as side-channel attack countermeasures. There are four contributions.
First, we present new architectures for Montgomery multiplication and exponentiation based
on variable pipelining and variable serial replication. Our implementations of these architectures
are compared to the best implementations in the literature and the design space is explored in
terms of speed and area trade-offs.
Second, we generalise our Montgomery multiplier design ideas by developing a parametric
model to allow rapid optimisation of a general class of algorithms containing loops with depen-
dencies carried from one iteration to the next. By predicting the throughput and the area of
the design, our model facilitates and speeds up design space exploration.
Third, we develop new architectures for primality testing including the first hardware ar-
chitecture for the NIST approved Lucas primality test. We explore the area, speed and power
consumption trade-offs by comparing our Lucas architectures on CPU, FPGA and ASIC.
Finally, we tackle the security issue by presenting two novel power attack countermea-
sures based on on-chip power monitoring. Our constant power framework uses a closed-loop
control system to keep the power consumption of any FPGA implementation constant. Our
attack detection framework uses a network of ring-oscillators to detect the insertion of a shunt
resistor-based power measurement circuit on a device’s power rail. This countermeasure is
lightweight and has a relatively low power overhead compared to existing masking and hiding
countermeasures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are suitable platforms for implementing crypto-
graphic algorithms in particular, and computationally demanding applications in general – this
field is known as reconfigurable computing. First, the structure of FPGAs makes them partic-
ularly suitable for pipelined applications, which is the case for most of the basic cryptographic
operations. Second, FPGAs can be used to embed security into low power environments keeping
very good performance. Finally, a pure hardware implementation of a cryptographic algorithm
is usually less vulnerable than its software counterparts which are usually run in a multi-tasking
operating system.
FPGAs are quickly increasing in capability and in size, and it becomes a growing challenge
to fully cover the design space available for a given budget and time to market. In parallel, as
computer security is becoming increasingly important, protocols and security requirements are
quickly evolving. For example an established algorithm may require increased key lengths to
resist cryptanalytic attacks for a few more decades [NIS12]. How can we make use of the extra
area provided by new devices or update a crypto-system with new security requirements without
going through the whole design process? This question illustrates the need for parametric and
customisable hardware designs for cryptographic operations capable of covering a large design
space.
The three dimensions that a designer commonly has to deal with are speed, area and
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power consumption. The main advantages of parametric designs are their scalability and their
reusability. They can be reused as IP cores in many projects with different trade-offs. However,
finding the optimal values for the parameters to meet a given design goal can be difficult
and time-consuming. An exhaustive approach implementing designs for all the values of the
parameters in a given search interval cannot be achieved in most projects where the time-to-
market is an issue. Therefore we need models that allow rapid optimisation of design parameters
and facilitates design space exploration.
A fourth dimension to consider when specifically dealing with cryptographic applications is
the security of the crypto-system (or its resistance to attacks). Attacks can be divided into two
categories: attacks on the encryption scheme and attacks on the implementation. Encryption
algorithms are designed to resist brute-force attacks and cryptanalysis, provided that a proper
key size is chosen. Hence the strength of the encryption scheme relies on choosing an approved
algorithm [ITLN09,NIS01] together with a suitable key size. The key size is chosen according to
the time the information needs to be kept secret [NIS12]. However, the physical implementation
of an encryption algorithm can leak information and create security flaws. Attacks exploiting
these physical flaws are called side-channel attacks.
Since their initial publication [KJJ99], a type of side-channel attack called power attacks
have been extensively studied. Power attacks recover the key of the encryption algorithm by
using one or multiple power traces, which are directly correlated to the switching activity of the
transistors inside the device. They have been successfully demonstrated on many common en-
cryption methods, including private key encryption such as DES [SOQP04] and AES [SMPQ06],
finite field based public key encryption such as RSA [MDS99] and Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic
curve based public key encryption [OOP03]. Theoretically, power attacks can be used to attack
any crypto-system with key-dependent power consumption. Hence proper countermeasures
against these attacks need to be incorporated and security of the implementation needs to be
considered.
In this thesis we develop parametric designs for cryptographic applications. Our designs are
especially useful for key generation and encryption in public-key cryptography. The design space
is explored in terms of speed, area, power consumption and security. A technology-independent
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parametric model is developed to allow rapid optimisation under speed and area constraints of
a general class of algorithms, which include some of our cryptographic applications. Resistance
to attacks is tackled by presenting two new power attack countermeasures based on on-chip
power monitoring. The following section presents our contributions in more detail.
1.2 Contributions
The major contributions of this thesis are divided into the following parts. Our research con-
tributions are also summarised in Table 1.1.
Parametric designs for public-key encryption
We present new hardware architectures for Montgomery modular multiplication and exponenti-
ation. In order to explore a large design space in terms of speed-area trade-off, our Montgomery
multiplier architecture uses variable pipeline stages and variable serial replications. Based on
the multiplier architecture, we design a modular exponentiation circuit. Modular exponenti-
ation is the main operation behind RSA encryption/decryption. We compare our designs to
existing architectures and discuss their scalability. Our best multiplier is 13 times faster than
the optimised software running on one core of a Core 2 Duo at 2.8 GHz, and is 4 times faster
than the best hardware implementation in the literature. (Chapter 3)
Rapid optimisation of parametric designs
We generalise the idea used to scale our Montgomery multiplier. We present a coarse-grained
method to automatically map a general class of algorithms consisting of a loop with loop depen-
dencies carried from one iteration to the next to a parametric hardware design with pipelining
and replication features. A technology-independent parametric model of the proposed design
is developed to capture the variations of area and throughput with the number of pipeline
stages and replications. Our model allows rapid optimisation of design parameters by a few
pre-synthesis operations. We present an optimisation method based on the model. We show
that our method facilitates design space exploration by quickly predicting the area taken by
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the design as well as its maximum frequency and throughput. It is up to 96 times faster than
a full search through the design space. (Chapter 4)
Novel architectures for primality testing
We present the first hardware architecture for the NIST approved Lucas primality test and
an architecture for the Miller-Rabin primality test. Our architectures are based on our Mont-
gomery multiplier and Montgomery exponentiator. We introduce our Miller-Rabin architecture
briefly before focusing on the Lucas primality test. We present a hardware architecture to com-
pute the Jacobi symbol based on the binary Jacobi algorithm. We analyse the dependencies in
the Lucas sequences computation and propose a schedule for the different operations. Finally
we compare the performance of our Miller-Rabin and Lucas architectures with an optimised
software implementation in terms of speed, area and energy efficiency. Our Lucas architectures
are implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA, and also synthesized for TSMC 65 nm and 45
nm ASICs. The FPGA implementation is 5 times more energy efficient than the optimised
software running on an Intel Xeon at 2.53 GHz. The 65 nm ASIC implementation is up to 39
times more energy efficient than the FPGA implementation. The 45 nm ASIC implementation
is 420 times more energy efficient than the optimised software implementation. (Chapter 5)
Power attack prevention and detection using on-chip monitoring
We present a novel approach involving on-chip power monitoring to prevent power attacks on
reconfigurable hardware. Our power monitor circuit is based on a network of evenly distributed
ring-oscillators. Two power attack countermeasures are derived from this circuit. They both
work under the assumption that an attacker uses a shunt resistor-based power measurement
circuit to perform the attack. The first countermeasure is a general framework based on a closed-
loop control system that keeps the power consumption of any FPGA implementation constant.
We analyse this new idea and show that using the framework as a hiding countermeasure is
not directly feasible on current commercial FPGAs. However it could be implemented as a
hard IP block on an FPGA dedicated to cryptography. The second countermeasure involves
detecting the insertion of a shunt resistor-based power measurement circuit onto a device’s
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power rail. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at detecting power attacks targeting
reconfigurable hardware. This countermeasure is lightweight and has a relatively low power
overhead. Shunt resistors as low as 2 Ω are detected with a maximum false-positive rate of
0.4% and no false-negatives. (Chapter 6)
Table 1.1: Summary of our research contributions
Research area Contributions
Parametric
designs for
public-key
encryption
(Chapter 3)
• New parametric Montgomery multiplier architecture using variable pipeline
stages and variable serial replications.
• Montgomery exponentiation circuit based on our multiplier architecture
with interleaved exponentiation support.
• Speed/area comparisons with existing architectures and scalability results.
Rapid
optimisation
of parametric
designs
(Chapter 4)
• Coarse-grained method for mapping algorithms containing one loop with
loop dependencies carried from one iteration to the next to a parametric
design using pipelining and replication.
• Model of the design that allows predicting the throughput and area varia-
tions with the number of pipeline stages and replications.
• General optimisation process integrating the model.
• Analysis of the accuracy and prediction capabilities of the optimisation
method.
Primality
testing
architectures
(Chapter 5)
• The first hardware architecture for the NIST approved Lucas probabilistic
primality test.
• Hardware architecture for computing the Jacobi symbol.
• Dependence analysis and scheduling of the Lucas sequence computation.
• Comparison of our architectures on FPGA and ASIC with an optimised
software in terms of speed, area and energy efficiency.
Power attack
prevention
and detection
(Chapter 6)
• On-chip power monitor circuit based on a network of ring oscillators.
• General framework based on a closed-loop control system that keeps the
power consumption of any FPGA implementation constant.
• Attack detection framework to detect the insertion of a shunt resistor-based
power measurement circuit onto a device’s power rail.
• Implementation and in-depth evaluation of our constant power and attack
detection frameworks.
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1.3 Thesis organisation
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the general background relevant to
our work. Chapter 3 presents a parametric Montgomery multiplier based on variable pipelining
and serial replication and its application to modular exponentiation. Chapter 4 generalises the
idea of the previous chapter by presenting a coarse-grained method to map loops with loop
dependencies carried from one iteration to the next to a parametric hardware design. Chap-
ter 5 presents novel architectures for probabilistic primality testing based on our Montgomery
multiplication and exponentiation designs. Chapter 6 describes new power attack countermea-
sures based on on-chip power monitoring using a network of ring oscillators. Finally chapter
7 summarises the contributions of this thesis and presents ideas for improvement and future
work. The organisation of the thesis together with the research topics explored in each chapter
are outlined in Fig. 1.1.
Chapter 1 -
Introduction
Chapter 2 -
Background
Chapter 3 -
Parametric
Montgomery
Architectures
Chapter 5 -
Primality
Testing
Architectures
Chapter 4 -
Mapping 
Loops onto 
Hardware 
Pipelines
Chapter 6 -
Power Attacks
Counter-
measures
Chapter 7 -
Conclusion
and Future 
Work
Speed - Area
Power
Security
Figure 1.1: Organisation of this thesis
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents the general background relevant to our work. We first introduce Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Then we discuss the two main types of encryption
schemes, namely symmetric-key and public-key cryptography. Finally, we present side-channel
attacks and power attacks. Additional background material is given in each main chapter in
order to facilitate their understanding.
2.1 Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)
A Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) is a reconfigurable hardware device that can be
programmed with any digital design after manufacturing. In this section we present the FPGA
structure, the typical FPGA design flow and describe some FPGA applications. Extensive
surveys of reconfigurable computing architectures and design methods are available in [Cha08,
TCW+05].
2.1.1 Device structure
The three principal components of an FPGA are logic, interconnects and I/O blocks. In island-
style FPGAs, logic, interconnects and I/O blocks are organised in a two-dimensional array as
shown in Fig. 2.1. The logic blocks connect to the general programmable interconnects via
SRAM-based programmable switch boxes (not shown in Fig. 2.1).
Each logic block contains a cluster of N logic elements. A simplified logic element contains
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Figure 2.1: Island-style architecture
a lookup table (LUT), a Flip-Flop (FF) and a multiplexer (MUX) as depicted in Fig. 2.2. The
output of the LUT can be registered into the FF. The MUX selects either the output of the
LUT or the output of the flip-flop.
Look Up Table 
(LUT)
Flip Flop (FF) MUX Outputk inputs
.
.
Figure 2.2: Simple logic element
A k-input LUT (k-LUT) can implement any logical function of k inputs by configuring 2k
SRAM cells with the truth table of the function. An example of a 3-LUT performing a 3-input
logical XOR is shown in Fig. 2.3. Complex functions can be implemented by combining LUTs
together. Most modern FPGAs are based on 4-input or 6-input LUTs.
A logic block and a logic element are respectively called Configurable Logic Block (CLB)
and Slice in Xilinx FPGA families [Xil11b] and Logic Array Block (LAB) and Adaptative Logic
Module (ALM) in Altera FPGA families [Alt12]. In modern FPGAs logic elements contain
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Figure 2.3: 3-LUT configured as a 3-input XOR
several LUTs, FFs and MUXes together with extra logic. The extra logic is often used for fast
carry-chain addition or shift registers.
The logic element consisting of LUTs, FFs and extra logic is a fine-grained computation
block. Most FPGAs contain a mix of such fine-grained blocks together with coarse-grained
blocks such as Digital Signal Processors (DSPs) and memory elements. DSPs speed up opera-
tions such as additions and multiplications whereas embedded memory elements offer fast and
low area-consuming storage.
As an example a Xilinx Spartan-6 contains two slices per CLB. Each slice contains four
6-LUTs, eight FFs and eight MUXes. In addition, one of the CLB slices contains extra logic
for fast carry generation. In about half of the device’s CLBs, this slice also contains dis-
tributed RAM and shift registers [Xil10a]. The Spartan-6 also contains several DSP blocks.
The XC6SLX150T, which is the largest FPGA in the Spartan-6 family has 23 038 slices and
180 DSP blocks. Most recent FPGAs such as the Virtex-7 can reach more than 300 000 slices
and 3000 DSP blocks [Xil12d].
2.1.2 Tools
The standard FPGA design flow is shown in Fig. 2.4. After specification, the design is pro-
grammed in a Hardware Description Language (HDL). The most popular HDLs are Verilog
and VHDL, which work at the Register-Transfer Level (RTL). Some approaches involving high
level programming languages targeting hardware also exist. We can cite for example Handel-
C [Gra10], Vivado High-Level Synthesis [Xil12a] and MaxCompiler [Tec11]. These high level
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languages often generate RTL code. They usually speed up design time but are less flexible
than standard HDLs. One way of verifying HDL designs is by behavioural testing. Testbenches
are written in order to verify each component of the design. Then the design is synthesized.
This step takes the RTL design and turns it into a logic gate netlist. After synthesis we obtain
useful estimates of the area consumption and the speed of the design. The logic gate netlist is
tested again usually using the same behavioural testbenches. The mapping process maps the
logic gate netlist to FPGA primitives such as LUTs, FFs, RAMs and DSPs. If not enough
resources are available on the device, the mapping fails and the user has to modify the RTL
design. The place-and-route process takes user constraints, places the primitives and routes the
design. User constraints are typically timing constraints and optional placement and routing
constraints. The placer and router try to match these constraints and output a timing report.
If the timing is not met, the user can choose to relax the constraints or to modify the HDL
design. Post-place and route tests can be performed at that stage using accurate timing in-
formation generated by the place-and-route process. Then the bitstream for the configuration
SRAMs of the FPGA is generated. Finally the FPGA is programmed with the bitstream of the
design which can be tested on chip. A common FPGA design cycle iterates through all these
steps until a functional implementation meeting timing and area requirements is found.
2.1.3 Applications
The structure of an FPGA makes it naturally suited to parallel and pipelined applications.
Many FPGA applications exist in a wide variety of areas such as networking [SP03], video
processing [LAD+98], high-performance computing [HVG+07], software-defined radio [BLC09],
industrial control systems [Liu11] and cryptography [BP99]. FPGAs can also be used as rapid-
prototyping platforms for application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and microprocessors.
ASICs are faster and consume less power than FPGAs. However, FPGAs have many advantages
that can influence a designer to choose an FPGA over an ASIC implementation. In particular
the time-to-market of a project using an FPGA is much shorter than the same project using
an ASIC. As a matter of fact, unlike ASICs FPGAs are standard devices which have already
been fabricated, packaged and tested by the vendor. FPGAs can also be less expensive than
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Figure 2.4: FPGA design flow
ASICs, especially in lower volumes since no user-specific fabrication is involved.
FPGAs are suitable platforms for implementing cryptographic algorithms. First, the struc-
ture of FPGAs makes them particularly suitable for pipelined applications, which is the case
for most of the basic cryptographic operations. Second, FPGAs can be used to embed security
into low power environments keeping very good performance. Finally, a pure hardware imple-
mentation of a cryptographic algorithm is usually less vulnerable than its software counterparts
which are usually run in a multi-tasking operating system.
35
2.2 Symmetric-key cryptography
In this section we give an overview of symmetric-key cryptography and we present the two most
common symmetric-key encryption algorithms.
2.2.1 Principles
Generalities
Symmetric-key cryptography was the only encryption scheme until the invention of public-key
cryptography in the 70s. It usually has five main components [Sta11, p. 57]:
• The plaintext P which is the non-encrypted message.
• The encryption algorithm E used to encrypt the plaintext by applying a set of substitu-
tions and transformations.
• The secret key K used both for encryption and decryption. The operations performed by
the algorithm depend on the key.
• The ciphertext C which is the encrypted message produced by the encryption algorithm.
• The decryption algorithm D used to decrypt the ciphertext using the secret key.
The main feature of symmetric-key cryptography is the use of the same key K for encryption
and decryption. The key has to be shared between the sender and the receiver in a secure way
and must be kept safe. The encryption algorithm is often required to be designed so that an
attacker having access to a number of ciphertexts together with the corresponding plaintexts
cannot decrypt any other ciphertext and/or recover the key. Note that the security of a well-
designed cryptographic system should not depend on the secrecy of the algorithm, but only
on the secrecy of the key. In other words a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything
about the system, except the key, is publicly available. This principle, known as Kerckhoffs’s
principle, was stated by Auguste Kerckhoffs in 1883 [Ker83].
The main steps of public-key encryption are the following:
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Figure 2.5: Symmetric key encryption
1. A secret key K is generated and shared between Alice and Bob over a secure channel.
This can be done using public-key encryption, which is presented in section 2.3.
2. If Alice wants to send a confidential message P to Bob, Alice encrypts the message using
the secret key K. The ciphertext is therefore:
C = E(K,P ) (2.1)
3. After receiving the message, Bob can decrypt it using the same key K as follows:
P = D(K,C) (2.2)
The encryption process is summarised in Fig. 2.5.
Block Cipher and Stream Cipher
A block cipher is an encryption/decryption algorithm which processes a fixed-size plaintext
block and produces a ciphertext block of the same size. Longer plaintexts/ciphertexts can be
processed using several modes of operation (electronic codebook, cipher block chaining, cipher
feedback mode, output feedback mode or counter mode, etc) approved by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [NIS].
A stream cipher encrypts a data stream one bit or one byte at a time, usually combining
the data stream with a cryptographic bit-stream. The cryptographic bit-stream is generated
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Figure 2.6: Stream and block ciphers (adapted from [Sta11, p. 93])
by a bit-stream generation algorithm using the secret key.
The differences between a block and a stream cipher are shown in Fig. 2.6. Widely used
symmetric encryption algorithms such as DES and AES are all block ciphers.
2.2.2 Cryptanalysis and brute-force attacks
Cryptanalytic attacks exploit knowledge about the cryptographic algorithm and optionally
some plaintexts or plaintext-ciphertext pairs, in order to recover a given plaintext or the se-
cret key. Several types of cryptanalytic attacks exist according to how much information the
attacker can obtain from the cryptographic system. The five main types of attacks are shown
in Table 2.1.
In every case, we suppose that the attacker knows the encryption algorithm and has ac-
cess to the ciphertext, which constitutes the ciphertext-only attack type. In a known-plaintext
scenario, the attacker is able to capture some plaintext messages and their corresponding cipher-
texts. A chosen-plaintext attack is possible if the attacker can encrypt any plaintext using the
crypto-system. The chosen-ciphertext attack is the symmetric of the chosen-plaintext attack.
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Table 2.1: Types of attacks (adapted from [Sta11, p. 60])
Attack type Additional information available to attacker
(encryption algorithm and ciphertext known by default)
Ciphertext-only • None
Known-plaintext • Some plaintext-ciphertext pairs
Chosen-plaintext
• Plaintext chosen by attacker and access to corresponding ci-
phertext encrypted with secret key
Chosen-ciphertext
• Ciphertext chosen by attacker and access to corresponding
plaintext decrypted with secret key
Chosen-text
• Plaintext chosen by attacker and access to corresponding ci-
phertext encrypted with secret key
• Ciphertext chosen by attacker and access to corresponding
plaintext decrypted with secret key
The chosen-text attack assumes that the attacker can encrypt/decrypt any plaintext/cipher-
text with the crypto-system and obtain the corresponding ciphertext/plaintext. Encryption
algorithms are usually designed to withstand at least known-plaintext attacks.
Brute-force attacks enumerate every possible key until an intelligible plaintext is recovered
from the ciphertext. For a key of size n, there are 2n possible keys. If n is large enough, such
an attack is not computationally feasible in practice.
Two common definitions try to quantify the security of an encryption scheme [Sta11, p.
61]. We say that an encryption scheme is unconditionally secure if not enough information
is present in the ciphertext to determine the plaintext, no matter how much ciphertext can
be obtained. An unconditionally secure encryption algorithm must use keys with the same
security requirements as the one-time pad. For each message, the one-time pad uses a new
random key of the same length as the message for encryption and decryption. This scheme
produces random ciphertexts with no statistical relationship to the corresponding plaintexts
and is therefore unbreakable. However it is limited by the fact that creating a large quantity
of truly random keys as well as distributing and protecting all these keys is impractical. Hence
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none of the widely used encryption algorithms is unconditionally secure. An encryption scheme
is computationally secure if the cost of breaking the cipher is higher than the value of the
encrypted information, or if the time required to break the cipher is higher than the time the
information needs to be kept secret. It can be hard to estimate whether a crypto-system is
computationally secure. NIST gives recommended key sizes and lifetimes for their approved
encryption ciphers [NIS12] in order to guide the design of a crypto-system.
2.2.3 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
Algorithm
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is one of the best known symmetric-key encryption
schemes. It was adopted in 1977 by the NIST [NIS99]. DES is a block cipher encrypting 64-bit
blocks using a 56-bit key1. DES is based on a Feistel cipher structure that alternates between
substitutions and permutations. The Feistel cipher structure is shown in Fig. 2.7. The data are
divided into a right and a left half. Round i takes the left part Li−1, the right part of the data
Ri−1 and Ki as inputs. Ki is derived from the key K through a subkey generation algorithm.
The output data are computed as:
Li = Ri−1 (2.3)
Ri = Li−1 ⊕ f(Ri−1, Ki) (2.4)
A substitution is performed on the left half Li−1 of the data by taking the exclusive or of Li−1
with the round function f applied to the right half Ri−1 and the round key Ki. Then the two
halves of the data are permuted. As shown in Fig. 2.7, the encryption and decryption processes
are very similar. The ciphertext is decrypted by swapping its two halves and performing the
same round operations using the round keys in reverse order. The output of these operations
give the plaintext (with its left and right halves swapped).
The DES encryption algorithm is shown in Fig. 2.8. DES has 16 rounds following the Feistel
structure with an extra permutation at the beginning and at the end. In the key schedule, the
1The key is actually 64-bit long but only 56 bits are used.
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Figure 2.7: 16-round Feistel encryption and decryption
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Figure 2.8: DES encryption algorithm
64-bit key is initially truncated and permuted (Permuted choice 1) to obtain a 56-bit key. In
each round the key is rotated using a predefined shift schedule. The shifted key is truncated to
48-bit and permuted again (Permuted choice 2) to form the round key Ki.
The Feistel function used for DES encryption/decryption is shown in Fig. 2.9. The 32-bit
right half R is expanded to 48 bits using an expansion permutation E and combined with the
48-bit round key K using exclusive or. The 48-bit result is dispatched to a series of S-boxes
S1 to S8. Each S-box performs a substitution on a 6-bit input and returns a 4-bit output.
Finally the 32-bit output of the set of S-box is permuted using a permutation function P . The
decryption algorithm is similar to the encryption algorithm with the key schedule performed
in reverse order.
The operations of each permutations box, expansion box and S-box are defined precisely by
the standard in [NIS99].
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Security
The relatively short key size of DES makes it vulnerable to brute-force attacks. In 1998, a
custom machine that is able to crack DES in a few days for less than $250,000 was built by
the Electronic Frontier Foundation [Fou98]. Since then much cheaper machines have been built
such as the Copacobana machine made of 120 low-cost FPGAs that can break DES in less than
nine days on average for $10,000 [KPP+06]. DES is still approved by NIST in the triple-DES
mode, which uses a larger 112-bit key [NIS12]. However, in new applications DES is superseded
by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
2.2.4 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was published by NIST in 2001 as a symmetric
block cipher to replace DES [NIS01]. AES is not a Feistel cipher. In AES, all operations
are performed on byte-wide data represented as polynomials over GF (28) with the irreducible
polynomial (x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1). The plaintext block size is 128 bits and the key can be 128,
192 or 256 bits. The cipher consists of N rounds, depending on the key size: 10 rounds for
a 128-bit key, 12 rounds for a 196-bit key and 14 rounds for a 256-bit key. A key expansion
mechanism creates a round key for each of the N rounds. The round keys are always 128-bit
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long for any of the three secret key sizes. In the first (N-1) rounds, four transformations are
performed in the following order: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, AddRoundKey.
An initial AddRoundKey transformation is performed before the first round. The last
round consists only of three operations (SubBytes, ShiftRows, AddRoundKey). During the
encryption/decryption process, the intermediate data (state) and the round keys are represented
as 4x4 matrices of bytes. The state is initialised column by column with the 16-byte plaintext.
The SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColumns operations only take the state as inputs, whereas
the AddRoundKey operation uses both the state and the round key. The final state is returned
as the ciphertext. Each column of the state matrix is considered as a polynomial of degree 4
whose coefficients are finite field elements in GF (28). The AES encryption process is shown in
Fig. 2.10 and the encryption algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.1.
In the following, we give an overview of each of the four AES transformations. These
transformations as well as the key expansion mechanism are explained in more detail in [NIS01,
Sta11].
Algorithm 2.1: AES encryption algorithm
Input: plaintext, roundkey, number of rounds ROUNDS
Output: ciphertext
1 state = plaintext
2 state = AddRoundKey(state, roundkey[0])
3 for round = 1 to ROUNDS do
4 state = SubBytes(state)
5 state = ShiftRows(state)
6 if round < ROUNDS then state = MixColumns(state)
state = AddRoundKey(state, roundkey[round])
7 end
8 ciphertext = state
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Figure 2.10: AES encryption algorithm (adapted from [Sta11, p. 175])
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SubBytes
The SubBytes transformation changes each byte of the state with a corresponding byte from
an SBOX as follows [DH10]:
New State[Row,Col] = SBOX [X, Y ] (2.5)
X = Old State[Row,Col] div 16 (2.6)
Y = Old State[Row,Col] mod 16 (2.7)
SBOX is a 16x16 byte array which is indexed by the hexadecimal digits (0..F, 0..F ) as:
SBOX [X, Y ] = AffineTransformation({XY }−1) (2.8)
{XY }−1 is the multiplicative inverse of byte {XY } in GF (28). AffineTransformation performs
a matrix multiplication followed by a vector addition and is described in detail in [Sta11, pp.
180–185].
ShiftRows
ShiftRows cyclically rotates left the last 3 rows of the state matrix by 1, 2 and 3 bytes respec-
tively as follows:

a b c d
e f g h
i j k l
m n o p

ShiftRows−−−−−−→

a b c d
f g h e
k l i j
p m n o

(2.9)
MixColums
The MixColums transformation multiplies each column, considered as a word-polynomial, by
a(x) = {03}x3 + {01}x2 + {01}x + {02} mod (x4 + 1). This is equivalent to performing the
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following transformation on the 4 bytes of each column:

m
n
p
q

MixColumn−−−−−−−→

{02} •m⊕ {03} • n⊕ p⊕ q
m⊕ {02} • n⊕ {03} • p⊕ q
m⊕ n⊕ {02} • p⊕ {03} • q
{03} •m⊕ n⊕ p⊕ {02} • q

(2.10)
where ⊕ and • represent respectively addition and multiplication in GF (28).
AddRoundKey
In the AddRoundKey stage, the round key is simply combined with the state using an exclusive
or operation. The expansion mechanism of the secret key to the different round keys is explained
in [Sta11, pp. 190–193].
Decryption
The AES decryption performs the inverse of the four main transformations on the ciphertext,
using the round keys in reverse order. InvShiftRows rotates the last 3 rows of the state right
instead of left. InvSubBytes uses the inverse SBOX. An inverse SBOX is constructed by taking
the inverse of AffineTransformation and then the multiplicative inverse in GF (28). In-
vMixColums multiplies the columns by a(x)−1 = {0B}x3 + {0D}x2 + {09}x + {0E}. Finally
AddRoundKey is its own inverse. The AES decryption algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.2.
Algorithm 2.2: AES decryption algorithm
Input: ciphertext, roundkey, number of rounds ROUNDS
Output: plaintext
1 state = ciphertext
2 state = AddRoundKey(state, roundkey[ROUNDS])
3 for round = ROUNDS − 1 downto 0 do
4 state = InvShiftRows(state)
5 state = InvSubBytes(state)
6 state = AddRoundKey(state, roundkey[round])
7 if round > 0 then state = InvMixColumns(state)
8 end
9 plaintext = state
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Security
Given the long key lengths for AES (128 bits, 192 bits or 256 bits), a brute-force attack is not
computationally feasible as of today. A related-key attack (requiring ciphertext obtained by
encrypting some plaintext under several keys related to each others) can break the full 12 rounds
of 192-bit AES with time complexity of 2176 and data complexity of 2123, and another attack
can break the full 14 rounds of 256-bit AES with 299.5 time and data complexity [BK09]. 256-
bit AES is more vulnerable to related-key attacks than 192-bit AES due to weaknesses in the
256-bit AES key schedule. The first key-recovery attack better than brute-force was published
in 2011 [BKR11]. It has a time complexity of 2126.1 for 128-bit AES, 2189.7 for 192-bit AES and
2254.4 for 256-bit AES. These improved cryptanalytic attacks are still computationally infeasible.
However practical side-channel attacks such as timing attacks [Ber05,OST06] and power attacks
[OGOP04] have been demonstrated against AES. Side-channel attacks are described in section
2.4.
2.3 Public-key cryptography
This section presents public-key cryptography and in particular the RSA algorithm, which is
commonly used for key management and digital signature.
2.3.1 Principles
Public-key cryptography was publicly introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [DH76a,DH76b].
It has two main features that differentiate it from conventional cryptography [Sta11, pp. 291–
299]:
• It is based on mathematical problems rather than on substitution and permutation ci-
phers.
• It is asymmetric which involves the use of two separate keys, as opposed to symmetric
encryption which only uses one key.
A public-key crypto-system has six main components:
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• The plaintext P which is the non-encrypted message.
• The encryption algorithm E used to encrypt the plaintext.
• The public key KU and the private key KR. The public key is made public and is used
for encryption. The private key is kept secret and is used for decryption.
• The ciphertext C which is the encrypted message produced by the encryption algorithm.
• The decryption algorithm D used to decrypt the ciphertext.
The main steps of public-key encryption are the following:
1. Each user generates a public/private key pair for encryption and decryption.
2. Each user makes its public key accessible in a public register and keeps its private key
secret. Therefore, each user maintains a public-key ring containing the public keys of the
other users.
3. If Alice wants to send a confidential message P to Bob, Alice encrypts the message using
Bob’s public key. The ciphertext is therefore:
C = E(KUb, P ) (2.11)
4. After receiving the message, Bob can decrypt it using its private key as follows:
P = D(KRb, C) (2.12)
The message can only be decrypted by Bob as he is the only one who knows the required private
key. This encryption process is summarised in Fig. 2.11.
Public-key encryption can also be used to provide authentication. As a matter of fact, Alice
can sign a message P she wants to send to Bob with her private key KRa:
S = E(KRa, P ) (2.13)
49
Encryption 
algorithm
E
Decryption 
algorithm
D
Bob’s public 
key KUb
Bob’s private 
key KRb
Output
Plaintext
P
Input
Plaintext
P
Ciphertext C
Alice Bob
Figure 2.11: Public-key encryption
Encryption 
algorithm
E
Decryption 
algorithm
D
Alice’s private 
key KRa
Alice’s public 
key KUa
Output
Plaintext
P
Input
Plaintext
P
Signed text S
Alice Bob
Figure 2.12: Public-key authentication
Then Bob can verify the signed message using Alice’s public key:
P = D(KUa, S) (2.14)
As the message was encrypted using Alice’s private key, only Alice could have prepared it.
Moreover, nobody can alter the message without access to Alice’s private key. Then this process
provides authentication in terms of source and data integrity. It is depicted in Fig. 2.12.
2.3.2 Requirements
A public-key crypto-system must fulfil the following requirements [DH76b]:
1. It is computationally easy to generate a pair (public key KUx, private key KRx).
2. Knowing the public key and the message to be encrypted, it is computationally easy to
generate the corresponding ciphertext.
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3. Knowing the private key it is computationally easy to decrypt the ciphertext.
4. It is computationally infeasible, knowing the public key, to determine the private key.
5. It is computationally infeasible, knowing the public key and the ciphertext, to recover the
original message.
Hence a public-key crypto-system relies on the discovery of a trap-door one-way function, that
is a family of invertible function fk such that:
Y = fk(X) is easy to compute, if k and X are known
X = f−1k (Y ) is easy to compute, if k and Y are known
X = f−1k (Y ) is infeasible to compute, if Y is known but k is not known
2.3.3 Key sizes
To prevent brute-force attacks, the keys used in public-key encryption have to be large. How-
ever, the public-key crypto-system relies on an invertible mathematical function that can be
complex to compute. Hence, the key size must also be small enough to allow encryption and
decryption to be performed in a reasonable amount of time. In practice, the key sizes needed
to prevent brute-force attacks make public-key encryption too slow to be used for general en-
cryption. The main applications of public-key cryptography are therefore key management and
digital signature which only require encryption of short messages.
2.3.4 RSA
RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) [RSA78] is a public-key encryption algorithm whose strength
relies on the difficulty of solving the following number-theoretic problems:
- Given N = p.q with p and q two large primes, try to factorise N .
- Find P such that PE = C mod N given integers N , E, and C such that N = p.q where
p and q are two large primes, 1 < E < (p − 1)(q − 1) is coprime to (p − 1)(q − 1), and
0 ≤ C < N .
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The RSA algorithm consists of three parts: key generation, encryption and decryption.
RSA key generation
To compute the public key used for encryption and the private key used for decryption the
following steps are performed [Sta11, pp. 302-303]:
1. Select two large prime numbers p and q such that p 6= q and keep them secret.
2. Calculate N = p.q.
3. Calculate the Euler’s totient function2 φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1) and keep it secret.
4. Select integer E such that gcd(φ(N), E) = 1 and 1 < E < φ(N). We often choose a small
value for E (common values are 3, 5, 17 or 65537 [FSK10]) to facilitate encryption.
5. Calculate D such that E.D = 1 mod φ(N).
The public key is (E,N) and the private key is (D,N).
Encryption/Decryption
The ciphertext C corresponding to the encryption of the plaintext P with the public key (E,N)
is:
C = PE mod N (2.15)
To decrypt the ciphertext C, one has to own the private key (D,N). C can then be decrypted
as follows:
P = CD mod N (2.16)
As a matter of fact, Euler proved that:
P = P k.φ(p.q)+1 mod p.q for k ∈ N (2.17)
2Number of numbers less than N relatively prime to N .
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As E and D are chosen so that E.D = k.φ(p.q) + 1 (step 5 of the RSA key generation), we
have:
CD mod N = (PE)D mod N
= PE.D mod N
= P k.φ(p.q)+1 mod N = P
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)
The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is a useful tool to simplify RSA encryption/decryption.
The CRT states that it is possible to reconstruct integers from their residues modulo a set of
pairwise relatively prime numbers [Sta11, pp. 278–281]. More formally, let:
M =
k∑
i=1
mi (2.18)
where gcd(mi,mj) = 1 for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k and i 6= j, that is the mi are pairwise relatively prime.
Any integer x in ZM (ring of integers modulo M) can be represented by the tuple (x1, x2, ..., xk)
where:
xi = x mod mi (2.19)
Moreover, x can be reconstructed from the xi as follows:
x =
(
k∑
i=1
xici
)
mod M (2.20)
ci = Mi.(M
−1
i mod mi) (2.21)
Mi = M/mi (2.22)
Note that (M−1i mod mi) is well defined as Mi is relatively prime to mi.
Applied to RSA, the CRT shows that in order to compute PE mod N , we can compute
PE mod (p−1) mod p and PE mod (q−1) mod q (the same applies to the decryption CD mod N).
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The reduction of the exponent comes from Fermat’s theorem, which states that ap−1 mod p = 1
if p and a are relatively prime. If P , E and N are n-bit long, the computation of PE mod N
requires about 3n/2 multiplications modulo N , assuming that around half of the bits of E
are 1 and that the square-and-multiply exponentiation algorithm is used. The computation of
PE mod (p−1) mod p and PE mod (q−1) mod q requires 2.3n/4 = 3n/2 multiplications modulo one
of the primes of size n/2. This saves at least a factor of 2 in computing time.
Key size
As of today a key size of at least 2048 bits is recommended. More precisely in [Lab04,FSK10,
NIS12], the use of a 2048 bit key is stated to be secure at least until 2030. For data that need
to be protected beyond 2031 a 3072 bit key is recommended. Most of the experiments involving
RSA encryption and key generation in this thesis are performed for 1024-bit inputs. This is
equivalent to 2048-bit security using the CRT.
2.4 Side-channel attacks
A side-channel attack is an attack based on the information gained from the physical implemen-
tation of a cryptosystem. It differs from brute-force or theoretical weaknesses that are based on
the analysis of the algorithm itself. A side-channel attack is implementation-dependent whereas
conventional cryptanalytic attacks are algorithm-dependent. Side-channel attacks are classified
in different categories according to the side-channel exploited.
Timing attacks are one of the most common side-channel attacks together with power
attacks, which are studied in more detail in the following sections. Timing attacks are based on
measuring the time various computations take to complete. All encryption algorithms perform
operations which depend on the value of the key. A common example is modular exponentiation
in a naive implementation of RSA. If the exponentiation algorithm uses the square-and-multiply
algorithm as shown in Algorithm 3.4, only a squaring operation is performed if the key bit is
0 whereas a squaring followed by a multiplication are performed if the key bit is 1. Hence the
execution time for modular exponentiation depends linearly on the number of bits at 1 in the
key. Repeated executions with the same key and different inputs can be used to recover the key
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completely using statistical analysis as shown in [Koc96]. Cache-timing attacks exploit timing
variability or inter-process leakage of memory access patterns created by cache misses. They
are particularly efficient on lookup-table based implementations of encryption algorithms and
have been successfully demonstrated against AES [Ber05,OST06].
Electromagnetic (EM) attacks are based on the leaked electromagnetic radiations of a device.
The analysis techniques for EM attacks are very similar to what is used in power analysis. EM
attacks have been successfully demonstrated on implementations of DES, RSA and Elliptical
Curve Cryptography among others [QS01,GMO01,DMOPV07].
Other less common side-channel attacks exist. For instance, differential fault analysis tries
to discover secrets by introducing faults in the circuit whereas acoustic cryptanalysis exploits
sound produced during computation.
The following sections focus on power attack.
2.4.1 FPGA power consumption
Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS)
The most popular logic style is Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS), which
is used to implement logic cells in most FPGAs. CMOS technology is based on NMOS and
PMOS transistors which are arranged in a complementary structure. The PMOS transistors
are located between VDD and the output of the cells and form a pull-up network. The NMOS
transistors are located between the ground and the output of the cells and form a pull-down
network. CMOS gates are built so that the pull-up and pull-down networks are never conducting
at the same time. The diagram of a CMOS NAND gate is shown in Fig. 2.13. If at least one
of the inputs A or B is low (GND), at least one transistor of the pull-up network is conducting
and one transistor of the pull-down network is insulating. Hence the output out is high. If
both A and B are high (VDD), both transistors of the pull-up network are insulating and both
transistors of the pull-down network are conducting. Hence the output out is low.
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Figure 2.13: CMOS NAND gate
Static Power Consumption
The power consumption of an FPGA is the sum of the static and dynamic power consumption
of all its transistors. The static power is caused by the leakage current Ileak flowing through
the MOS transistors that are turned off. The static power consumption is therefore:
Pstat = Ileak.VDD (2.23)
Dynamic Power Consumption
The dynamic power consumption is mainly caused by the switching of the output signal of a
logic cell. The dynamic power consumption is data-dependent. It is often the dominant factor
in the total power consumption even if static power is catching up because of process shrinking.
Two factors contribute to the dynamic power consumption: the output capacitance of the cell
and the temporary short circuit that occurs during the switching of the output.
The output capacitance of a cell CL depends on the physical properties of the process
technology, the length of the wires to the following cells and the number of following cells
(fanout). When a 0 → 1 output transition occurs, CL charges which causes a current to
flow from the power supply. It can be shown that the average charging power consumption
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is [MOP07]:
Pchrg = α0→1.f.CL.V 2DD (2.24)
f is the clock frequency and α0→1 is the average number of 0→ 1 transitions occurring at the
output of the cell per clock cycle.
Short-circuit current is due to the finite rise and fall times of PMOS and NMOS transistors.
Hence for both 0 → 1 and 1 → 0 transitions, there is a period of time during which a current
flows from VDD to ground. The short-circuit power consumption can be approximated by:
Psc = (α0→1 + α1→0).f.VDD.Ipeak.tsc (2.25)
Ipeak is the current peak caused by the short-circuit and tsc is the time of the short circuit.
To obtain this result, we make the simple assumption that the short-circuit current for one
switching event is a triangle with base tsc and height Ileak.
The dynamic power consumption Pd is the sum of the charging power consumption Pchrg
and the short-circuit power consumption Psc:
Pd = Pchrg + Psc (2.26)
2.4.2 Power analysis
Power analysis relies on the fact that the dynamic power consumption of a circuit depends on the
switching activity of its transistors as shown in equations 2.24 and 2.25. Hence, by measuring
the power consumed by a chip performing a given cryptographic operation, an attacker can
recover information about the data being processed and the secret keys used.
Simple power analysis (SPA) proceeds by direct observation of a power trace. An implemen-
tation whose power consumption is different depending on which bit of the secret key is being
processed is vulnerable to SPA. This is for instance the case for some implementations of the
square-and-multiply modular exponentiation algorithm used in RSA or in the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol. The power trace of an unsecured implementation of this algorithm,
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in which squaring and multiplication operations have significantly different power signatures,
is presented in [Roh10]. In this example, the private key can be recovered easily with only a
single power measurement. Scalar multiplication in elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is also
vulnerable to SPA. In this algorithm, either a point doubling or a point addition operation is
performed, depending on the value of the key.
Differential power analysis (DPA) performs statistical analyses of multiple power traces
for different inputs. This method is introduced in [KJJ99] where a DPA on a smartcard
implementation of the DES algorithm is successfully performed. DPA is generally more powerful
than SPA. The secret key is partitioned into smaller subkeys. Intermediate values or transitions
depending on the analysed subkey and known inputs or outputs (message m) are mapped into
estimated power consumptions (hm) using a power model. The attacker usually has a limited
knowledge of the device attacked and he cannot perform precise simulations at the analog, logic
or behavioural level. Hence, the simple Hamming weight (HW) or Hamming distance (HD)
models are usually chosen.
The Hamming weight model estimates the power consumption by counting the number of
ones in the intermediate value of interest. This is the simplest model and is often applied
if the attacker only knows one intermediate value and cannot have access to the preceding
or succeeding value. This model is usually not very suited to CMOS circuits whose power
consumption depends on the output transitions.
The Hamming distance model counts the number of 0→ 1 and 1→ 0 transitions that occur
in a part of the circuit during a certain period of time. Usually the number of transitions is
approximated by the number of bit flips in the intermediate value of interest. If the intermediate
value changes from v0 to v1, the Hamming distance model computes HD(v0, v1) = HW (v0⊕v1),
where HW (v) represents the Hamming weight of word v. In [SOQP04], it is shown that the
Hamming distance model is very suited to estimate the power consumption of an FPGA device
by predicting the number of bit transitions inside the device’s registers.
Once the power model is chosen, the attacker uses statistical methods to estimate the most
likely secret subkey from all the possible subkeys in the search space. The correlation power
analysis attack (CPA) is often used to this end [KJJ99]. CPA uses the Pearson correlation as
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the statistical distinguisher. Suppose that we have K key hypothesis, M different messages for
which we have captured power traces of length T . hm,i is the estimated power consumption for
message m and key hypothesis i and pm,j is the recorded value of the power trace for message m
at time j. A KxT correlation matrix R is computed. Its elements ri,j are defined by [MOP07]:
ri,j =
∑M
m=1(hm,i − hi).(pm,j − pj)√∑M
m=1(hm,i − hi)2.
∑M
m=1(pm,j − pj)2
(2.27)
hi is the mean value of the vector hi of estimated power consumptions for all messages
under key hypothesis i. pj is the mean value of the vector pj of recorded power consumptions
for all messages at time j. The most likely secret subkey is simply determined by identifying
the row that contains the extreme value of matrix R.
2.4.3 Countermeasures
In designing a secured hardware-based crypto-system one needs to incorporate protections
against SPA and DPA. In [MOP07], these countermeasures are divided into two groups: mask-
ing and hiding countermeasures.
Masking countermeasures randomize the intermediate values processed by the cryptographic
device. The main goal is to make the power consumption independent of the intermediate
values. They have been successfully applied to several encryption algorithms [RWS11, RM08]
but usually lead to area and performance overheads. As a matter of fact, in order to get the
correct result, that is the same result as the one obtained without masking, the output has to be
corrected. This correction step can double the data-path of the implementation. For example,
if we consider Boolean masking on AES, one data-path is required to process the plaintext
and intermediate values masked by a random number, while another datapath processes the
random number itself.
Hiding countermeasures aim at decoupling the data-specific power consumption from the
processed intermediate values at the physical level. When the attacker does not have physical
access to the device, filtering the power supply is a straightforward solution. Noise can be
added to the power trace using on-chip noise generation [GM11]. The mapping, placement
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and routing algorithms can also be made security-aware. In [TV04, YS07], wave dynamic
differential logic (WDDL) and symmetrical routing are used to reduce the power consumption
fluctuations. These techniques require specific placement and routing algorithms and can lead
to area overhead of 3 times or more. Random dynamic voltage and frequency switching have
also been proposed as hiding contermeasures [YWV+04, BZ07]. However, these techniques
introduce a performance overhead and for current commercial FPGAs, voltage switching would
need to be implemented off-chip, compromising the security of the system. No actual hardware
implementation of these two solutions have been presented.
Both types of countermeasures focus on making an attack more difficult by decreasing
the correlation between the power consumption and the actual computation. In practice no
countermeasure alone can guarantee the security of a cryptographic system and several coun-
termeasures should be used simultaneously.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter we first introduce Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Then we describe
the two main types of encryption schemes, namely symmetric-key and public-key cryptogra-
phy. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
are discussed as practical applications of symmetric-key cryptography. RSA, the public-key en-
cryption algorithm commonly used for key management and digital signature, is also presented.
Finally, we present side-channel attacks and power attacks in particular. For an unprotected
implementation, power attacks are generally much more efficient at recovering cryptographic
keys than cryptanalytic attacks.
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Chapter 3
Parametric Montgomery Multiplier
Architecture
In this chapter, we present new hardware architectures for Montgomery modular multiplica-
tion and exponentiation. After introducing Montgomery arithmetic, we focus on designing a
parametric Montgomery multiplier that can explore a large design space in terms of speed-area
trade-off. Our Montgomery multiplier architecture is applied to modular exponentiation, which
is the main operation behind RSA encryption/decryption. Finally we compare our designs to
existing architectures and discuss their scalability.
3.1 Motivation
In section 2.3, we show that most public-key algorithms consist of two main stages: the key
generation stage which requires the ability to generate large prime numbers, and the encryp-
tion/decryption stage. Modular multiplication and modular exponentiation are core operations
of several public-key crypto-systems such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and RSA.
They are also extensively used in probabilistic primality tests, which are studied in chapter 5.
As FPGAs are quickly increasing in size, it is becoming more of a challenge to fully utilize
the design space available for a given budget. This introduces the need for parametric designs
capable of exploring the entire design space, especially in terms of speed-area trade-offs.
The Montgomery algorithm is the most suited algorithm for hardware implementation of
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modular multiplication due to its relatively simple structure. In this chapter, after introducing
Montgomery arithmetic, we present new scalable and parametric hardware architectures for
Montgomery modular multiplication and exponentiation. Chapter 4 will extend our architec-
ture to a general class of algorithms. In chapter 5, we will use our modular multiplier and
exponentiator designs to create scalable architectures for primality testing.
3.2 Introduction to Montgomery Arithmetic
This section presents additional background on Montgomery arithmetic which is relevant to
the understanding of the chapter.
3.2.1 Montgomery multiplication algorithm
Montgomery multiplication is commonly used to speed up modular multiplication. In partic-
ular, by using the Montgomery algorithm we can greatly accelerate modular exponentiation.
The Montgomery algorithm was first introduced by Peter Montgomery in 1985 in [Mon85].
Let us explain the principles behind the Montgomery algorithm by first describing Mont-
gomery reduction. Let R and N be two integers with R greater than N and relatively prime to
N . Since gcd(R,N) = 1, there exist R−1 and N ′ such that 0 < R−1 < N and 0 < N ′ < R and:
RR−1 −NN ′ = 1 (3.1)
Note that this equation gives:
N ′ = (−N)−1 mod R (3.2)
For an integer X, X.R−1 mod N can be computed efficiently using Algorithm 3.1. This algo-
rithm works as follows [Gua03,Mon85]. We have:
XR−1 = XRR−1/R = X(NN ′ + 1)/R (3.3)
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Moreover, for any integer l:
((XN ′ + lR)N +X)/R mod N = (XN ′N + lRN +X)/R mod N (3.4)
= (XN ′N +X)/R mod N (3.5)
Hence instead of computing q = XN ′, we can compute q = XN ′ mod R without changing the
result of a. Now assuming 0 ≤ X < RN , the value of a = (X + qN)/R is less than 2N . Hence
only one extra subtraction by N might be needed to obtain a mod N .
Algorithm 3.1: Montgomery reduction algorithm
Input: X, N , R−1 and N ′ such that 0 < R−1 < N , 0 < N ′ < R and R.R−1 −N.N ′ = 1
Output: a = X.R−1 mod N
1 q = (X mod R)N ′ mod R
2 a = (X + qN)/R
3 if a ≥ N then a = a−N
The idea behind the Montgomery multiplication algorithm is to map the numbers 0 ≤ A ≤
N and 0 ≤ B ≤ N to their residues A = AR mod N and B = BR mod N . It can be shown
that this mapping is a one-to-one mapping. The product AB mod N is mapped to:
(AB)R mod N = (AR)(BR)R−1 mod N (3.6)
This is therefore equivalent to applying Algorithm 3.1 on the product (AR)(BR).
The reduction and multiplication steps can be interleaved to produce an efficient algorithm.
Let:
A =
m−1∑
k=0
akr
k, B =
m−1∑
k=0
bkr
k, N =
m−1∑
k=0
nkr
k (3.7)
A, B andN are written asm-word numbers in radix r. We want to compute P = ABR−1 modN
with R = rm 1. In this case gcd(R,N) = 1 only if gcd(r,N) = 1.
Algorithm 3.2 iterates on the words ai of A. At iteration i, we interleave the computation of
the partial product aiB with a reduction step performed by Algorithm 3.1. Hence we compute
1A and B would previously be converted to their respective residue representations A and B. Here we drop
the A and B notations to simplify the equations
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Algorithm 3.2: Radix-r Montgomery modular multiplication algorithm
Input: A =
∑m−1
i=0 air
i, B =
∑m−1
i=0 bir
i, N =
∑m−1
i=0 nir
i, N ′ = (−N)−1 mod r,
0 ≤ A,B ≤ N
Output: P = ABr−m mod N
1 P = 0
2 for i = 0 to m− 1 do
3 q = (p0 + aib0)N
′ mod r
4 P = P + aiB + qN
5 P = P/r
6 end
7 if P ≥ N then P = P −N
P = P + aiB + qN followed by P = P/r. The value of q is computed as:
q = (P + aiB)N
′ mod r = (p0 + aib0)N ′ mod r (3.8)
The simplification in equation 3.8 is possible because (P − p0) and (B − b0) are multiples
of r. Note that:
N ′ = (−N)−1 mod r = (r − n0)−1 mod r (3.9)
This is due to the choice of R = rm together with equation 3.1. Intuitively, each iteration
of Algorithm 3.2 can be seen as a partial Montgomery reduction on the partially computed
product. After m iterations we obtain:
P = (a0B + a1Br + ...+ am−1Brm−1)r−m mod N = ABr−m mod N (3.10)
If r = 2 and n0 = 1, the calculation of q can be simplified as q = (p0 + aib0), which is equal
to the LSB of (P + aiB). This also ensures that gcd(r,N) = 1. The corresponding radix-2
Montgomery multiplication algorithm is given in Algorithm 3.3. In this chapter, we focus on
designing a scalable hardware architecture for this algorithm. Many other variations of the
Montgomery multiplication algorithm exist. A widely cited review of Montgomery multiplica-
tion algorithms is presented in [KABSK96].
Algorithm 3.3 only consists of simple additions, subtractions, comparisons and shifts. In
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Algorithm 3.3: Radix-2 Montgomery modular multiplication algorithm
Input: A =
∑n−1
i=0 ai2
i, B =
∑n−1
i=0 bi2
i, N =
∑n−1
i=0 ni2
i, ai, bi, ni ∈ {0, 1}, n0 = 1,
0 ≤ A,B ≤ N
Output: P = A.B.2−n mod N
1 P = 0
2 for i = 0 to n− 1 do
3 P = P + ai.B
4 P = P + p0.N
5 P = P/2
6 end
7 if P ≥ N then P = P −N
particular, it does not need any multiplication or division unit. Interleaving the multiplication
and the reduction steps also saves storage space as no large product needs to be stored.
The radix-2 Montgomery algorithm actually computes A.B.2−n mod N in O(n) operations
where n is the bitwidth of the inputs. It introduces an extra 2−n factor compared to a classical
modular multiplication. As explained in the general case, the inputs have to be converted to
N -residue as follows:
A = A.2n mod N
B = B.2n mod N
It can be done by Montgomery multiplying the inputs by the constant C = 22n mod N .
The result of the Montgomery multiplication of A by B becomes:
P = A.B.2n mod N
P is converted back to a normal representation by Montgomery multiplying it by one. The
calculation of the constant C, the initial conversions to N -residue and the conversion back to
normal representation are also in O(n) but introduce a computational overhead. Hence for a
single modular multiplication, the Montgomery algorithm can be less efficient than a classical
multiplication followed by a modular reduction due to the effect of constant factors. However,
for applications that compute a sequence of modular multiplications, we only need to perform
the conversions once. In this case, the speedup introduced by the use of the Montgomery
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Figure 3.2: Montgomery multiplication with one ripple-carry adder
algorithm often outperforms the computational overhead especially for large inputs. The right-
to-left exponentiation algorithm presented in section 3.2.3 is an example of such an application.
3.2.2 Hardware implementations of the Montgomery algorithm
A relevant review of different modular multiplication techniques together with their hardware
implementations is presented in [NdMM06]. Many FPGAs implementations of the Montgomery
algorithm have been presented in the literature. We describe here some major contributions.
In [FL05] the authors present the ARSA core, a scalable RSA architecture taking advantage
of the high-speed adder/subtractor logic of Altera FPGAs in arithmetic mode. The Mont-
gomery multiplier of the ARSA core computes the Montgomery product, decomposed into
blocks, using two simple adders along with two multiplexers for the input selection as shown
in Fig. 3.1. The quicker version of the ARSA core runs at 200 MHz and takes an area of 900
Altera Logic Elements (LE). It is capable of computing a 1024-bit modular exponentiation in
about 80 ms using Montgomery multiplication. This design is very area-efficient but slow.
The design presented in [DM02] also takes advantage of the dedicated carry-chain logic of
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FPGAs. The authors use a processing element similar to Fig. 3.2. This design comes from the
observation that at iteration i, only four different values can be added to P depending on the
values of ai and p0: 0, B, N or B +N . For bitwidths exceeding the size of an FPGA column,
the authors pipeline the carry-chain to reduce performance loss.
Another interesting design is presented by Blum in [BP99]. The full multiplier uses a
systolic array of processing elements, each of them being a Montgomery multiplier cell. This
implementation is much more area consuming than a one-block implementation but it is also
faster. According to [FL05], this implementation takes more than ten times the area of an
ARSA core for a bitwidth of 1024, and is two times faster. A radix-16 version of the systolic
array design of [BP99] is presented in [BP01]. A scalable pipelined Montgomery multiplier
whose number of processing elements can be chosen according to the area availability and the
speed requirements is presented in [CBLC04]. Every pipeline element of this design undergoes
two stall operations. Moreover, the way the pipeline is organised requires a complex RAM
decoder. In all these designs the processing element is also based on the ripple-carry adder-
based architecture shown in Fig. 3.2.
In [BST02] and [NAPP+05], a comparison between a Montgomery multiplier implementa-
tion with two carry-save adders (CSA) and one with a single CSA is made. The architectures
are shown in Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4 respectively. A carry-save adder takes three numbers x, y
and z and add them together to obtain two numbers: the sum S and the carry C. A n-bit CSA
consists of n full-adders and performs the addition x+y+z = S+C in O(1) time. For compar-
ison, a standard ripple-carry adder has a latency in O(n) due to the need for carry propagation.
The redundant representation (S,C) used by the CSA prevents the need for carry propaga-
tion. On recent FPGAs with dedicated carry-lookahead logic, a CSA is faster than an ordinary
adder for large enough inputs. For example, on a Spartan-6 XC6SLX150T this is the case for
inputs larger than 32 bits. The one-CSA Montgomery multiplication implementation turns
out to take half the area of the two-CSA implementation with better speed performance. The
carry-save Montgomery algorithm is explained in more detail in section 3.3. Other CSA-based
Montgomery architectures are presented in [MMM03]. The main weakness of these designs
is that they are not parametric and therefore do not scale well with the increase in size and
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speed of FPGAs. Our design adds pipeline and replication capabilities to this implementation
to explore as much design space as possible.
All of the designs presented so far perform multiplication by repeated additions and are
implemented in LUTs. For a bitwidth n, they have a complexity of O(n2) in terms of Area ×
Time (AT) product [BST02]. Montgomery multipliers that take advantage of the embedded
multipliers (or DSPs) of recent FPGAs also exist [TTL03, Suz07, OS08, CELL10]. In [OS08],
the authors develop a parametric Montgomery multiplier architecture targeting low time-area
products. It consists of an array of processing elements. Each processing element is based on
two embedded multipliers. The parameters of the architecture are the number of processing
elements, the radix and the number of words used. This paper also makes an exhaustive speed
and area comparison of 1024-bit Montgomery multiplier architectures. All these multiplier-
based designs perform Montgomery multiplication by blocks. If s is the number of blocks
in an n-bit input, they perform O(s2) multiplications. In [CELL10] the authors present a
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Table 3.1: Comparison of hardware implementations of Montgomery multiplication
Design Radix LUT/DSP based Scalability parameters
ARSA [FL05] 2 LUT Size of adders
Daly [DM02] 2 LUT Pipeline depth of carry chain
Bunimov [BST02] 2 LUT No
Amanor [NAPP+05] 2 LUT No
McIvor [MMM03] 2 LUT No
Blum [BP99] 2 LUT Number of PEs
Blum [BP01] 16 LUT No
Cheung [CBLC04] 2 LUT Number of PEs
Tang [TTL03] 217 DSP No
Suzuki [Suz07] 217 DSP No
Oksuzoglu [OS08] 217 DSP Number of PEs
Chow [CELL10] 232 DSP No
Ours 2 LUT
Number of pipeline stages
Number of replications
Montgomery multiplier based on the Karatsuba algorithm with a O(nlog3/log2) time complexity.
A 512-bit implementation of this design running at 300 MHz on a Virtex-6 FPGA is 60 times
faster than an optimised multi-threaded software implementation on an Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz
CPU. However, this implementation is extremely area-consuming. For a bitwidth of more than
1024 bits, it cannot fit in any Virtex-6 FPGA.
Table 3.1 summarises the differences between the different Montgomery architectures pre-
sented in this section. Our Montgomery multiplier architecture is presented in section 3.3.
Speed, area and additional scalability results are given in section 3.5. All our architectures
are LUT-based in order to allow easier customisation and better scalability across different
generations of FPGAs.
3.2.3 Montgomery modular exponentiation
Equations 2.15 and 2.16 show that the basic operation at the core of RSA encryption and
decryption is modular exponentiation. A simple but commonly used algorithm for modular
exponentiation is given in Algorithm 3.4.
This algorithm is called the right-to-left binary exponentiation algorithm. It requires O(n)
modular multiplications for n-bit inputs. The algorithm iterates on the bits of E from the LSB
to the MSB. At each iteration i, the variable Pi = X
2i mod N is squared modulo N to obtain
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Algorithm 3.4: Right-to-left binary exponentiation algorithm
Input: X,E,N with E =
∑n−1
i=0 ei2
i, ei ∈ {0, 1}
Output: Zn = X
E mod N
1 Z0 = 1, P0 = X
2 for i = 0 to n− 1 do
3 Pi+1 = P
2
i mod N /* Square */
4 if ei = 1 then
5 Zi+1 = Zi.Pi mod N /* Multiply */
6 else
7 Zi+1 = Zi
8 end
Pi+1 = X
2i+1 mod N (squaring operation). If ei = 1, the accumulated product Zi is multiplied
by Pi modulo N (multiplication operation), otherwise it remains the same. This step relies on
the following formula:
XE mod N = X
∑n−1
i=0 ei2
i
mod N (3.11)
=
n−1∏
i=0
Xei2
i
mod N (3.12)
After n iterations, n being the bitwidth of E, Zn contains X
E mod N . In practice, if we
perform the test of ei first, only two variables P and Z, updated at each iteration, are needed.
Other exponentiation algorithms exist. A detailed survey of existing exponentiation meth-
ods is presented in [Gor98].
3.3 Scalable Montgomery multiplier architecture
Our work on Montgomery multiplication is first presented in [Mas09] and an improved version
is published in [LMLEC10]. Our goal is to design a scalable Montgomery multiplier whose
speed and area can be adapted to the application.
We choose a one-CSA based Montgomery multiplier as the basic block of our design. As
discussed earlier, a CSA is faster than a ripple-carry adder with no area overhead. Algorithm
3.5 from [BST02] is used. This algorithm is a straightforward adaptation of Algorithm 3.3 to
the carry-save format. The diagram of a multiplier cell is given in Fig. 3.5. The bitwidth of
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Figure 3.5: Diagram of a Montgomery multiplier cell
this cell is set as a design parameter.
Algorithm 3.5: Carry-save Montgomery algorithm for modular multiplication
Input: A =
∑n−1
i=0 ai2
i, B =
∑n−1
i=0 bi2
i, N =
∑n−1
i=0 ni2
i, (ai, bi, ni) ∈ {0, 1}3
Output: P = A.B.2−n mod N
1 S = 0
2 C = 0
3 D = B +N /* Pre-computation of B+N */
4 for i = 0 to n− 1 do
5 if (s0 = c0) and ai = 0 then I = 0 /* Equivalent to ai = p0 = 0 */
6 if (s0 6= c0) and ai = 0 then I = N /* Equivalent to ai = 0, p0 = 1 */
7 if (s0 ⊕ c0 ⊕ b0) = 0 and ai = 1 then I = B /* Equivalent to ai = 1, p0 = 0 */
8 if (s0 ⊕ c0 ⊕ b0) = 1 and ai = 1 then I = D /* Equivalent to ai = 1, p0 = 1 */
9 S,C = S + C + I /* Carry-save addition */
10 S = S div 2 /* Shift of the sum */
11 C = C div 2 /* Shift of the carry */
12 end
13 P = S + C /* Full addition */
14 if P ≥ N then P = P −N
We apply two techniques to our design: pipelining and serial replication. Pipelining improves
the throughput of the design and serial replication improves its latency. Three main challenges
have to be addressed to design a parametric Montgomery multiplier using these techniques:
Challenge 1. Algorithm 3.5 cannot be easily parallelised due to the data dependencies between
the consecutive values of the sum S and the carry C in the main loop. At iteration i+ 1,
the values of S and C from iteration i are needed to compute the new value of I and the
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Figure 3.6: Structure of a 32 bit pipelined Montgomery multiplier with 4 pipeline stages
new values of S and C.
Challenge 2. To explore as much design space as possible, the bitwidth, the number of replica-
tions and the number of pipeline stages should be parameters.
Challenge 3. The control logic should adapt to the values of these parameters.
Fig. 3.6 shows the basic structure of our pipelined design. We call p the number of pipeline
stages. Each Montgomery cell is a modified version of the basic cell presented earlier. We cope
with Challenge 1 by allowing each basic cell to perform a consecutive part of the iterations.
For this principle to work, the final addition and subtraction blocks are removed from this cell
and the number of iterations performed by each cell becomes a parameter. The basic cell is
enhanced with the ability to load the S and C registers from the inputs. The current values of
S and C are also available at the output of each cell.
Inside each pipeline block, the CSA can be replicated as many times as needed. We call r
the total number of CSAs in series. Part of a basic cell for r = 2 is shown in Fig. 3.7. The
data dependencies problem prevents us from simply duplicating the CSA and perform several
iterations in parallel. Instead, several CSAs along with the shift logic are put in series. This is
equivalent to unrolling the loop of Algorithm 3.5 (r− 1) times. The I-selector is also replicated
as the values of I differ for each CSA and at each iteration. Replicating the CSA (r− 1) times
reduces the number of clock cycles required to perform a multiplication by a factor of r. The
area overhead is less than (r − 1) times the area of the basic cell because only a part of the
basic cell is replicated. In practice, replication also increases the latency between the outputs
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Figure 3.7: Focus on the CSA and I-selector of a basic cell for r = 2
of registers S and C and their respective inputs. This reduces the maximum clock frequency
at which the multiplier can run.
Allowing the bitwidth (n) and the pipeline depth (p) to take any value makes it more
difficult to divide the number of iterations between blocks. When n is not a multiple of p, each
block cannot perform the same number of iterations. We address this challenge by adding an
extra iteration to the first n mod p pipeline blocks. This leads to n mod p blocks computing
bn/pc+ 1 iterations, and (n− n mod p) blocks computing bn/pc iterations.
Inside a pipeline block, in order to allow the number of replications (r) to take any value,
the result can be extracted from any CSA. This solution deals with the case when the number
of iterations the cell has to perform is not a multiple of the number of replications.
A flexible pipeline control is implemented. This control deals with the updates of two
types of registers: the registers between blocks and the triangular register array. The register
triangular structure consists of arrays of registers controlled as FIFO queues. The inputs enter
all the FIFOs at the same time when the done signal of the very first cell is triggered. The
element at the head of the FIFO of a given cell leaves the queue when the corresponding cell
has finished to use it, that is when its done signal is triggered.
Inside a pipeline block, the control logic manages the extraction of the result from the
correct CSA, depending on the number of replications chosen and the number of iterations this
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particular block has to perform. This is implemented through a multiplexer whose select line
is set according to the value of an iteration counter.
Let us take a full example summarizing this section with n = 1024, p = 5 and r = 7. As
bn/pc = 204 and n mod p = 4, the first 4 pipeline blocks compute 204 + 1 = 205 iterations
and the last one computes 204 iterations. Our flexible pipeline control deals with this issue.
Inside each block, we want 7 replications. In the first 4 pipeline blocks, we loop through the 7
CSAs 30 times (d205/7e). The result is extracted from CSA number 2 (205 mod 7) after the
last iteration. In the last pipeline block, we loop through the 7 CSAs 30 times (d204/7e). The
result is extracted from CSA number 1 (204 mod 7) after the last iteration.
3.4 Application to modular exponentiation
In this section, we demonstrate how our scalable Montgomery multiplier can be used as the
main building block of a modular exponentiator. In particular, we show how the pipeline of
the multiplier can speed up the exponentiation speed.
3.4.1 Basic Montgomery exponentiator
Our basic Montgomery exponentiator is also presented in [Mas09,LMLEC10]. The exponentia-
tor implements Algorithm 3.4 using the pipelining and replication capabilities of the multiplier.
Two main problems have to be solved for this design to be efficient in terms of speed and
area. First, the pipeline of the multiplier has to be optimally used. The number of pipeline
stages of the multiplier giving best performance for use with the exponentiator is equal to two.
This is due to the fact that in Algorithm 3.4, Pi+1 depends on Pi and Zi+1 depends on both Pi
and Zi. If we use more than two pipeline stages, the multiplier’s pipeline cannot be kept full
due to these data dependencies.
Second, integrating our multiplier in a bigger design can reduce its running frequency due
to critical path problems. The latency of the adders and subtractors used in the multiplier are
indeed a bottleneck for large bitwidths. To reduce the critical path, all the ripple-carry adders
and the subtractors are pipelined.
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The design of our exponentiator is represented in Fig. 3.8. It has three main parameters: the
number of multiplier’s pipeline stages, the number of replications for the multiplier’s pipeline
cells and the pipeline depth of the adders/subtractors. At each iteration, the current values of
P and Z are stored in registers. The control logic manages the inputs to give to the multiplier
and the data to write back. It also controls the multiplier.
3.4.2 Adding interleaved exponentiation support
As said before, the data dependencies in the exponentiation algorithm prevent us from efficiently
using a multiplier with more than two pipeline stages to compute a single exponentiation.
However in a crypto-system several modular exponentiations might be needed to encrypt or
decrypt a piece of data. For example, using RSA and the CRT to sign a 2n-bit number with a
2n-bit key already requires two n-bit exponentiations. The idea is to interleave the iterations of
several exponentiations in the multiplier’s pipeline. This technique enables us to cut the data
dependencies of the different exponentiations that are running simultaneously. Fig. 3.9 shows
the benefits of interleaving several exponentiations. This figure compares the number of clock
cycles needed to perform one exponentiation in a 4-stage pipeline to the number of clock cycles
needed to perform two interleaved exponentiations in the same pipeline. To simplify we suppose
that each pipeline stage takes one clock cycle and that 4 multiplications are needed to complete
an exponentiation. Recall that at iteration i, Pi+1 depends on Pi, and Zi+1 depends on both Pi
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Figure 3.9: Modular exponentiations in a 4-stage pipeline
and Zi. Hence we cannot perform a single exponentiation in a 4-stage pipeline without stalling
the pipeline as shown in Fig. 3.9a. In that case performing a single exponentiation takes 17
clock cycles. If we interleave two exponentiations in the 4-stage pipeline (Fig. 3.9b), we see that
the pipeline is kept full. It amounts to replace the stalls of Fig. 3.9a with actual computation.
Only two extra clocks are needed to drain the pipeline and we can perform two exponentiations
in 19 clock cycles. This increases the throughput of the exponentiator by almost a factor of 2
compared to the non-interleaved method.
We modify our exponentiator to add interleaved exponentiation support. The diagram of
the new exponentiator is shown in Fig. 3.10. The values of the inputs corresponding to different
exponentiations are stored in RAMs. The maximum number of interleaved exponentiations is
a parameter of our design. It determines the depths of the different RAMs. Two multiplexers
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Figure 3.10: Modular exponentiator with interleaved exponentiation support
enable the selection of the inputs to the multiplier according to the operation performed. The
operation can be one of the following:
- Conversion of X to N-residue
- Conversion of 1 (initial value of Z) to N-residue
- Calculation of the new value of P (at each iteration)
- Calculation of the new value of Z (at each iteration)
- Conversion of Z back to normal representation
New inputs corresponding to a new exponentiation can be loaded at any time by the user pro-
vided that the maximum number of interleaved exponentiations is not reached (this is indicated
by the full signal).
At each iteration, the value at the address of the P-RAM corresponding to the current
exponentiation is updated, followed by the value at the same address in the Z-RAM. Note that
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the P-RAM can be loaded with either the value of the input X or the output of the Montgomery
multiplier. The exponentiation are interleaved following the model shown in Fig. 3.9b. The
simultaneous exponentiations are numbered. The control algorithm used to fill the multiplier’s
pipeline consists of the following steps:
1. Choose a new exponentiation number
2. Start the computation of the values of P and Z for the current iteration of the current
exponentiation
3. Update the iteration number of the current exponentiation
4. Goto 1.
Step 1 is implemented through an arbiter. The arbiter ensures that the iterations of each expo-
nentiation enter the multiplier’s pipeline in a round-robin fashion and that the exponentiations
finish in order.
Finally, in order to write-back the results given by the multiplier to the correct memory
addresses, a FIFO keeps track of the label (exponentiation and iteration numbers) of the com-
putation being performed in each stage of the pipeline.
3.5 Design space exploration and comparison to existing
architectures
In this section, we give implementation results for our parametric designs. We compare our
multiplier to the best FPGA implementations in the literature and show how it scales with
the number of replications and the number of pipeline stages. We also give results for our
exponentiator and confirm the benefits of interleaving exponentiations. In all the tables, we
use the designs presented in section 3.2.2 for comparison, provided that enough relevant data
are available in the corresponding papers. Our architectures are coded in Verilog. Appendix
C discusses our testing methodology. We place and route our designs with Xilinx ISE 14.1
for Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs. The implementation parameters are given in appendix D.1.1.
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In particular we perform place-and-route in performance evaluation mode, which means that
instead of using external timing constraints, the tool automatically generates timing constraints
for each internal clock separately and adjusts the constraints during execution [Xil12b, p.
123]. The performance achieved by this mode is not necessarily the best possible performance.
Better clock frequencies might be obtained by running multiple place-and-route instances for
each design with different clock constraints and cost tables. However using the performance
evaluation mode is a good compromise between speed of the fully routed design and place-and-
route time.
Table 3.2 compares the execution time of our multiplier with other implementations for
n = 1024 bits. When comparing the reported performance, one should take into account that
they do not all target the same FPGA family. In particular our implementations target more
recent FPGAs. Virtex-5 FPGAs have 6-input LUTs whereas the other devices reported in this
table have 4-input LUTs. Hence we expect the other implementations to occupy slightly less
LUTs on Virtex-5. Moreover given the advances in process technology, the same architecture is
likely to run faster on Virtex-5 than on earlier devices. On the other hand, in order to allow a fair
comparison with the software implementation, we report place-and-route results whereas the au-
thors of some of the other implementations ( [OS08] and possibly [NAPP+05,MMM03,DM02])
report synthesis results. The area reported after synthesis is generally close to reality. However,
the reported frequency is a very optimistic guess of the actual achievable frequency after place-
and-route. Hence these results only give a rough idea of how our implementations perform
compared to other implementations in the literature. For the software version, we report the
mean and the standard deviation (σ) of the execution time for one million multiplications of
random numbers. For 1024 bits the GMP library uses optimised assembly implementations of
the schoolbook methods for multiplication and divisions, which are O(n2) algorithms.
Our multiplier achieves latencies in range with other implementations. In particular for
p = 1 and r = 8, the latency of our multiplier is almost 3 times lower than the software
implementation and only 30% slower than Tang’s design. However, real-world applications,
such as exponentiation, often execute many multiplications. Hence comparing throughputs
is more relevant. Our multiplier without any pipelining and replication is faster than most
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Table 3.2: Performance comparison of 1024 bit multipliers
Design Device
Clock Area Latency Throughput
(MHz) (LUT) (µs) (Mb/s)
Ours (p = 8, r = 7) XC5VLX330T-2 51.48 204 923 4.23 2510.26
Ours (p = 2, r = 8) XC5VLX110T-3 70.83 60 629 2.57 1098.94
Ours (p = 1, r = 8) XC5VLX110T-3 90.19 32 937 2.00 710.42
Tang [TTL03] XC2V3000-6 90.11 N/A 1.49 688.60
Ours (p = 2, r = 4) XC5VLX110T-3 82.47 36 038 3.76 649.60
Ours (p = 1, r = 4) XC5VLX110T-3 147.34 20 641 2.09 584.79
Ours (p = 2, r = 1) XC5VLX110T-3 170.56 17 585 6.32 339.79
Ours (p = 1, r = 1) XC5VLX110T-3 195.31 11 415 5.51 194.93
GMP 4.2.4 [gmp] Intel Core 2 Duo
2800 N/A
mean: 5.45 mean: 189.65
mpz mul/mpz mod E7400 σ: 0.53 σ: 17.19
Oksuzoglu [OS08] XC3S500E-
119 6 906 7.62 134.35
(1020 bit) 4FG320C
McIvor [MMM03] XC2V3000 75.23 23 234 13.46 76.08
Daly [DM02] XCV1000 54.61 10 116 19.03 54.45
Amanor [NAPP+05] XVC2000E-6 49.0 8 064 21.00 48.86
existing implementations with a throughput of 194.93 Mb/s. It is also faster than the software
implementation of modular multiplication using the very optimised GMP library on one core
of an Intel Core 2 Duo E7400 running at 2.8 GHz. For p = 8 and r = 7, our multiplier is 4
times faster than the best hardware implementation and 13 times faster than the optimised
software implementation. We can still get better performance by increasing r and p if we target
an FPGA with enough available area. Our design scales as the device scales and can therefore
adapt to future FPGA families.
Table 3.3 compares our multipliers in terms of Latency × Area and Area / Throughput to
existing designs. The latency is reported in clock cycles and the throughput in (clock cycles)−1.
By doing so we make the results independent of the speed of the device on which the designs
are implemented. The Latency × Area and Area / Throughput results are normalised to our
best architectures for both metrics respectively. For p = 4 and r = 8 our multiplier ranks first
in terms of Area / Throughput. It is 58% more efficient than Oksuzoglu’s. It is interesting to
see that (p, r) = (4, 8) is a design point favouring throughput over area, whereas Oksuzoglu’s
design clearly favours area over throughput. For p = 1 and r = 8, our design is very close to
Oksuzoglu’s in terms of Latency × Area product and better than all the other designs.
Fig. 3.11 to 3.16 show how our multiplier scales with r and p. In these figures, we only
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Table 3.3: Latency × Area and Area / Throughput normalised to our best designs for 1024 bit
multiplication
Design
Area Latency Throughput Latency × Area /
(LUTs) (clock cycles) (clock cycles)−1 Area Throughput
Ours (p = 4, r = 8) 116 789 186 1/34 3.66 1
Ours (p = 1, r = 8) 32 938 180 1/130 1 1.08
Oksuzoglu [OS08]
6 906 907 1/907 1.06 1.58
(1020 bit)
Amanor [NAPP+05] 8 064 1027 1/1027 1.40 2.09
ARSA 128 [FL05] 900 10404 1/10404 1.58 2.36
Daly [DM02] 10 116 1039 1/1027 1.77 2.62
Ours (p = 1, r = 1) 11 415 1076 1/1026 2.07 2.95
ARSA 64 [FL05] 700 18564 1/18564 2.19 3.27
ARSA 32 [FL05] 500 34980 1/34980 2.95 4.40
ARSA 16 [FL05] 300 67860 1/67860 3.43 5.13
McIvor [MMM03] 23 234 1026 1/1026 4.02 6.00
report synthesis results. This is justified as we are only interested in the relative speed and area
consumption of our architectures. Note that the outliers for (p, r) = (7, 7) and (p, r) = (8, 6) in
Fig. 3.11 to Fig. 3.14 are due to the inability of the synthesis tool to perform a logic optimisation
on the I-selector of the basic cells for a specific pipeline block. This optimisation is performed
for all other values of p and r on all the pipeline blocks. It is also performed if we synthesize
the problematic pipeline block alone with proper wrapping logic. Not enough detail is given on
the proprietary synthesis algorithm to explain this behaviour.
As expected, Fig. 3.11 and Fig. 3.12 show that the latency of the design depends mostly
on r. However, as shown in Fig. 3.12 the latency does not decreases linearly with r. In fact
increasing r also decreases the maximum frequency of the design by slowing down the latency
of the critical path.
The throughput of the design increases linearly with p as shown in Fig. 3.13. As expected
the benefits of increasing r becomes marginal for large r as the slow down of the critical path
overcomes the gain in clock cycles. In that sense the multiplier scales better with p than with
r. The scalability of our multiplier in terms of area consumption is shown in Fig. 3.15 and
Fig. 3.16. For small values of r (r ≤ 4), the area overhead of doubling the number of pipeline
stage is less than 100% whereas it is around 100% for greater values of r. This is due to the
fact that for small values of r the area taken by the logic required at the input and output of
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thesis on a XC5VLX330T against p for different
values of r
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 4.5
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
M
u l
t i p
l i c
a t
i o
n  
l a
t e
n c
y  
( µ s
)
Number of replications r
p=1
p=2
p=3
p=4
p=5
p=6
p=7
p=8
Figure 3.12: Multiplication latency after syn-
thesis on a XC5VLX330T against r for different
values of p
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
 3000
 3500
 4000
 4500
 5000
 5500
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
M
u l
t i p
l i c
a t
i o
n  
t h
r o
u g
h p
u t
 ( M
b / s
)
Number of pipeline stages p
r=1
r=2
r=3
r=4
r=5
r=6
r=7
r=8
Figure 3.13: Multiplication throughput after
synthesis on a XC5VLX330T against p for dif-
ferent values of r
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
 3000
 3500
 4000
 4500
 5000
 5500
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
M
u l
t i p
l i c
a t
i o
n  
t h
r o
u g
h p
u t
 ( M
b / s
)
Number of replications r
p=1
p=2
p=3
p=4
p=5
p=6
p=7
p=8
Figure 3.14: Multiplication throughput after
synthesis on a XC5VLX330T against r for dif-
ferent values of p
the pipeline is not negligible compared to the area of the multiplier cells. Keeping p constant,
if we double r the corresponding area overhead is much less than 100%. Increasing the number
of replications is less area-consuming than increasing the number of pipeline stages as a smaller
part of the basic cell (only the CSA and I-selector logic) is duplicated.
Table 3.4 compares the execution time of our exponentiator with other implementations for
n = 1024 bits. For the hardware results we assume that half of the bits of the exponent are
set and we report place-and-route results. The pipeline depth of all ripple-carry adders and all
subtractors is fixed to 16 in order to reduce the critical path. For p > 2 we use the interleaved
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different values of p
version of the exponentiator. The execution time is normalised to the minimum number of
interleaved exponentiations required to keep the multiplier’s pipeline full 2. For the software
version, we report the mean and standard deviation for one million exponentiations of random
numbers.
For p = 2 and r = 7, our non-interleaved implementation running at 94.09 MHz is 2 times
faster than the optimised software implementation using the GMP library on one core of an
Intel Core 2 Duo E7400 running at 2.8 GHz. By interleaving multiple exponentiations (p = 8,
r = 5) we can run more than 5 times faster than the software and 2 times faster than the best
Montgomery modular exponentiator in the literature which uses DSPs.
Table 3.5 compares our best non-interleaved and interleaved designs in terms of the Time
× Area product with the other designs. As in Table 3.3, the results are independent of the
clock speed of the device used. Our exponentiator is more efficient than all the designs but
Blum’s and Tang’s. It is interesting to note that both designs use high-radix Montgomery
multipliers. Blum’s design use a radix-16 multiplier. Tang’s uses a radix-217 multiplier based
on 96 embedded multipliers. For Tang’s design, the multipliers area is not taken into account
in our calculation of the Time × Area product.
Fig. 3.17 reports the exponentiation time against r for exponentiators with and without
interleaving support and for different values of p after synthesis. For p = 4 (respectively
22 interleaved exponentiations for p = 4, 4 interleaved exponentiations for p = 8
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Table 3.4: Performance comparison of 1024 bit exponentiators
Design Device
Clock
Area
Ex. Time
(MHz) (ms)
Ours (p = 8, r = 5) XC5VLX330T-3 95.37 157 674 LUTs 0.75
Suzuki [Suz07]
XC4VFX12-
200/400
7 874 LUTs +
1.71
10SF363 17 DSP48
Ours (p = 2, r = 7) XC5VLX110T-3 94.09 60 687 LUTs 2.24
Tang [TTL03] XC2V3000-6 90.11
28 668 LUTs +
2.28
62 multipliers
GMP 4.2.4 [gmp] Intel Core 2 Duo
2800 N/A
mean: 4.23
mpz powm E7400 σ: 0.12
Ours (p = 2, r = 2) XC5VLX110T-3 88.95 29 940 LUTs 6.57
Oksuzoglu [OS08] XC3S500E-
119
15 398 LUTs +
7.95
(1020 bit) 4FG320C 20 multipliers
Ours (p = 2, r = 1) XC5VLX110T-3 138.68 23 791 LUTs 8.00
Ours (p = 1, r = 2) XC5VLX110T-3 102.70 20 695 LUTs 10.29
Blum [BP01] XC4000 45.7 13 266 LUTs 11.94
Ours (p = 1, r = 1) XC5VLX110T-3 114.40 17 623 LUTs 18.41
Daly [DM02] XCV1000 49.63 26 738 LUTs 21.21
Blum [BP99] XC4000 52.1 9 730 LUTs 40.49
Table 3.5: Time × Area product normalised to our best design for 1024 bit exponentiation
Design
Area Latency
Time × Area
(LUTs) (clock cycles)
Tang [TTL03] 28 668 205824 0.59
Blum [BP01] 13 266 545832 0.73
Ours (p = 8, r = 3) 94 016 106015 1
Ours (p = 1, r = 8) 39 143 268783 1.06
ARSA 128 [FL05] 900 15980544 1.44
ARSA 64 [FL05] 700 28514304 2.00
Blum [BP99] 9 730 2109456 2.06
ARSA 32 [FL05] 500 53729280 2.70
Daly [DM02] 26 738 1052637 2.82
ARSA 16 [FL05] 300 104232960 3.14
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p = 8) with interleaving support, two (respectively four) exponentiations are interleaved in the
pipeline. The reported execution time is then normalised to the number of exponentiations
performed. This plot shows that without interleaving support, using more than two pipeline
stages is useless. In fact, it even slightly increases the exponentiation time because extra
clock cycles are introduced for pipeline management without any increase in the multiplier’s
throughput. On the other hand, we see that using interleaved exponentiation greatly improves
the performance of our exponentiator. The interleaved exponentiator using 4 pipeline stages is
faster than the 2-stage non-interleaved exponentiator. It is actually less than two times faster
for r ≤ 4 due to better achievable running frequencies for the non-interleaved version. For
r ≤ 5, we can still get another two times speedup by increasing the number of pipeline stages
from 4 to 8. For r > 5 and p = 8, the high utilization of the FPGA lead to a stiff decrease in
the maximum clock frequency due to increased routing delays.
Fig. 3.18 shows that our interleaving exponentiator does not require more logic area than
our basic exponentiator3. As a matter of fact, the only area-consuming hardware added to
the exponentiator are the RAMs used to store the operands and the intermediate values of
each interleaved exponentiation. These can either be implemented in block RAMs or/and in
registers, which are not a bottleneck in terms of area. For example our implementation for
3The interleaved exponentiator is actually smaller than the non-interleaved version. The non-interleaved
version is based on the regular architecture presented in chapter 4. The interleaved version is recoded from
scratch.
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r = 8 and p = 8 only makes use of 101 Block RAMs out of 324 available in the XC5VLX330T,
leaving enough Block RAMs to interleave 16 extra exponentiations. This is more than enough
given that for p = 8, interleaving more than 4 exponentiations will not improve the normalised
exponentiation time.
Therefore, these results show that with no logic area overhead, our interleaving exponen-
tiator is faster than our basic exponentiator. More importantly, the new exponentiator scales
with both r (up to the limits previously described) and p.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present new hardware architectures for Montgomery modular multiplication
and exponentiation. The loop-carried dependency in the Montgomery algorithm prevents a
parallel hardware implementation. In order to explore a large design space in terms of speed-
area trade-off, our Montgomery multiplier architecture uses variable pipeline stages and variable
serial replications. These two techniques are both equivalent to unrolling the loop of the
Montgomery algorithm. Serial replication duplicates the main computational element of the
design in order to perform several iterations of the loop in the same clock cycle. This effectively
reduces the latency of a multiplication, that is the number of clock cycles needed to complete
one multiplication. However replication increases the critical path of the design and therefore
its running frequency as confirmed in section 3.5. Pipelining duplicates the entire multiplier
cell and registers the output of each cell. This reduces the number of iterations performed in
each cell, but not the overall number of clock cycles needed to complete one multiplication.
Hence pipelining only increases the throughput of the multiplier. Moreover, apart from the
possible routing congestions created by increasing the complexity of the design, pipelining does
not have a direct negative effect on the running frequency of the design. In that sense, the
multiplier scales better with the number of pipeline stages than it does with the number of
replications. These observations are developed further in the following chapter, which will
extend our architecture to a general class of algorithm with loop dependencies carried from one
iteration to the next.
Our Montgomery multiplier architecture is applied to modular exponentiation, which is
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the main operation behind RSA encryption/decryption. Due to the data dependencies in the
exponentiation algorithm, for a single exponentiation the multiplier can only be used at full
throughput for 2 pipeline stages or less. In order to overcome this limitation, we interleave
several exponentiations in the multiplier’s pipeline. This technique amounts to replacing the
pipeline bubbles by actual computation and has no area overhead. Applications of modular
exponentiation to probabilistic primality testing are presented in chapter 5.
Our scalable Montgomery multiplier implemented on a Virtex-5 FPGA can achieve through-
puts 4 times higher than the best existing hardware implementation and 13 times higher than an
optimised software implementation. Our multiplier is also more efficient than existing designs
(for which clock cycles data are available) in terms of Latency × Area and Area / Throughput.
By interleaving multiple exponentiations our exponentiator can run more than 5 times faster
than optimised software and 2 times faster than the best modular exponentiation hardware
reported in the literature. Only designs based on high-radix multipliers are more efficient than
our exponentiator in terms of Time × Area product. Our Montgomery multiplier and expo-
nentiation architectures scale well with the number of pipeline stages and replications. Hence
better performance will be achieved on upcoming devices such as the Virtex-7, which will be
faster and larger.
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Chapter 4
Mapping Loop Structures onto
Parametrised Hardware Pipelines
This chapter generalises the idea used to scale our Montgomery multiplier presented in the
previous chapter. We present a coarse-grained method to automatically map a general class of
algorithms consisting of a loop with loop dependencies carried from one iteration to the next to a
parametric hardware design with pipelining and replication features similar to the Montgomery
multiplier architecture. The general algorithm consists of three stages. The pre-computation
stage initialises the result vector. The main stage iterates on the bits of some of the inputs to
update the result vector according to its previous value and the values of the inputs. Finally,
the post-computation stage terminates the algorithm. A technology-independent parametric
model of the proposed design is developed to capture the variations of area and throughput with
the number of pipeline stages and replications. Our model allows rapid optimisation of design
parameters by a few pre-synthesis operations. We present an optimisation method based on
the model. We show that our method facilitates design space exploration by quickly predicting
the area taken by the design as well as its maximum frequency and throughput.
4.1 Motivation
In chapter 3, we introduced two parametric designs. The main advantages of parametric designs
are their scalability and their reusability. They can be reused as IP cores in many projects
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with different speed-area trade-offs. However, finding the optimal values for the parameters
to meet a given design goal can be difficult and time-consuming. An exhaustive approach
implementing designs for all the values of the parameters in a given search interval cannot be
achieved in most projects where the time-to-market is an issue. Therefore we need a model of
the design that facilitates estimating its parameters under speed and area constraints. Such area
and speed estimation models are often application-dependent [BLC09,YLS+08] or technology-
dependent [EJCT00,SJ08].
Previous work on resource and performance estimations for reconfigurable devices has
mainly been focused on high-level RTL estimation. The common method used for resource
estimation involves identifying the basic operations in the algorithm which can be represented
as a Data Flow Graph (DFG) [EJCT00] or an RTL netlist [SJ08]. A library of operators char-
acteristic of the device is then used to estimate the resources needed by the algorithm. This
process usually requires approximations in order to fit the parameters of the identified operation
(bitwidth, number of inputs, etc) to the operator in the library [KNRK06]. Such estimation
tools are readily available in commercial software such as Xilinx System Generator [MQF91]
and PlanAhead [SJ08]. The RTL resource estimation tool used by Xilinx is claimed to be 60
times faster than synthesis [SJ08], which allows fast design space exploration. Similar methods
can be used to estimate the performance of the design by using a device-dependent library of
delays for the estimated resources.
These methods are general and inherently fine-grained. A most specific and coarse-grained
approach focused on energy-consumption is developed by Becker et. al in [BLC09,BLC10]. The
authors target runtime reconfigurable software-defined radio applications. Their approach needs
a priori information about the implementation, usually obtained by running a few synthesis
operations.
The literature on algorithm mapping onto reconfigurable hardware and associated design
space exploration is vast. For instance, in [SHD02] a mixed compiler/synthesis tools approach
is presented. Several compiler optimisations are performed on the algorithm before translation
to RTL. The design space is then searched using resource estimations obtained from synthesis
results.
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Mapping of unrolled loop onto pipelines has also been extensively studied [Wei97, BP98,
STL04]. In particular the authors of [STL04] propose the Reconfigurable Dataflow approach
that maps loops with loop-carried dependencies onto efficient pipelines. This method is more
fine-grained and general than our approach to the extent that it supports loop-carried depen-
dencies of various sizes and loop indices determined at runtime. However the authors do not
provide any resource and performance model for the mapped implementation, which makes
design space exploration difficult.
Unlike other more fine-grained loop pipelining and resource estimation methods, the method
presented in this chapter is restrained to a particular application domain and uses a coarse-
grained model of the corresponding hardware mapping. As a matter of fact, our base module
is a coarse-grained cell which already consists of many fine-grained operators. Our method is
particularly useful for quick optimisation of design parameters through design space exploration.
To this extent it is close to the method presented in [BLC09, BLC10]. However, the authors
of [BLC09, BLC10] focus on a parallelizable class of algorithms while the focus of this work
is on algorithms that cannot be parallelized due to loop-carried dependencies. The restrained
application domain of our model makes the resource and performance estimations as well as
the design space exploration more accurate than general estimation methods.
4.2 Main idea
We focus on a class of algorithms with loop dependencies carried from one iteration to the
next. Common applications falling into this category are bitwise algorithms for which the
result is updated at each iteration based on the corresponding bit of one or several inputs.
This is for instance the case for the Montgomery multiplication algorithm and the square-
multiply exponentiation algorithm presented in chapter 3 as well as the Lucas primality test
presented in chapter 5. Some important arithmetic algorithms such as the integer square
root [Par00, Cre] and the restoring division algorithms also follow this pattern. Algorithms
performing a reduce operation also exhibit such loop dependencies. This is the case for several
algebraic algorithms such as matrix-vector and matrix multiplications, for which products of
row and column elements are iteratively accumulated. Finally, loop dependencies carried from
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one iteration to the next are also common in approximation algorithms for which a solution
is refined at each iteration based on the result from the previous one. The Newton-Raphson
method is one of the best known algorithms of this type.
Usually algorithms with loop-carried dependencies cannot be easily parallelized. However,
several techniques can be used for efficient hardware implementation. Pipelining and replication
are introduced in chapter 3. To recall these concepts, let us take a simple example using the
carry-save adder (CSA) based Montgomery multiplication of Algorithm 3.5. Let us assume that
we want to perform a n = 32 bit Montgomery multiplication. A simple hardware architecture
for the loop would reuse the same processing logic (Montgomery cell) 32 times, storing the
intermediate values of S and C in registers. This architecture is compact but slow as the
latency of one multiplication is 32 clock cycles.
If we are willing to trade area for performance, the Montgomery cell can be replicated. For
example if we replicate the Montgomery cell once, we obtain r = 2 copies of the cell in series
in a Montgomery block, as shown in Fig. 3.7. Hence the latency of one multiplication is now
32/2 = 16 clock cycles. The area is slightly less than doubled as some control logic can be
shared. However by replicating the cell, we increase the delay through the block and hence the
critical path delay. In practice, replication is only useful if the minimum period that we want
to achieve is higher than the critical path delay.
Now let us assume that we want to perform several multiplications. In our replicated design
we would have to wait for the first multiplication to terminate before starting a new one, leading
to a throughput of one multiplication every 16 clock cycles. To increase the throughput of the
design, we can pipeline the Montgomery block as shown in Fig. 3.6. As opposed to replication,
pipelining buffers the output of each duplicated block. Here the entire block is duplicated, and
therefore doubling the number of pipeline stages doubles the logic area. For p = 4 pipeline
stages, each block is assigned 32/4 = 8 iterations. Each block contains r = 2 cells. Hence it
takes 8/2 = 4 clock cycles for a block to compute its part of the iterations. The latency of
the architecture is still 16 clock cycles but a new multiplication can now be started every 4
clock cycles, leading to a throughput of one multiplication every 4 clock cycles. The following
sections formalise these ideas.
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4.3 General bit by bit processing algorithm with loop-
carried dependency
In this analysis, we consider algorithms that can be described in the general form presented in
Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.1: General bit by bit processing algorithm
Input:
A = {A0, ..., Ak−1} with Aj =
∑n−1
i=0 a(j,i)2
i for 0 ≤ j < k
ai = {a(0,i), ..., a(k−1,i)} for 0 ≤ i < n
B = {B0, ..., Bl−1} with Bj =
∑βj−1
i=0 b(j,i)2
i for 0 ≤ j < l
Output:
R = {R0, ..., Rm−1} with Rj =
∑ρj−1
i=0 r(j,i)2
i for 0 ≤ j < m
1 R = pre(A,B) /* Variables initialisation */
2 for i = 0 to n− 1 do
3 R = main(ai,B,R) /* Loop-carried dependency through R */
4 end
5 R = post(A,B,R) /* Final additions, shifts, etc */
Table 4.1: Parameters of the general algorithm
Parameters Description
k Size of vector A of inputs {A0, ..., Ak−1}
n Bitwidth of inputs {A0, ..., Ak−1}
l Size of vector B of inputs {B0, ..., Bl−1}
βj Bitwidth of input Bj
m Size of vector R of inputs {R0, ..., Rm−1}
ρj Bitwidth of input Rj
The different parameters are described in Table 4.1. This algorithm has an optional pre-
computation stage (line 1). This stage can consist of initialisation of variables, initial shifts,
etc. Then, the algorithm iterates on the number of bits n of the elements {A0, ..., Ak−1} of
input vector A. At each iteration of the loop, the result vector R is updated through the
main() function (line 3). At iteration i, this function takes the previous value of vector R, the
input vector B and the i-th bits ai = {a(0,i), ..., a(k−1,i)} of each element of vector A. A possible
post-computation stage terminates the algorithm (line 5).
In practice, every algorithm with one loop that has loop dependencies carried from one
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iteration to the next, and for which some inputs are processed bit by bit, can be represented in
this general form. Table 4.2 shows how we can map the Montgomery multiplication algorithm,
the exponentiation algorithm and the integer square root algorithm to our general algorithm.
For each algorithm the inputs, the outputs, the number of iterations (n) and the three functions
pre(), main() (at iteration i) and post() are identified. Note that for the integer square root
algorithm to conform to our general algorithm, its input bits have to come from two elements
of input vector A. In fact, the bit by bit processing of the elements of A does not limit the
generality of our approach as k n-bit physical elements can be zipped together to form n k-bit
logical inputs if required. In section 4.7 we choose these three reference designs to evaluate the
accuracy of our model.
4.4 Mapping of the algorithm to the parametric hard-
ware description
We focus on the main loop of Algorithm 4.1 and map it to the general hardware design described
in Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2.
The n iterations are divided between p blocks organised in a pipeline fashion as shown in
Fig. 4.1. Pipeline block number i performs iter(i) successive iterations of the loop where for
all i ∈ [1, p]:
iter(i) =
⌊
n
p
⌋
+ extra(i) (4.1)
extra(i) =
 1 if i < n mod p0 if i ≥ n mod p (4.2)
The number of iterations are evenly distributed between pipeline blocks and if p does not
divide n, the first n mod p blocks perform an extra iteration. Therefore, block number i
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Table 4.2: Specialisation of the general algorithm for three applications
CSA Montgomery Exponentiation Integer Square root
Inputs
A = {A0}, B = {B0, B1}
A0 = A =
∑s−1
i=0 ai2
i
B0 = B =
∑s−1
i=0 bi2
i
B1 = N =
∑s−1
i=0 ni2
i
(ai, bi, ni) ∈ {0, 1}3
A = {A0}, B = {B0}
A0 = E =
∑s−1
i=0 ei2
i,
ei ∈ {0, 1}
B0 = X, B1 = N
A = {A0, A1}, B = ∅
A0 = (a1a3...as−1)2
A1 = (a0a2...as−2)2
where A = (as−1...a1a0)2
is the number we want
to take the square root
of and ai ∈ {0, 1}
Outputs
R = {R0, R1, R2}
R0 = S = A.B.2
−n mod N
R1 = C
R2 = D
R = {R0, R1}
R0 = Z = X
E mod N
R1 = P
R = {R0, R1}
R0 = Rem, R1 = Root
n s s s/2
pre() S = 0, C = 0, D = B +N Z = 1, P = X Rem = 0, Root = 0
main()
if (s0 = c0) and ai = 0
then
I = 0
if (s0 6= c0) and ai = 0
then
I = N
if (s0 ⊕ c0 ⊕ b0) = 0 and
ai = 1 then
I = B
if (s0 ⊕ c0 ⊕ b0) = 1 and
ai = 1 then
I = D
S,C = S + C + I
S = S div 2
C = C div 2
if ei = 1 then
Z = Z.P mod N
P = P 2 mod N
Root = (Root << 1)
a = (a(0,i)a(1,i))2
Rem = (Rem << 2) + a
Div = (Root << 1) + 1
if Div ≤ Rem then
Rem = Rem−Div
Root = Root+ 1
post()
S = S + C
if S ≥ N then S = S −N - -
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Block 1
B
R
reg
reg
reg
reg
sreg sreg
A0[0:It(1)-1] Ak-1[0:It(1)-1]
.   .   .
Block 2
sreg sreg
A0[It(1):It(2)-1] Ak-1[It(1):It(2)-1]
.   .   .
reg reg
Block p
sreg sreg
A0[It(p-1):It(p)-1] Ak-1[It(p-1):It(p)-1]
.   .   .
reg reg
p
B
R
Figure 4.1: Pipeline of the parametric hardware description
Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell r
reg
reg
sreg sreg
A0[It(i-1):It(i)-1] Ak-1[It(i-1):It(i)-1]
.   .   .
reg reg
i
B
R
B
R
iter(i) iter(i)
iter(i) iter(i)
r r
1 1 1 1 1 1
Σβi
i=0
l-1
Σρi
i=0
m-1
Figure 4.2: Inside pipeline block i
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processes the bits It(i− 1) to (It(i)− 1) of inputs A0 to Ak−1 where:
It(0) = 0
It(i) =
i∑
k=1
iter(k) ∀i ∈ [1, p] (4.3)
The other inputs to block number i are:
- the current value of result vector R, calculated by block number (i− 1) if i ≥ 2 or given
by the pre-computation stage if i = 1,
- the value of input vector B.
Each pipeline block consists of a processing cell performing the actual computation, some
registers, and extra logic needed for the control. As well as organising the basic blocks in a
pipeline fashion, we allow the processing cell of each block to be replicated in series without
buffering as shown in Fig. 4.2. This feature is relevant if the processing cell consists only of
combinational logic. If the operations performed by a cell take several clock cycles, replication
will not improve the number of clock cycles spent in each pipeline block. For instance let us
assume that the operations of a cell take 10 clock cycles and we need to perform 2 iterations in
each pipeline block. With one cell, the single cell performs both iterations one after the other for
a total of 20 clock cycles. If we replicate the cell once, the first cell performs the first iteration.
The second cell waits for the first cell to terminate then it performs the second iteration. Hence
the total time through the block is still 20 clock cycles and no speed improvement is achieved.
If each pipeline block has r main processing elements, r iterations are processed in series
during one clock cycle. Hence the number of clock cycles spent in pipeline block i per operation
is:
lat(i) =
⌈
iter(i)
r
⌉
(4.4)
We call this number the latency of pipeline block i. lat(i) is expressed in clock cycles and
is therefore independent of the frequency of the design. This equation shows that an extra
clock cycle is needed if r does not divide iter(i). In this case the results of block i need to be
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extracted from cell number iter(i) mod r during this extra clock cycle.
Between each block, registers save the values of vectors R and B to be given as inputs to
the next block. The registers for R are updated at each clock cycle with the results of cell
number r or cell number iter(i) mod r. The registers for B are only updated each time the
operation of the preceding block is done. Finally, a triangle of registers at the top ensures that
the pipeline blocks are always given the correct values from their corresponding elements of
vector A. In the triangle of registers, the bottom registers connecting to each pipeline block
are circular shift registers (denoted sreg in Fig. 4.2). They provide the cells in the pipeline
block with the inputs corresponding to the current iteration.
Mapping our general algorithm to this particular hardware structure has three main ad-
vantages. First, the parametric nature of this structure (through the two parameters r and p)
allows the designer to explore a large design space and therefore to consider different speed/area
trade-offs. Second, we will show that the throughput of the design can be improved by increas-
ing the values of r and p, the biggest limitation being the area available. This is particularly
interesting for applications targeting high-speed performance. Finally, our structure is regular
and the generation of the pipeline and replication logic is automated.
4.5 Modelling of the architecture
We develop a model of our parametric design presented in the previous section enabling rapid
optimisation for throughput under area and speed constraints. The use of such a model reduces
development time as fewer synthesis operations are needed to obtain satisfactory values for r
and p.
4.5.1 Latency and throughput
Our module needs to perform n iterations to complete the main computation if no replication
is introduced. Let tp,e be the time to perform such an iteration, corresponding to c clock cycles
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at a frequency f :
tp,e =
c
f
(4.5)
If c = 1, the main processing element of a block can be replicated. If c > 1, as we cannot
replicate the main processing element it takes n.c clock cycles to perform the n iterations.
Therefore the total time to perform the main operation is:
tp =

∑p
i=1 lat(i).tp,e if c = 1
n.tp,e if c > 1
(4.6)
This corresponds to the time taken by the system to compute the first result, that is the latency
of the hardware module in seconds. Note that in practice, it is clear that replication increases
the delay through a pipeline block and therefore reduces the maximum frequency f of the clock
as cells are put in series without buffering. This is considered in section 4.5.2.
To simplify the equations, we assume that the latency of the pre-computation and post-
computation operations are shorter than the latency of a pipeline block. If not the case,
the throughput bottleneck is in the slower of the two stages, not in the main computation.
The throughput φ of the design (number of operations per unit of time when the pipeline is
full) depends on both the pipeline length p and the number of replications r. It is inversely
proportional to the maximum number of clock cycles spent in a pipeline block:
φ =

1⌈dnpe
r
⌉
tp,e
=
f⌈dnpe
r
⌉ if c = 1
1⌈
n
p
⌉
tp,e
=
f⌈
n
p
⌉
c
if c > 1
(4.7)
Replicating and pipelining a design reduce the effective number of iterations that need to be
computed in each block, leading to the following constraint:
p.r ≤ n (4.8)
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4.5.2 Frequency
To simplify, we assume that the pre-processing and post-processing modules are not a frequency
bottleneck. Hence the critical path is in a pipeline block and the minimum period is equal to the
delay through a block. In our parametric description, the size of the main processing element
in each block is around the same for all p. Even if the size of the control hardware managing
the iterations in a block decreases with p, the delay through a block is not likely to decrease
significantly. Therefore, we assume that the minimum period of the design does not depend on
p. On the contrary, replication has a negative effect on the critical path as the replicated cells
are connected together in series. The minimum period can therefore be approximated by:
Tp(r) ≈ dl + rdc (4.9)
where dc is the delay through a cell, r is the number of cells in a block and dl is the sum of
the delays through the logic located before and after the cells (mostly multiplexers). Hence the
frequency of the design is:
f(r) =
1
Tp(r)
=
1
dl + rdc
(4.10)
Let us define:
f0 = 1/Tp(1) (4.11)
the frequency of the design for r = 1 and:
λ = dc/Tp(1) (4.12)
the ratio of the delay through the basic cell to the minimum period for r = 1. We can rewrite
the frequency as:
f(r) =
1/Tp(1)
1 + dc/Tp(1)(r − 1) =
f0
1 + λ(r − 1) (4.13)
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4.5.3 Area
We decompose the area taken by our design into two parts:
- Al the area taken by logic
1
- Ar the area taken by registers
Let us first consider the area taken by the logic Al. Let Acell be the logic area of a cell for
r = 1, Amux,2 and Amux,3 be the area taken respectively by a 2-to-1 and a 3-to-1 bit multiplexer.
We recall that ρi is the bitwith of the output Ri and m is the number of such outputs. As
shown in Fig. 4.2, the multiplexers required at the inputs of the R registers are either 2-input
or 3-input multiplexers, depending on the need for an extra clock cycle in pipeline block i.
Hence, the logic area of pipeline block i is:
Ablock(i) = r.Acell +
m−1∑
k=0
ρk.Amux(i) (4.14)
where:
Amux(i) =
 Amux,2 if iter(i) mod r = 0Amux,3 if iter(i) mod r 6= 0 (4.15)
Each register of the top register triangle needs either a 2-input or a 3-input multiplexer (not
shown on Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2) depending on whether they are simple registers (to choose
between the initialisation value or the value from the previous register) or circular shift registers
(to choose between the initialisation value, the value from the previous register, or the shifted
output). The part of the register triangle supplying inputs to pipeline block number i is of size
iter(i). We recall that k is the size of vector A. Hence the logic area of the register triangle is:
Atriangle = k
p∑
i=1
iter(i). ((i− 1).Amux,2 + Amux,3) (4.16)
1We do not explicitly consider coarse-grained blocks such as DSPs and BRAMs in this model as all our
architectures are implemented on fine-grained logic for scalability issues explained in section 3.2.2. However
the model could be easily extended to coarse-grained resources by taking into account the occupation of these
resources individually.
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Let Apre and Apost be the fixed logic area taken respectively by the pre-computation and post-
computation modules. We can deduce the total logic area:
Al = Apre + Atriangle +
p∑
i=1
Ablock(i) + Apost (4.17)
To calculate Ar we need to derive the total register size S. The total size of the registers
between two pipeline blocks is:
Sd =
l−1∑
i=0
βi +
m−1∑
i=0
ρi (4.18)
The size of a register in the top triangle of registers is for pipeline block i:
Sp(i) = k.iter(i) (4.19)
Let Scell be the total size of the registers internal to a cell, Spre and Spost be respectively the
total size of the registers of the pre-computation and post-computation modules. The total
register size is:
S = Spre + p.(Sd + r.Scell) +
p∑
i=1
i.Sp(i) + Spost (4.20)
Finally, we have:
Ar = S.Ar,e (4.21)
where Ar,e is the area taken by a one-bit register.
4.5.4 Constraints
The following constraints are used:
- Maximum area available for logic Al,max
- Maximum area available for registers Ar,max
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- Minimum frequency fmin at which we want the design to run
4.5.5 Throughput optimisation
The problem of optimising the throughput of the design can be formulated as follows:
maximise:
φ =

1⌈dnpe
r
⌉
tp,e
=
f⌈dnpe
r
⌉ if c = 1
1⌈
n
p
⌉
tp,e
=
f⌈
n
p
⌉
c
if c > 1
such that: (4.22)
Al ≤ Al,max
Ar ≤ Ar,max
f ≥ fmin
p.r ≤ n
Given a search interval for r and p, this problem is solved easily by exhaustive search.
4.6 Optimising the design
We show how the parameters of our model can be determined and we present an optimisation
process based on our model.
4.6.1 Determining the values of the parameters
Our model contains many parameters which affect the values of r and p maximising the through-
put. Table 4.3 summarises how each parameter is determined. The number of A inputs (k),
the number of B inputs (l), the number of outputs (m) and their respective bitwidths (n, β0, ...
βl−1, ρ0, ..., ρm−1), and the number of clock cycles c needed to complete an iteration, depend
on the application. Hence, we can obtain them easily once the design of the hardware mod-
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Table 4.3: Determination of the design parameters
Parameters Determination
A inputs number (k), bitwidth (n) application-dependent
B inputs number (l), bitwidths (β0, ... βl−1) application-dependent
R outputs number (m), bitwidths (ρ0, ... ρm−1) application-dependent
Iteration clock cycles (c) application-dependent
Minimum frequency fmin design choice
Maximum logic area (Al,max) device-dependent
Maximum register area (Ar,max) device-dependent
Basic cell area (Acell) pre-synthesis
Basic cell registers (Scell) pre-synthesis
Pre/post-computation area (Apre, Apost) pre-synthesis
Pre/post-computation registers (Spre, Spost) pre-synthesis
Area of a 1-bit register (Ar,e) pre-synthesis
Multiplexers area (Amux,2 and Amux,3) pre-syntheses
Frequency parameters (f0, λ) interpolation or direct
ule is fixed. The minimum frequency fmin at which our module runs is a design choice. The
maximum area available for registers Ar,max and for logic Al,max are device-dependent. For an
FPGA, Ar,max is the maximum number of registers and Al,max is the maximum number of LUTs
available. For an ASIC, Ar,max and Al,max can be grouped together to provide the maximum
area available given in µm2, in number of cells or in the technology-independent notion of a
register bit equivalent (rbe) [MQF91].
The area of a basic cell Acell, of the pre-computation and post-computation modules (Apre
and Apost) can be approximated by using a priori knowledge of the design or found by running
a single synthesis operation for r = 1 and p = 1. This is also the case for the registers internal
to a cell Scell and the registers of the pre-computation and post-computation modules (Spre and
Spost). The area of a 1-bit register (Ar,e), 2-to-1 and 3-to-1 multiplexers (Amux,2 and Amux,3)
are easily determined by running short synthesis operations.
The frequency parameters f0 and λ can be obtained by two different means. The first solu-
tion is to run some synthesis operations in order to get the values of f for a small set of chosen r
and find f0 and λ by interpolation. The second solution is to run a single synthesis operation to
find the value of f0 and compute λ directly using equation 4.12, provided that we can estimate
the delays through a pipeline block and a replicated cell. In our current implementation of the
optimisation process these parameters need to be extracted by the designer.
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Figure 4.3: Optimisation process
If the search intervals for r and p are large enough, the time taken by the extra synthesis
operations (we call them pre-synthesis operations) is negligible compared to the time it would
take to synthesize the design for every possible value of the tuple (r, p) in the search intervals.
More precisely, running 3 or 4 pre-synthesis operations for uniformly distributed values of r in
the search interval is usually enough to get a good approximation of λ by interpolation. The
pre-synthesis time needed to determine the multiplexers area is negligible. Moreover one of the
pre-synthesis operations used to determine the frequency parameters also gives us the basic cell
area Acell. Hence for r.p > 4, using our model should be faster than a complete search through
the design space. Speedup results are given in section 4.7.2.
4.6.2 Design generation and optimisation process
Given the different application-dependent parameters of the design and the number of pipeline
stages p and replications r, a script automatically generates RTL code for our general pipelined
and replicated hardware mapping as well as the corresponding control logic. This greatly sim-
plifies the work of the designer. Only the basic cell, the pre-computation and post-computation
logic are defined by the designer for each application. In the examples presented in section 4.7,
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these modules are coded in Verilog. A higher level hardware language such as Handel-C or
Xilinx HLS could be used to reduce the design time further.
The complete optimisation process of our parametric design is depicted in Fig. 4.3. The
aim of this process is to find satisfactory values for the parameters r and p, that is values that
are close to the real optima, in a short amount of time. First the different parameters of the
model are determined using the methods described in Table 4.3. Given a search interval for r
and p, respectively [rmin, rmax] and [pmin, pmax], the throughput optimisation of equation 4.22
gives us the optimal values of r and p according to the model. We call them rmodel and pmodel.
The values rmodel and pmodel are then given to the Refinement process. This optional process
performs a small number of synthesis operations around rmodel and pmodel to refine the solution
by giving the real post-synthesis values of f , Ar and Ap to the model. The refinement intervals
for r and p are respectively [rmodel−∆r, rmodel+∆r] and [pmodel−∆p, pmodel+∆p]. The outputs
of this process are rs and ps.
The Pre-synthesis, Optimisation and Refinement processes are implemented as a Python
software tool which interfaces with Xilinx synthesis tools.
4.7 Accuracy and design space exploration results
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy and the benefits of our model against a complete
search through the design space.
4.7.1 Accuracy of the model
We consider three applications presented in Table 4.2:
• 512-bit CSA-based Montgomery multiplication
• 128-bit modular exponentiation
• 512-bit integer square root
The hardware mappings of these designs are synthesized for a Xilinx Spartan 6 XC6SLX45T-
FGG484-3 with XST 13.2 optimising for area, without resource sharing and equivalent register
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removal. All the synthesis operations are run on an Intel Core i7 950 CPU @ 3.07GHz machine
with 6GB of DDR3 memory. The application-dependent parameters for these three applications
are summarized in Table 4.4.
The basic cells of the Montgomery multiplier and the integer square root modules only
consist of combinational logic (c = 1). Hence replication can be introduced. We synthesize
these two designs for all the combinations of the number of replications (r) and pipeline stages
(p) in the respective intervals [1, 16] and [1, 16]. The basic cell of the modular exponentiation
module, which is basically a modular multiplier, is synchronous (c > 1). Therefore replicating
this cell is irrelevant. We synthesize this design for r = 1 and p in [1, 32]. Table 4.5 shows
the different design parameters obtained after the pre-synthesis stage. For the multiplier and
the square root modules we determine the frequency parameters by interpolation using three
points: (p, r) = (1, 1), (p, r) = (1, 8) and (p, r) = (1, 16). The frequency of the exponentiation
module is fixed to its value for p = 1.
For our three applications Table 4.6 reports the maximum, average and standard deviation
of the relative prediction errors of our model across all the combinations of the parameters p and
r for the number of look-up tables (LUTs), the number of registers, the maximum frequency
and the throughput. The maximum errors for the number of LUTs and registers are very low
over the three applications (1.18% to 4.43%, and 0.42% to 1.24% respectively). The maximum
frequency error is more substantial for the Montgomery multiplication and the exponentiation
module. We suspect that this error is due to uncontrollable optimisations performed by the
synthesis tool on routing delays that sometimes make the frequency depend on the number
of pipeline stages p. This dependency on p does not follow a general trend and therefore
cannot be modelled effectively. For the Montgomery multiplier, this frequency error is only
localised to a few (r, p) tuples. In fact the maximum frequency error is equal to 21% but the
mean and standard variation of the frequency error are low (2-3%). This is not the case for
the exponentiation module whose average frequency error is high and close to the maximum
frequency error. In that case the reference point chosen to determine f0 ((r, p) = (1, 1)) has
a maximum frequency which is around 15% lower than for the other values of p, leading to a
constant error.
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Table 4.8: Design constraints
fmin (MHz) (Al,max, Ar,max) (LUTs,FF)
0 (6822, 13644)
25 (13644, 27288)
50 (27288, 54576)
100 (∞,∞)
The throughput error of the Montgomery multiplier is very high. Our model supposes that
the latency of the pre-computation stage is shorter than the latency of any pipeline block.
However, in this application the pre-computation stage performs a pipelined addition which
takes 8 clock cycles. For r and p such that ddn/pe /re < 8, the latencies of the pipeline blocks
are less than 8 and the throughput of the module is fixed and only determined by the latency
of the pre-computation stage. This invalidates equation 4.7. These values of r and p should be
avoided as they lead to pointless area-consuming designs. The last column of Table 4.6 shows
the corrected throughput errors, that is when not taking into account these designs. In that
case, the throughput errors are similar to the frequency errors.
4.7.2 Design space exploration
We evaluate the prediction capabilities of our model. The Spartan 6 used has 27288 LUTs and
54576 flip-flops (FFs). For each of our three applications, we use our model to find the design
with maximum throughput for all the combinations of fmin (in MHz) and (Al,max, Ar,max)
in Table 4.8. Hence for each application, we perform 16 different optimisations. Note that
setting fmin = 0 MHz corresponds to not putting any constraint on the frequency. Setting
(Al,max, Ar,max) = (∞,∞) corresponds to assuming that the FPGA has unlimited area.
Table 4.7 present our results. The design space size corresponds to the number of synthesis
operations needed for a full search through the design space without using our method. The
total synthesis time is the time taken to perform this search. The two other synthesis times
reported are the average total synthesis time over the 16 optimisations performed using our
model, respectively before and after refinement. Without refinement, our method can speed up
the design space exploration by an average of 419 times for the CSA Montgomery application
and 200 times for the integer square root. The lower average synthesis speedup of 34 times for
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the exponentiation application is directly linked to the smaller size of the design space explored.
Without refinement the optimum design is not always found by our model. For the Mont-
gomery multiplier module, our worst estimation is 2 pipeline stages and 2 replications off the
optimum design. For the exponentiation and the integer square root modules, it is only 1
pipeline stage off. This leads to a throughput error (error between the optimum throughput
and the throughput of the design given by the model) between 9% and 38%. In order to find
the optimum design, extra syntheses need to be performed. This reduces the average synthesis
speedups by a factor of 2 to 4. However, even with this speedup decrease using our method
still saves hours of synthesis time. In particular the design space exploration time for the CSA
Montgomery application is reduced from almost 2 days to only half an hour. Note that in
practice we cannot know how many extra synthesis operations are needed to find the optimum
design. Hence there is a trade-off between speed of the design space exploration and accuracy
of the result.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we generalise our work on scalable Montgomery multiplication. We describe how
we can map algorithms with the same structure as Montgomery multiplication to a parametric
hardware design using pipelining and replication. A technology-independent model of our
general design is developed. It allows rapid hardware mapping and optimisation of the algorithm
by only running a few number of pre-synthesis operations and therefore reduces time-to-market.
We present an optimisation method based on the model and we evaluate our method on three
different applications implemented on a Xilinx Spartan 6 XC6SLX45T FPGA: the Montgomery
multiplier, the modular exponentiatior and a integer square root module. Our model facilitates
design space exploration by quickly predicting the area taken by the designs with less than 5%
of error and their maximum frequencies and throughputs with less than 22% of error. As a
matter of fact, our optimisation method is up to 96 times faster than a full search through the
design space.
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Chapter 5
Novel Architectures for Probabilistic
Primality Testing
This chapters presents the first hardware architecture for the NIST approved Lucas primality
test and a novel architecture for the Miller-Rabin primality test. Our architectures are based
on the Montgomery multiplier and the Montgomery exponentiator described in chapter 3 and
generated using the tools presented in chapter 4. After introducing probabilistic primality
testing and our Miller-Rabin architecture briefly, we focus on the Lucas primality test. We
present a hardware architecture to compute the Jacobi symbol based on the binary Jacobi
algorithm. We analyse the dependencies in the Lucas sequences computation and propose a
schedule for the different operations. Finally we compare the performance of our Miller-Rabin
and Lucas architectures with an optimised software implementation in terms of speed, area and
energy efficiency. Our Lucas architectures are implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA and
synthesized for TSMC 65 nm and 45 nm ASICs.
5.1 Motivation
Many crypto-systems require the ability to test large numbers for primality. For instance,
the key generation process of the RSA algorithm presented in section 2.3.4 needs two prime
numbers of up to 1536 bits to allow secure data encryption beyond 2031 according to the RSA
Laboratory recommendations [Lab04]. Algorithm 5.1 shows a typical method for finding large
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primes. The main idea behind this algorithm is to test random numbers in the appropriate
range until a prime number is found. In the neighbourhood of u, about one in ln(u) numbers
is prime. Hence choosing a limit m = 100(blog2uc+ 1) for the number of tests ensures that we
will almost certainly find a prime [FSK10]. The isPrime() function is our main interest in this
chapter.
Algorithm 5.1: Generation of large prime numbers
Input: l lower bound of range in which prime should lie
u upper bound of range in which prime should lie
Output: p random prime in the interval {l, ..., u} or -1 if no prime found
1 m = 100(blog2uc+ 1) /* Ensures a prime is almost certainly found */
2 for i = 0 to m− 1 do
3 Choose a random integer n in {l, ..., u}
4 if isPrime(n) then
5 return n
6 end
7 return −1
In [AKS02], the problem of finding whether a number is prime has been proven to be
solvable in polynomial time using the AKS primality. This test is deterministic, meaning
that it deterministically distinguishes whether the number is prime or composite. It is also
unconditional, meaning that it does not rely on any unproven hypothesis. However, this test
is complex and impractical to implement in hardware.
Probabilistic methods determine whether or not a number is prime with a certain probability
of error. More precisely, all numbers declared composite1 by these tests are not prime whereas
a number declared prime can be composite with a small probability. By repeatedly running
the test with different parameters, we can reduce this probability. Probabilistic primality tests
are in use in most crypto-systems.
In a typical crypto-system, new keys are generated much less frequently than data are
encrypted or signed. This is particularly true for public/private key pairs. Hence accelerating
the key generation process is less important than accelerating encryption. However, the two
main probabilistic tests recommended by NIST [ITLN09], namely the Miller-Rabin and the
Lucas test, are mostly based on modular multiplication and modular exponentiation. The
1A composite number is a number that can be written as a product of more than one prime factor, that is
a non-prime number.
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Montgomery multiplication and exponentiation hardware already present for RSA encryption
can therefore be reused.
5.2 Probabilistic primality testing
This section presents additional background on probabilistic primality testing, which is useful
to understand the chapter.
5.2.1 Fermat primality test
The simplest probabilistic test is based on Fermat’s little theorem which states that for a prime
p and a positive integer a such that gcd(p, a) = 1:
ap−1 = 1 mod p (5.1)
Using the contrapositive of this theorem, we can design a pseudo-primality test as shown in
Algorithm 5.2.
Algorithm 5.2: Fermat primality test
Input: n odd integer, k parameter determining the accuracy of the test
Output: composite if n is composite, prime if n is probably prime
1 for i = 0 to k − 1 do
2 Choose a random integer a with 1 ≤ a ≤ n− 1
3 if an−1 = 1 mod n then
4 continue
5 else
6 return composite
7 end
8 return prime
For a given a, a composite number n such that gcd(n, a) = 1 and an−1 = 1 mod n is called
a base-a pseudoprime. By performing many tests with different random a we decrease the
probability to declare a composite number prime. However, some numbers are pseudoprime to
all bases [MD00]. Such numbers are called Carmichael numbers.
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5.2.2 Miller-Rabin primality test
The Miller-Rabin strong pseudoprime test [Rab80] is an improvement over the Fermat test.
This test is given in Algorithm 5.3. It relies on the fact that if we can find an integer a such
that:
ad 6= 1 mod n
and
a2
jd 6= −1 mod n for all 0 ≤ j ≤ l − 1
then an odd integer n, written as n = 2ld+ 1, is composite.
Miller and Rabin have shown that if k tests are performed on an odd composite number, then
the probability that this number passes each test is less or equal to 1/4k. When the strategy
for finding primes presented in Algorithm 5.1 is used in conjunction with the Miller-Rabin test,
bounds on the probability of returning a composite number are given in [DLP93, ITLN09].
Algorithm 5.3: Miller-Rabin strong pseudoprime test (from [Rab80])
Input: n = 2ld+ 1 odd integer, k parameter determining the accuracy of the test
Output: composite if n is composite, prime if n is probably prime
1 for i = 0 to k − 1 do
2 Choose a random integer a with 1 ≤ a ≤ n− 1
3 if ad = 1 mod n or a2
jd = −1 mod n for some 0 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 then
4 continue
5 else
6 return composite
7 end
8 return prime
Instead of using random numbers, the first k prime numbers can be used. This is shown in
Algorithm 5.4. A scalable hardware implementation of this test is given in [CBLC04].
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Algorithm 5.4: Miller-Rabin strong pseudoprime test deterministic variant
Input: n = 2ld+ 1 odd integer, set P of |P | first primes
Output: composite if n is composite, prime if n is probably prime
1 for i = 0 to |P | − 1 do
2 a = P [i] /* Choose (i+1)th prime as the witness */
3 if ad = 1 mod n or a2
jd = −1 mod n for some 0 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 then
4 continue
5 else
6 return composite
7 end
8 return prime
5.2.3 Lucas primality test
Principle
The Lucas sequences U(a, b) and V (a, b) of the pair (a, b) are the sequences:
U(a, b) = (U0(a, b), U1(a, b), U2(a, b), ...) and
V (a, b) = (V0(a, b), V1(a, b), V2(a, b), ...)
such that for each k ≥ 0:
Uk(a, b) =
αk − βk
α− β (5.2)
Vk(a, b) = α
k + βk (5.3)
where α and β are the two roots of the quadratic equation x2 − ax + b = 0, with a, b chosen
such that a, b 6= 0 and the discriminant D = a2 − 4b 6= 0 [MD00].
For a integer and p prime, the Legendre symbol is defined as:
(
a
p
)
=

0 if a = 0 mod p
1 if a 6= 0 mod p and x2 = a mod p is soluble for some integer x
−1 if a 6= 0 mod p and x2 = a mod p is not soluble
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For any integer a and any positive odd integer n with prime decomposition n = pγ11 p
γ2
2 ...p
γk
k , the
Jacobi symbol is defined as the product of the Legendre symbols corresponding to the prime
factors of n:
(a
n
)
=
(
a
p1
)γ1 ( a
p2
)γ2
...
(
a
pk
)γk
The Lucas theorem is defined as follows [MD00].
Lucas Theorem. Let a, b, D, and Uk be as above. If p is prime, gcd(b, p) = 1 and(
D
p
)
= −1, then p divides Up+1.
The Lucas test is based on the contrapositive of the Lucas Theorem stating that if, under
the previous assumptions, an odd positive integer n does not divide Un+1, then n is composite.
Lucas Test algorithms
A simple algorithm performing a Lucas Test is given in Algorithm 5.5.
Algorithm 5.5: Simple Lucas test algorithm
Input: n odd integer
Output: composite if n is composite, probably prime if n is probably prime
1 Choose a, b 6= 0 such that D = a2 − 4b 6= 0, gcd(b, n) = 1 and (D
n
)
= −1
2 Compute Un+1(a, b) /* Directly or recursively */
3 if Un+1(a, b) mod n = 0 then
4 return probably prime
5 else
6 return composite
Consider line 1 of Algorithm 5.5. Some methods to choose a, b and D are given in [BW80,
PSJ80]. A method proposed by Selfridge [PSJ80] consists of choosing D as the first element in
the sequence {5,−7, 9,−11, 13, ...} such that (D
n
)
= −1, a = 1 and b = 1−D
4
. If n is square,
it can be shown that
(
D
n
)
> −1 for any D. Hence, so that the algorithm terminates, we have to
check whether n is a perfect square2 either before looking for a correct D or after a few trials
2A number n is a perfect if there exists a positive integer a such that n = a2.
118
for D.
Consider line 2. Several methods can be used to compute Un+1. A simple method is to use
equation 5.2 directly. However, this method is not efficient for hardware implementation as it
requires solving a quadratic equation and performing a big integer division. It is better to use
a recurrence relation. For example, we can easily show that for k > 1:
Uk(a, b) = aUk−1 − bUk−2 (5.4)
Vk(a, b) = aVk−1 − bVk−2 (5.5)
We can also show that for k > 0:
Uk(a, b) =
aUk−1 + Vk−1
2
(5.6)
Vk(a, b) =
aVk−1 +DUk−1
2
(5.7)
In [JQ96], a more complex recurrence relation is used to come up with an efficient method to
compute the Lucas sequences:
Ui+j(a, b) = UiVj − bjUi−j (5.8)
Vi+j(a, b) = ViVj − bjVi−j (5.9)
A particular case of this recurrence relation useful for calculating Uk and Vk by processing k
bit by bit is:
U2k(a, b) = UkVk (5.10)
V2k(a, b) = V
2
k − 2bk =
V 2k +DU
2
k
2
(5.11)
as:
bk = αkβk
Vk + Uk
√
D
2
Vk − Uk
√
D
2
=
V 2k −DU2k
4
(5.12)
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This recurrence relation is used in the American National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) approved Lucas probabilistic primality test given in Algorithm 5.6.
Algorithm 5.6: Lucas probabilistic primality test (from [ITLN09])
Input: n odd integer
Output: composite if n is composite, probably prime if n is probably prime
1 if n is a perfect square then
2 return composite
3 Find the first D in the sequence {5,−7, 9,−11, 13,−15, 17, ...} for which the Jacobi
symbol
(
D
n
)
= −1.
4 if
(
D
n
)
= 0 for any D in this sequence then
5 return composite
6 k = n+ 1
7 Let klkl−1...k0 be the binary expansion of k, with kl = 1
8 U = 1, V = 1 /* Initialisation */
9 for i = l − 1 to 0 do
10 Utemp = UV mod n /* Equation 5.10 */
11 Vtemp = (V
2 +DU2)/2 mod n /* Equation 5.11 */
12 if ki = 1 then
13 U = (Utemp + Vtemp)/2 mod n /* Equation 5.6 */
14 V = (Vtemp +DUtemp)/2 mod n /* Equation 5.7 */
15 else
16 U = Utemp
17 V = Vtemp
18 end
19 if U = 0 then
20 return probably prime
21 else
22 return composite
The NIST algorithm first checks if n is a perfect square. If not, it uses the method described
by Selfridge to find a correct value for D. This test is sometimes called the Lucas-Selfridge
probabilistic primality test. Lines 4-5 rely on the fact that if
(
D
n
)
= 0, a factor of n exists [BW80]
and we can therefore stop the test. Lines 6 to 18 computes Un+1(a, b) using an algorithm similar
to left-to-right binary exponentiation. It starts with U = U1(a, b) = 1 and V = V1(a, b) = 1.
Let us call UKi and VKi the terms of the Lucas sequences held respectively in U and V at the
beginning of iteration i. At iteration i, if bit ki = 0, the current values of U and V are updated
through equations 5.10 and 5.11. Hence at the end of iteration i, we have U = UKi−1 = U2Ki
and V = VKi−1 = V2Ki This is similar to the squaring operation in binary exponentiation. If bit
ki = 1, U and V are first updated through equations 5.10 and 5.11 and then through equations
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5.6 and 5.7. Hence at the end of iteration i, we have U = UKi−1 = U2Ki+1 and V = VKi−1 =
V2Ki+1. This is similar to the square-and-multiply operation in binary exponentiation. We
deduce the following recurrence relation:
Kl = kl = 1 (5.13)
Ki = 2Ki+1 + ki+1 ∀i < l (5.14)
from which we obtain:
K0 = 2(2...(2kl + kl−1) + kl−2...) + k0 (5.15)
= 2lkl + 2
l−1kl−1 + 2l−2kl−2 + ...+ k0 = k (5.16)
In [ITLN09], the NIST gives an algorithm to determine if a number is a perfect square.
This algorithm is complex for hardware implementation as it requires divisions and squaring.
A much simpler binary algorithm is presented in [Cre]. We give the binary integer square root
algorithm in Algorithm 5.7. This algorithm returns the integer square root of an n-bit number
together with the remainder using only shifts, additions and subtractions. At each iteration, a
digit of the root is determined using two consecutive digits of the input a (from the MSB to
the LSB) and the remainder is updated accordingly. The number tested is a perfect square if
the remainder is equal to zero after n/2 iterations.
Line 3 of Algorithm 5.6 requires the ability to compute the Jacobi symbol
(
D
n
)
. As before,
the algorithm given by the NIST in [ITLN09] is not fit for fast hardware implementation as it
requires several modular reductions. Some more relevant binary Jacobi algorithms using only
shifts, additions/subtractions and comparisons are presented in [SS93,PPV06,ES98,Ved06].
No FPGA implementation of the Lucas primality test has been reported in the literature
so far.
5.2.4 Combining tests
A primality test can be made stronger by combining two or more probabilistic methods. The
Baillie-PSW Primality Test consists of a single Miller-Rabin test with base 2 followed by a
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Algorithm 5.7: Binary integer square root algorithm (from [Cre])
Input: a =
∑n−1
i=0 ai2
i, ai ∈ {0, 1}
Output: rem (remainder), root (square root)
1 rem = 0
2 root = 0
3 divisor = 0
4 for i = 0 to n/2− 1 do
5 root = (root << 1)
6 rem = (rem << 2) + (a >> (n− 2))
7 a = (a << 2)
8 divisor = (root << 1) + 1
9 if divisor ≤ rem then
10 rem = rem− divisor
11 root = root+ 1
12 end
Lucas test [PSJ80]. We could not find any mention of a composite number passing this test
in the literature. Moreover in [ITLN09], the authors claim that there is no known composite
number passing the number of Miller-Rabin tests with random bases prescribed by the NIST3
followed by a single Lucas test.
5.3 Miller-Rabin primality test architecture
Our parametric Miller-Rabin prime tester is based on both our multiplier and our exponentiator.
The challenge is to use the multiplier and the exponentiator optimally, keeping the design
relatively simple. Our hardware design is based on Algorithm 5.4 but could easily be adapted
to Algorithm 5.3.
To save area, one single multiplier is shared by the exponentiator (to perform the multipli-
cations needed to compute ad mod n) and the prime tester (to perform the consecutive modular
multiplications needed to compute the a2
jd mod n). In a scenario where random numbers are
given to the module to be tested for primality, on average the time to compute ad mod n
largely dominates the calculation of the a2
jd mod n. To demonstrate this property, let Y be
the random variable representing the number of trailing 0 in a uniformly distributed random
3This number depends on the bitwidth of the key to generate.
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even variable X of size k. Let X[i] represent the ith bit of X. We have:
p(Y = 0) = 0 (5.17)
p(Y = 1) = p(Y ≥ 1) ∩ p(X[1] = 1) = 1.1
2
=
1
2
(5.18)
p(Y = i) = p(Y ≥ i) ∩ p(X[i+ 1] = 1) =
(
1
2
)i−1
.
1
2
=
(
1
2
)i
∀i ≥ 2 (5.19)
Hence the expected value of Y is:
E(Y ) =
k−1∑
i=0
i.p(Y = i) =
k−1∑
i=0
i.
(
1
2
)i
=
1
2
k−1∑
i=1
i.
(
1
2
)i−1
(5.20)
This series is strictly monotonically increasing and converges towards 2. Hence the value of l
in Algorithm 5.4 is less than 2 on average. This shows that on average the multiplier is used
less than once directly by the prime tester at each iteration.
A diagram containing the important blocks, signals and connections of our prime tester is
presented in Fig. 5.1. The values of the first prime numbers are stored in a ROM. At each
iteration, the control logic selects the prime to use as a witness for the test and the inputs
to give to the multiplier, to the comparator and to other intermediate registers. The control
logic contains the state machine of the prime tester which controls the multiplier and the
exponentiator.
5.4 Lucas primality test
Our Lucas Primality tester is based on Algorithm 5.6 recommended by the NIST. We divide
our Lucas hardware into three sub-modules:
1. Perfect square test module (lines 1-2)
2. Jacobi symbol calculator module (lines 3-5)
3. Lucas sequence (or Un+1(a, b)) calculator module (lines 6-22)
Module 1 is an implementation of Algorithm 5.7. In our implementation, the iterations of
the loop are performed by the square root cell. The architecture of the square root cell is given
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n n-1
Figure 5.1: Miller-Rabin prime tester
Figure 5.2: Square root cell
in Fig. 5.2. The values of rem and root are stored in registers. a is stored in a shift register
and shifted by 2 at each iteration. The diagram of the square root cell is given in Fig. 5.2.
In the following, we focus on module 2 and 3 which are the most interesting ones. Three
main challenges have to be addressed when designing these modules:
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Challenge 1. The Jacobi symbol calculator module has to work with negative integers and must
not contain any complex modular reduction that would greatly increase the area taken
by the design.
Challenge 2. We need to design parametric and efficient modules for the two main operations
of the Lucas calculator: (2.a) modular multiplication and (2.b) modular add-shift.
Challenge 3. These two operations have to be rescheduled to optimise the speed of the design,
making the most of the pipeline capabilities of the modules.
5.4.1 Challenge 1: Jacobi symbol calculator
Classical Jacobi algorithms require a full modular reduction at each iteration. This operation
can only be implemented with a divider which is area consuming. This is not the case for the
binary Jacobi algorithm presented in [SS93]. We modify this algorithm to compute
(a
b
)
for
negative a by using the following property of the Jacobi symbol:
(−a
b
)
=

(a
b
)
if b mod 4 = 1
−
(a
b
)
if b mod 4 = 3
(5.21)
Our modified binary Jacobi algorithm is presented in Algorithm 5.8.
All the modular reductions use a fixed modulo which is a power of two. In that case,
x mod y = (x & (y − 1)). These operations are therefore very simple to implement in hard-
ware. To reduce the critical path and therefore increase the maximum clock frequency, the
comparators and the subtractors are pipelined.
5.4.2 Challenge 2: Lucas sequence calculator
Our Lucas sequence calculator performs the operations of lines 6 to 22 of Algorithm 5.6. This
part of the algorithm consists of several modular multiplications and modular add-shift opera-
tions. The operations performed in the for loop can be decomposed as shown in Algorithm 5.9.
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Algorithm 5.8: Binary Jacobi algorithm
Input: a integer, b odd positive integer
Output:
(a
b
)
1 t = 1
// Support for negative a
2 if a < 0 then
3 a = −a
4 if b mod 4 = 3 then t = −t
5 end
// Original algorithm from [SS93]
6 while a 6= 0 do
7 while a mod 2 = 0 do
8 a = a/2
9 if (b mod 8 = 3) or (b mod 8 = 5) then t = −t
10 end
11 if a < b then
12 interchange(a, b)
13 if (a mod 4 = 3) and (b mod 4 = 3) then t = −t
14 end
15 a = (a− b)/2
16 if (b mod 8 = 3) or (b mod 8 = 5) then t = −t
17 end
18 if b = 1 then
19 return t
20 else
21 return 0
Algorithm 5.9: Decomposition of the operations performed in the for loop of the Lucas
primality test algorithm
1 Utemp = U.V mod n
2 Vtemp = V
2 mod n
3 temp1 = U2 mod n
4 temp1 = D.temp1 mod n
5 Vtemp = (Vtemp + temp1)/2 mod n
6 if ki = 1 then
7 U = (Utemp + Vtemp)/2 mod n
8 temp2 = D.Utemp mod n
9 V = (Vtemp + temp2)/2 mod n
10 else
11 U = Utemp
12 V = Vtemp
If k is an (l+1)-bit number with kl = 1, the algorithm performs between 4l and 5l modular
multiplications. We reuse our parametric Montgomery multiplier to perform these modular
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multiplications and solve challenge 2.a. All the operations are performed in n-residue represen-
tation, with n the number under test.
Algorithm 5.10: Modular addition with right shift
Input: N odd integer, A < N and B < N positive integers
Output: S = (A+B)/2 mod N
1 if (A+B) mod 2 = 1 then
2 S = (A+B +N)/2 /* N added to make sum even */
3 if S ≥ N then S = S −N /* The sum can now be greater than N */
4 else
5 S = (A+B)/2
Figure 5.3: Hardware design for modular add-shift
Similarly, the algorithm performs between l and 3l modular add-shift operations. Algo-
rithm 5.10 shows how the modular addition with right shift is implemented. Note that the
values of the two operands A and B of this addition are always less than the modulo. Hence
the modular reduction can be performed by a simple subtraction.
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We develop a pipelined hardware design for the modular add-shift module. All the oper-
ations are computed by homogeneous blocks, the number of blocks being a parameter of the
design. Our architecture is shown in Fig. 5.3. Short horizontal and vertical lines represent
registers. The first row of adders computes A + B. Its output is given to the second row of
adders which computes A+B +N and to a shifter which computes (A+B)/2. The output of
the second row of adders is shifted right and given to a row of subtractors. These subtractors
compute (A+B+N)/2−N . They are also used to determine if (A+B+N)/2 ≥ N . The MUX
Select generates the select signal of the multiplexer according to the borrow out of the row
of subtractors and the value of the LSB of A + B. If m is the number of adders/subtractors
in each row, after m + 2 cycles of latency our module can generate one result per clock cycle.
This solves challenge 2.b.
Our Lucas calculator has four main parameters: the bit-width of the number under test,
the number of pipeline stages of the Montgomery multiplier, the number of replicated carry-
save adders in each multiplier’s pipeline block and the pipeline depth of the modular add-
shift module. By combining Montgomery multiplication and our pipelined modular add-shift
architecture, we get rid of the need for direct modular reduction. A proper scheduler needs to
be designed to make the most of our parametric modules.
5.4.3 Challenge 3: scheduling
To increase the speed of Algorithm 5.9 we reschedule the modular multiplications and the
modular additions. In particular we want to minimise stalls in the Montgomery multiplier’s
pipeline. To keep the design simple and reduce its vulnerability to side-channel attacks we
decide to execute the calculations of (Utemp + Vtemp)/2 mod n and (Vtemp + temp2)/2 mod n
even if ki = 0. In that case, the result is disregarded. Hence temp2 always needs to be calculated
and we always perform 5 Montgomery multiplications and 3 modular additions at each iteration.
The true dependencies between the different operations are shown in the dependency graph of
Fig. 5.4. Output and anti-dependencies have already been removed by register renaming.
The latency and the throughput of the Montgomery multiplier depend on the bit-width of
the inputs, the number of pipeline stages and the number of replications. Using a pipeline
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Instructions
1. Utemp = U.V mod n
2. Vtemp = V
2 mod n
3. temp1 = U2 mod n
4. temp1 = D.temp1 mod n
5. Vtemp = (Vtemp + temp1)/2 mod n
6. temp2 = D.Utemp mod n
7. U =
{
Utemp if ki = 0
(Utemp + Vtemp)/2 mod n if ki = 1
8. V =
{
Vtemp if ki = 0
(Vtemp + temp2)/2 mod n if ki = 1
7 8
3 21
4
5 6
7 8
Iteration i-1
Iteration i+1
Iteration i
1
Modular
multiplication
5
Modular
addition
Figure 5.4: Analysis of the true dependencies in the Lucas sequence calculation algorithm
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M2
M3
A1
A2
Inst. 1
Inst. 2
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Inst. 8
NOP
Bubble
Clock Cycle
M1, M2, M3: Multiplier’s pipeline stages
A1, A2: Modular adder’s pipeline stages
Figure 5.5: Lucas sequence calculator schedule for a 3-stage multiplier’s pipeline
depth of more than 3 for the multiplier does not improve the speed of the Lucas sequence
calculation given the dependencies shown in the dependency graph of Fig. 5.4. The latency
of the modular add-shift module depends on the number of adders/subtractors blocks used in
each row. Sticking to the instruction numbering introduced in the table of Fig. 5.4, we use the
following schedule: Inst.3, Inst.1, Inst.2, Inst.4, Inst.6, Inst.5, Inst.7, Inst.8. Fig. 5.5 shows this
schedule for a multiplier pipeline depth p = 3. To keep the example simple, we assume that
each multiplier’s pipeline stage takes 4 clock cycles to complete its operations. We also assume
that the latency of the modular adder is 2 clock cycles. A1 and A2 represent the 2 pipeline
stages of our modular adder. M1 to M3 represent the 3 pipeline stages of the multiplier. In
the actual implementations, the latency of a multiplier’s pipeline stage is much higher than the
latency of the modular adder (42 and 10 respectively for our fastest implementation presented
in section 5.5) and the number of pipeline stages of the module adder is chosen to maximise
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the clock frequency of the implementation. However, this simplification does not change the
interpretation of the system behaviour. From clock cycle 1 to clock cycle 20, the multiplier
performs 5 multiplications without stalling. At clock cycle 21, no more multiplication can be
given to the multiplier until Inst.7 terminates. Hence the multiplier stalls for 8 clock cycles.
Once Inst.7 terminates the multiplier’s pipeline can be filled again. This situation shows that
the multiplier’s pipeline cannot be run full all the time, which leads to some unavoidable
performance loss.
Our particular schedule may not be optimal for all the values of the parameters but this
schedule is a relevant compromise under the assumption that the addition time is shorter than
the multiplication time.
The main components of our Lucas calculator module are the Montgomery multiplier, the
modular add-shift module and several registers to store the values of Utemp, Vtemp, temp1,
temp2, D, U , V and k. We also need an adder to compute k = n+ 1. A leading zeros detector
is used to identify the most significant bit in the binary representation of k. Multiplexers
select the inputs to the Montgomery multiplier and the modular add-shift module. FIFOs and
dependency tables record the state of the Montgomery multiplier’s pipeline and of the modular
add-shift module. This enables the scheduler to prevent read-after-write dependencies and to
feed the Montgomery multiplier and the modular add-shift pipelines correctly.
5.4.4 Lucas prime tester
The square test module, the Jacobi symbol calculator module and the Lucas calculator are
integrated into our Lucas prime tester. The square test and the search for the value of D are
performed in parallel. If the number tested is a perfect square or if a D such that
(
D
n
)
= 0 is
found, the test finishes and returns 0 (the number is declared composite). Otherwise, the Lucas
sequence calculator is started as soon as a correct value for D is found. Then a comparator
tests if Un+1(a, b) = 0. The test finishes and returns 1 if Un+1(a, b) = 0 (the number is declared
probably prime) or 0 if Un+1(a, b) 6= 0 (the number is declared composite).
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5.5 Speed/Area/Power trade-off of FPGA and ASIC im-
plementations
5.5.1 FPGA implementation of our Miller-Rabin architecture
We place and route our designs with Xilinx ISE 14.1 for Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs in performance
evaluation mode. The implementation parameters are given in appendix D.1.1. Table 5.1
compares the execution time of our Miller-Rabin prime tester with other implementations for
n = 1024 bits. The pipeline depth of all ripple-carry adders and all subtractors is set to 8. The
execution time of the prime tester depends on the number under test. Hence we choose a test
set of 10 000 random numbers and use them for all our experiments. We report the mean and
the standard deviation of the execution time. For p = 1 and r = 1, our prime tester is 7 times
faster than Cheung’s non scalable design and takes 1.8 times less area. It is 100 times faster
than the fastest scalable design from [CBLC04] with only 20% area overhead. For p = 2 and
r = 8, our design running at 73.7 MHz is 1.6 times faster than the GMP implementation on
one core of an Intel Core 2 Duo running at 2.8 GHz. It is 49 times faster than Cheung’s non
scalable design and only takes 2 times more area. However, one should take into account that
the Virtex-II FPGA used in Cheung’s work is several generations behind our high-end Virtex-5
FPGA. In order to make the results independent of the speed of the devices, Table 5.2 compares
the designs in terms of Time × Area product. These results show that our architecture is up
to 2.9 times more efficient than Cheung’s best design.
Our prime tester implementation is limited by data dependencies and cannot explore the
full design space provided by the multiplier and the exponentiator presented in chapter 3. In
fact, only one exponentiation is performed at a time. Unless we run several iterations of the
tests speculatively4, we cannot interleave exponentiations in the multiplier’s pipeline. Hence
using more than 2 pipeline stages for the multiplier does not improve the exponentiation speed.
We can always increase the speed of the prime tester by increasing the number of replications r
4Even if interleaved exponentiation is supported by our exponentiator, this would require extra control and
arbitration logic. As a matter of fact, each Miller-Rabin test does not only perform one exponentiation but
also a number of multiplications depending on the number under test. Such a feature could be implemented as
future work.
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Table 5.1: Performance comparison of 1024 bit Miller-Rabin
Design Device
Clock Area Ex. Time
(MHz) (LUTs) mean/σ (ms)
Ours (p = 2, r = 8) XC5VLX330T-2 73.7 74 779 2.64/0.97
Ours (p = 2, r = 4) XC5VLX110T-3 93.4 46 071 3.51/1.30
GMP 4.2.4 [gmp] Intel Core 2 Duo
2800 N/A 4.33/1.82
mpz millerrabin E7400
Ours (p = 2, r = 2) XC5VLX110T-3 123.1 34 199 4.85/1.79
Ours (p = 1, r = 4) XC5VLX110T-3 87.4 32 593 6.21/2.29
Ours (p = 1, r = 1) XC5VLX110T-3 123.6 22 169 17.4/6.42
Cheung [CBLC04] (non-scalable) XC2V6000 8.2 40 262 129.28/
Cheung [CBLC04] (scalable 32 PE) XC2V6000 32.2 18 666 1776.80/
Cheung [CBLC04] (scalable 8 PE) XC2V6000 30.7 5 744 5478.14/
Table 5.2: Time × Area product normalised to our best design for 1024 bit Miller-Rabin test
Design
Area Latency
Time × Area
(LUTs) (clock cycles)
Ours (p = 2, r = 8) 74 779 194207 1
Ours (p = 2, r = 4) 46 071 328590 1.04
Ours (p = 1, r = 4) 32 593 542894 1.22
Ours (p = 2, r = 2) 34 199 597358 1.41
Cheung [CBLC04] (non-scalable) 40 262 1056727 2.93
Ours (p = 1, r = 1) 22 169 2151984 3.29
Cheung [CBLC04] (scalable 8 PE) 5 744 167938074 66.42
Cheung [CBLC04] (scalable 32 PE) 18 666 57260715 73.60
up to the point where the path through the carry-save adders becomes the critical path of the
design. Moreover, as will be shown for the Lucas in the next section, a hardware implementation
of the test is likely to be more energy efficient than its software counterpart.
5.5.2 FPGA and ASIC implementations of our Lucas architecture
FPGA results
We place and route our designs with Xilinx ISE 14.1 on a Virtex-5 XC5VLX330T-2 FPGA in
performance evaluation mode. Our hardware designs are compared with an optimised software
implementation of Algorithm 5.6 using dedicated functions of the GMP library 5.0.1 for all
the operations and compiled with the Intel Compiler 12.0. The targeted architecture for our
software implementation is an Intel Xeon W3505 @ 2.53 GHz with 3 GB of main memory.
Only one core of the Xeon processor is used. We report the average execution time, the
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dynamic power consumption and the average energy for both the hardware and the software
implementations. For the average execution time, a random set of 10 000 1024-bit values is used
as input. For the maximum execution time, we choose an input in our random set that goes
through all the steps of Algorithm 5.6, requiring a full calculation of the Lucas sequence5. The
input value is given in appendix D.3. The dynamic power and energy consumption are reported
for this input. For the software version, the dynamic power is measured with a watt-metre at
the output of the system. The dynamic power of the FPGA is estimated using XPower Analyzer
14.1. The toggle rates of the different nets are obtained by post place-and-route simulation.
The results are reported in Table 5.3. The parameters p and r represent respectively the
number of pipeline stages of our Montgomery multiplier and the number of replicated carry-save
adders in each pipeline block.
Table 5.3: FPGA implementation results of 1024 bit Lucas primality testers
Type
Area Clock
Average Max. Dynamic
Energy
Ex. Time Ex. Time Power
(LUTs) (MHz) (ms) (ms) (mW) (mJ/op)
Hardware
34 598 72.7 48.66 72.42 446.56 32.34
(p = 1, r = 1)
Hardware
37 676 79.1 22.59 33.47 587.45 19.66
(p = 1, r = 2)
Hardware
38 720 74.4 26.55 39.46 560.46 22.12
(p = 2, r = 1)
Hardware
44 869 75.5 14.56 21.54 840.16 18.10
(p = 2, r = 2)
Hardware
43 188 76.6 23.13 34.11 681.11 23.23
(p = 3, r = 1)
Hardware
54 458 85.0 12.18 18.44 1191.61 21.97
(p = 3, r = 2)
Hardware
75 455 92.8 7.65 11.17 1807.33 20.19
(p = 3, r = 4)
Hardware
107 348 71.6 7.46 10.80 2357.36 25.46
(p = 3, r = 8)
Software N/A 2530 2.40 3.30 28 000 92.40
As expected, the execution time decreases with the number of pipeline stages p and the
5Note that this input gives a number of clock cycles very close to the worst-case behaviour for the hardware
implementations, for which the number of clock cycles to compute the Lucas sequence is fixed. The only variation
is in the search for a correct value for D. This is negligible compared to the Lucas sequence calculation. However
this might not be the worst-case input for the software version as the execution time of the Lucas sequence
calculation in software depends on the numbers of ones in the binary representation of n+ 1.
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number of replications r while the dynamic power consumption increases with r and p as the
area and switching activity increase. The area scaling is much better than linear with r and
p as the area contribution of other fixed size modules such as the Jacobi symbol calculator or
the modular add-shift modules cannot be neglected. For the same reason the achievable clock
frequency is not directly linked to the number of replications r as the critical path is not always
in the Montgomery multiplier. It is interesting to note that bigger designs sometimes achieve
better clock frequencies than smaller ones. This behaviour is linked to the fact that we run
the place-and-route tool in performance evaluation mode. Hence we might not reach the best
possible timing closure for all the implementations.
Our fastest design is 3 times slower but 3 times more energy efficient than the software
version. This design takes around 50% total area available in the Virtex-5 LX330T. Our most
energy-efficient design is 5 times more energy-efficient than the software version. Most of the
time is spent in Montgomery multiplications. Two main factors can explain the excellent speed
of the software. First, unlike the hardware implementation, the software implementation does
not always execute lines 13 and 14 of Algorithm 5.6. For random 1024-bit inputs, this saves
512 Montgomery multiplications and 1024 modular additions on average in the Lucas sequence
calculation. Second, the particular structure of our Montgomery multiplier makes it much faster
than a software implementation if inputs can be provided at a high throughput without stalling
the pipeline. In this application, the data dependencies in the algorithm limit the maximum
value for the number of pipeline stages p and therefore the achievable speed of our multiplier.
Like the Miller-Rabin test, the results could be improved further by increasing the number of
replications r if a bigger FPGA is available. Upcoming FPGAs such as Virtex 7 will be several
times bigger than this Virtex-5 allowing much better performance while still having unused
area. We also expect the energy efficiency of our FPGA designs will improve with advances
in FPGA technology. It should be noted that the Virtex-5 FPGA (65 nm) is one generation
behind the Xeon W3505 CPU (45 nm).
Server applications would benefit from augmenting the CPU with one of more FPGAs
configured with this design. In these applications, power consumption can turn out to be as
important as performance. As a matter of fact, improving the energy efficiency of the system
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can lead to huge savings in fixed costs (cooling equipment) and variable costs (energy bill).
ASIC results
We synthesize our design for the TSMC 65 nm tcbn65gplustc library using Synopsys Design
Compiler version G-2012.06-SP2. Our two fastest designs in 65 nm are also synthesized for
the TSMC 45 nm tcbn45gsbwptc library to allow a fair comparison with the Xeon W3505 CPU
which also adopts 45 nm technology. We suppose that all the inputs of our Lucas module are
driven by a D flip-flop. We also assume that all the outputs of our module have the capacitive
load of the same D flip-flop. We estimate the power of each synthesized architecture using
Synopsys PrimeTime-PX. For our estimation, the same input as in the previous section is
considered. The toggle rates of the different nets are obtained by post-synthesis simulation. In
order to obtain a more accurate estimation of the power consumption, a virtual clock network
is created for each architecture. We do not use any advanced power optimisation technique
such as clock gating and dynamic voltage scaling. The constraints used for synthesis and power
estimation as well as example scripts are given in appendix D.2. Our results are reported
in Table 5.4. The area is given in 2-input NAND gates. One NAND gate corresponds to 4
transistors.
We see that for our 65 nm architectures running at 1 GHz, the variation of the execution
time with r and p follows the expected trend. Namely the execution time decreases almost
linearly with r whereas it is less impacted by an increase in p. This is due to the fact that the
pipeline of the multiplier is not always full. However, for r greater than 4, the replicated carry-
save adders of our Montgomery multiplier are on the critical path of the Lucas module. Hence
the Lucas prime tester’s maximum frequency decreases, which results in some performance lose.
Our fastest 65 nm ASIC implementation is 8 times faster than the FPGA implementation
while only consuming 369 mW. It is at least 39 times more energy efficient. Our fastest 45 nm
ASIC implementation is 4 times faster and 420 times more energy efficient than the software
implementation. The cell count and the power consumption of our implementations make them
suitable for integration as a co-processor into a general purpose CPU or an embedded system,
different speed/area/energy trade-offs being available through parametrization.
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Table 5.4: ASIC implementation results of 1024 bit Lucas primality testers
Type
Area Freq.
Max Dynamic
Energy
Exec. Time Power
(kGates) (GHz) (ms) (mW) (mJ/op)
65 nm ASIC
426 1.00 5.26 325.1 1.73
(p = 1, r = 1)
65 nm ASIC
441 1.00 2.65 338.5 0.91
(p = 1, r = 2)
65 nm ASIC
485 1.00 2.94 394.1 1.17
(p = 2, r = 1)
65 nm ASIC
516 1.00 1.63 412.9 0.68
(p = 2, r = 2)
65 nm ASIC
546 1.00 2.61 453.4 1.20
(p = 3, r = 1)
65 nm ASIC
595 1.00 1.57 472.9 0.75
(p = 3, r = 2)
65 nm ASIC
658 0.75 1.38 368.9 0.52
(p = 3, r = 4)
65 nm ASIC
623 0.50 1.68 238.9 0.41
(p = 3, r = 8)
45 nm ASIC
644 1.66 0.94 334.3 0.32
(p = 3, r = 2)
45 nm ASIC
714 1.25 0.83 264.8 0.22
(p = 3, r = 4)
Software N/A 2.53 3.30 28 000 92.40
5.6 Summary
This chapter presents our parametric hardware architecture of the NIST approved Lucas prob-
abilistic primality test and a novel architecture for the Miller-Rabin primality test. Primality
testing is needed by the key generation process of many public-key crypto-systems. Our archi-
tectures reuse the scalable Montgomery multiplication and exponentiation designs presented in
chapter 3.
The Miller-Rabin test is the most common primality test for cryptographic systems. Our
implementations are up to 49 times faster than other hardware implementations while only twice
as large. They are up to 2.9 times more efficient in terms of Time × Area product. Moreover
our best implementation is 1.6 times faster than an optimised software implementation on an
Intel Core 2 Duo running at 2.8 GHz.
The use of a Lucas test as the last step of a probabilistic prime tester can greatly reduce
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the probability of error of the overall test. To our knowledge, our work is the first hardware
implementation of the Lucas test in the literature. Our architecture implemented on a Virtex-5
FPGA is 3 times slower but is up to 5 times more energy efficient than the software version
running on a Intel Xeon W3505. A 65 nm ASIC implementation is more than 8 times faster and
39 times more energy efficient than the FPGA implementation. A 45 nm ASIC implementation
is 4 times faster and 420 times more energy efficient than the optimised software implementation
in comparable technology. Our design is scalable and the performance scaling of our architecture
is much better than linear in area. The cell count and the power consumption of our ASIC
implementations make them suitable for integration into a general purpose CPU or an embedded
system whereas our FPGA implementation would more likely benefit server application.
Our prime tester implementations are limited by data dependencies and cannot explore
the full design space provided by the multiplier and the exponentiator presented in chapter
3. Therefore they do not perform very well compared to software. However, our hardware
implementation are significantly more energy efficient than software on FPGAs and on ASICs
and mostly use hardware that is already present for encryption. Moreover, if we suppose that
an attacker can obtain physical access to the crypto-system, implementing such cryptographic
modules purely in hardware greatly reduces the vulnerability of the system when compared
to a software implementation, which is usually run in a multi-tasking operating system. But
without proper protections our cryptographic modules are still vulnerable to side-channel at-
tacks. New countermeasures against power attacks, a typical example of side-channel attacks,
are investigated in chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Power Attacks Countermeasures
Involving On-Chip Monitoring
In this chapter we present a novel approach involving on-chip power monitoring to prevent
power attacks on reconfigurable hardware. Our power monitor circuit is based on a network
of evenly distributed ring-oscillators. Two power attack countermeasures are derived from
this circuit. The first countermeasure is a general framework based on a closed-loop control
system that keeps the power consumption of any FPGA implementation constant. The second
countermeasure involves detecting the insertion of a shunt resistor-based power measurement
circuit onto a device’s power rail. After introducing the common shunt resistor-based power
measurement setting, we present our on-chip monitor circuit. Then we describe and evaluate
our two countermeasures.
6.1 Motivation
As shown in sections 2.2 and 2.3, encryption algorithms are designed to make brute-force
attacks or exhaustive key search computationally infeasible and to resist cryptanalysis based
on theoretical weaknesses. However, the physical implementation of an encryption algorithm
can leak information and create security flaws. Attacks exploiting these physical flaws are called
side-channel attacks.
Since their initial publication [KJJ99], a relevant type of side-channel attacks called power
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attacks have been extensively studied. As explained in section 2.4, power attacks recover the
key of the encryption algorithm by using one or multiple power traces, which are directly
correlated to the output capacitance of the transistors in the device as well as their output
switching frequency. They have been successfully demonstrated on many common encryption
methods, including private key encryption such as DES [SOQP04] and AES [SMPQ06], finite
field based public key encryption such as RSA [MDS99] and Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve
based public key encryption [OOP03]. Theoretically, power attacks can be used to attack any
crypto-system with a key-dependent power consumption.
Two major types of countermeasures exist in order to make an implementation resistant to
power attacks. Masking countermeasures randomize the intermediate values processed by the
cryptographic device. These countermeasures are application-dependent as they require the
algorithm to be modified. Moreover, they are resource consuming. For instance random mask-
ing for AES can lead to 2 to 3 times area overhead [RWS11]. Hiding countermeasures remove
the data dependency of the power consumption. The most common hiding countermeasures,
namely differential logic and symmetrical routing, implement the complement of each logic
operator and attempt to route it symmetrically to the initial operator. The idea is to always
consume the same amount of power independently of the input data. These techniques are very
efficient in protecting a hardware crypto-system against power attacks. However, they lead to
3 to 10 times area overhead and slow down the circuit [TV04,YS07].
Our work takes a different approach. We measure the power consumption of the device
on-chip (section 6.3) and use this information to either prevent or detect power attacks. Our
first countermeasure presented in section 6.4 is a hiding countermeasure that keeps the power
consumption constant by using a closed-loop control system using our power measurement
circuit as the sensor, a power consumer circuit as the actuator, and a PID controller. It has a
relatively low area footprint, which is independent of the size of the crypto-system. However this
countermeasure is not easily feasible on current commercial FPGAs due to the limited speed
of the control loop. Our second countermeasure presented in section 6.5 detects the insertion
of a shunt resistor-based power measurement circuit by comparing the power variations in the
circuit at runtime with values obtained during calibration. We are not aware of previous work
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Figure 6.1: FPGA power measurement model
on detecting power attacks on reconfigurable hardware.
6.2 Power attack measurement settings
Fig. 6.1 shows a simplified model of the most common setting to measure the power consumption
of an FPGA chip as presented in [MOP07,OOP03]. A shunt resistor REXT (typically 1 ohm to
50 ohms) is inserted into the core logic power supply line VCCINT of the FPGA. RNET represents
the equivalent resistance of the FPGA power network. I is the current drain due to circuit
switching. The power consumed by the FPGA is given by the following equations:
P = VINT I = (VCCINT − VTOT )I (6.1)
VTOT = VEXT + VNET (6.2)
RTOT = REXT +RNET (6.3)
If the voltage drop due to the resistors VTOT is small compared with VCCINT , the power con-
sumption of the device can be approximated by the following equations:
P ≈ VCCINT I (6.4)
I = VEXT/REXT (6.5)
I = VTOT/RTOT = (VCCINT − VINT )/RTOT (6.6)
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As shown in the equations, the power consumption of the FPGA is approximately proportional
to the voltage drop across the resistors. An attacker with physical access to the voltage supply
pin can obtain a power trace by inserting a shunt resistor REXT and measuring the voltage
drop VEXT . We can also monitor the FPGA’s power consumption by measuring the internal
voltage VINT as shown in equation 6.6.
Ideally, in an attack scenario the power measurement circuit should not modify the electrical
behaviour of the FPGA board. However, in order to obtain a clean power trace REXT cannot
be too small. Even for 1 ohm, the voltage drop across the shunt resistor VEXT is not completely
negligible. Hence the FPGA supply voltage VINT is smaller than VCCINT . In practice, VCCINT
needs to be increased after programming the device to allow the FPGA to run close to normal
operating voltage. Even with this compensation the FPGA supply voltage VINT cannot be kept
constant at all time. In fact, when the device is running, I and therefore VEXT vary due to
circuit switching. The variations in VEXT are what enables the attacker to obtain power traces.
However they also create variations in the FPGA supply voltage VINT that are much larger
than without the shunt resistor.
The power consumption of a device can also be measured using an electromagnetic (EM)
probe or a contactless current probe. In this chapter, we only focus on the power measurement
circuit of Fig. 6.1.
6.3 On-chip power monitoring with ring oscillators
As shown in section 6.2, RTOT creates variations in the FPGA supply voltage VINT . Ring
oscillators (ROs) are perfect candidates to monitor these variations. Since the circuit switching
speed of an FPGA is correlated with its supply voltage VINT , the oscillation frequency of a RO
is affected by the supply voltage [FBCP10]. A linear approximation can be used to model the
relationship between the FPGA supply voltage VINT and the oscillation frequency fRi of ring
oscillator i:
fRi ≈ kiVINT + fi (6.7)
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where ki and fi are positive constants. Note that fRi also depends on the chip temperature.
However, for a low number of inverters in the RO, we can neglect the variations with temper-
ature compared to the variations with voltage. As a matter of fact the authors of [FBCP10]
demonstrate experimentally that a 3-inverter RO implemented on a Virtex-5 is much less sen-
sitive to temperature than to voltage variations and that the voltage sensitivity decreases with
the number of inverters. The oscillation frequency of ROs can also be subject to crosstalk
effects. The authors of [GWWT12] demonstrate a variation of ring oscillator frequencies of up
to 5% on Virtex-5 and Virtex-6 due to capacitive coupling from long interconnects, whereas no
significant effect is observed on other interconnect types. As none of our RO implementations
uses long interconnects, this effect should not be observed in our power monitor.
The major challenge of using a RO to measure the FPGA’s supply voltage is the trade-off
between time resolution and response time. In order to obtain a sufficient resolution, we need
to accumulate enough oscillations from the RO. This implies running the RO for a long period
of time, which increases the measurement period Ts. However, increasing the measurement
period decreases the number of measurements that can be taken per second and therefore
reduces the sampling rate of the power monitor. A solution is to make the RO oscillate faster
by decreasing the number of inverters. However, on FPGAs the inverters of ring oscillators are
built from LUTs. Hence even a 1-inverter RO1 does not oscillate very fast (around 350 MHz
in our experiments on Spartan-6 presented in section 6.4.4).
Another improvement is to evenly distribute a network of ROs among the FPGA. The
oscillations from each RO are accumulated locally during a fixed amount of time. All the
accumulated values are then summed together and used as the power measurement. This is
shown in Fig. 6.2. This solution provides a more consistent measurement because the effect of
voltage variations within the FPGA is averaged. Moreover by averaging the values of uniformly
distributed ROs, we reduce the influence of random wire delay variations on the power monitor
reading.
1Such a RO oscillates on FPGAs due to the relatively long logic and wire delays.
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For m ROs, the power monitor output is as follows:
p =
1
fs
m−1∑
i=0
fRi (6.8)
where fs = 1/Ts is the sampling frequency of the power monitor.
Some recent FPGAs such as the Xilinx Virtex-6 have system monitoring capabilities through
ADCs that could also be used to monitor the supply voltage VINT [Xil10b]. However the
sampling rates of these ADCs are low (200 kHz for the Virtex 6 system monitor [Xil12c]). A RO-
based power monitor has a much higher sampling rate (around 25 MHz in our implementation)
that can be scaled according to the area available and the advances of fabrication technology.
Moreover, ROs can be built using primitives that are available to all commercial FPGAs.
Our RO-based power monitor is the core element of the two countermeasures presented in
sections 6.4 and 6.5.
6.4 Constant power reconfigurable computing
6.4.1 Principles
Our first countermeasure using on-chip power monitoring is summarised in Fig. 6.3. Our goal
is to keep the power constant at a certain value (the setpoint) higher than the maximum power
consumed by the user logic. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.4. The framework is based on the
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principles for a closed-loop control system.
The three main components of the control system together with their requirements are presented
below:
Power monitor. The power monitor measures the on-chip power of the FPGA. Its input is
a value correlated to the on-chip power consumption, such as the average voltage across
the power network of the FPGA. Its output is a value proportional to the input that
can be easily interpreted by the controller. The power monitor should provide precise
and uniform power measurement across the chip. Its resolution should be high enough to
detect any small variation of power that can be measured externally.
Power consumer. The power consumer is used to compensate for the on-chip power consump-
tion. The power amplitude of the consumer should be higher than the power dynamic
range of the user logic (as defined in Fig. 6.4) so that the power of the system can be kept
constant. Its resolution should be high enough to compensate for the smallest variation
of power measurable by the power monitor.
Controller. The controller manages the power consumer. Its goal is to make the measurement
given by the power monitor match the setpoint. In order to quickly compensate for any
power variation of the user logic, the controller needs to be chosen and tuned so that it
has good regulation properties. In particular, the controller’s response to a sudden power
change should be fast enough to hide the power trace of the operations performed by the
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user logic.
The following sections describe our implementations of the power consumer and the con-
troller. Like the power monitor, these two modules are self-contained into the FPGA fabric.
This makes our framework resistant to attacks which would involve removing or replacing some
of the on-board power modules in order to bypass the power regulation process.
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6.4.2 On-chip power consumer
Fig. 6.5 shows the architecture of our power consumer. It consists of two major components:
the power consuming wires and the control circuit. A power consuming wire is a routing
interconnect that spans edge to edge vertically or horizontally across the FPGA. In modern
commercial FPGAs all these long routing interconnects are buffered many times to reduce the
logic delay. When a periodic switching signal such as a clock signal is fed into one of these
long wires, current is drawn at each buffer in order to drive the parasitic capacitance along the
wire. Thus significant power is drawn along the wire being activated. We distribute the power
consuming wires evenly across the FPGA. We control the number of activated wires using a
decoder and an array of AND gates. The hardware descriptions and constraints to guide the
uniform placement of the wires are generated automatically by a script. A multiplexer is used
at the clock input of the power consumer array to choose between several clock signals with
different frequencies. The power consumed by the power consumer can be calculated as follows:
Pconsumer = NCV
2
INTfsw (6.9)
where N is the number of activated wires, C is the parasitic capacitance of each wire, VINT is
the supply voltage of the FPGA’s core logic and fsw is the frequency of the power consumer’s
switching signal.
6.4.3 Power controller
We use a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller to regulate our system. The PID
controller is a commonly used feedback controller and, if well-tuned, has very good regulation
and response properties. The controller module has two different modes:
Configuration mode. The following parameters of the system are determined and set up:
the power setpoint, the optimal clock frequency of the power consumer, the optimal pro-
portional, integral and derivative constants of the PID controller.
Regulation mode. The PID controller is regulating the power consumption of the FPGA.
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When the FPGA is powered on, the controller begins with the configuration mode. The
controller configurations sequence is shown in Fig. 6.6. First, the user logic is operated during
a certain amount of time during which the minimum and maximum power values are obtained.
This determines the user logic’s power amplitude as shown in Fig. 6.4. The configuration run
is not protected against power attacks. Hence for cryptographic applications, a key different
from the secret key should be used. Then the setpoint is set to the maximum power value
plus a given margin. This margin takes into account a possible increase in maximum power
when using the actual secret key. The user logic’s power dynamic range is calculated as the
difference between the setpoint and the minimum power value. It is shown in Fig. 6.4 and
corresponds to the maximum power that needs to be generated by the power consumer. Then
the power consumer clock frequency is tuned so that the power consumer’s amplitude is greater
than but as close as possible to the user logic’s power dynamic range. If the power consumer’s
amplitude is smaller than the user logic’s power dynamic range, the control system might not be
able to compensate for the user’s logic power consumption. However, if the power consumer’s
amplitude is much higher than the user logic’s power dynamic range, the control system is
likely to experience quantization effects which would reduce its effectiveness. Finally, the PID
controller parameters are determined using the relay feedback auto-tuning method.
The relay feedback auto-tuning method is commonly used to find the optimal parameters
of a PID controller. We make the output of the system oscillate by alternating the control
command between its maximum value and its minimum value. This corresponds to replacing
the PID controller with a relay.
The principles of the PID auto-tuning method applied to our system are shown in Fig. 6.7.
First the power consumer is set to half its maximum control value Cmax/2 in order to determine
the nominal bias value for the power monitor around which the system would oscillate. Then
the control command is set to 0. In order to maintain the oscillations, the power consumer
control value is set to Cmax when the power monitor measurement value becomes greater than
the nominal bias value. It is set back to 0 when the power monitor measurement value becomes
less than the nominal bias value. We wait for the oscillations to stabilise and obtain the
amplitude A and the period T of the oscillations. We stop the PID auto-tuning procedure after
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a few hundred oscillations are recorded.
The ultimate gain can be computed as follows:
Ku =
4H
piA
(6.10)
where H is the control action (amplitude of the command) and A is the amplitude of the
response. The ultimate period Tu is equal to the oscillation period T . Using the notations of
Fig. 6.7, we deduce:
Ku =
2Cmax
piA
(6.11)
Tu = T (6.12)
In order to reduce the sensitivity to high-frequency noise, the derivative term of the PID
controller is filtered by a first-order system with the time constant Td/N . The controller includes
an optional set-point weighting mechanism to prevent impulses in the control signal when the
reference value changes. Moreover an anti-windup mechanism based on back-calculation is
used to prevent large transients when the power consumer saturates. The PID control equation
and these three advanced techniques are detailed in appendix A. The proportional, integral,
derivative and tracking constants of the PID controller are:
Kp = K Ki =
Kh
Ti
(6.13)
Kd0 =
Td
Td +Nh
Kd1 =
KTdN
Td +Nh
(6.14)
Kt =
h
Tt
(6.15)
where h is the sampling period of the control loop and according to the ZNFD method for PID
controllers [AM08]:
K = 0.6Ku Ti = 0.5Tu Td = 0.125Tu (6.16)
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and:
Tt =
√
TiTd (6.17)
After the configuration of the system is finished, the controller switches to regulation mode.
The PID control algorithm is shown in Algorithm 6.1. This algorithm is based on the dis-
cretization of the PID controller equation. Each time a new value from the power monitor
is received, the PID control command is computed and the power consumer control value is
updated accordingly.
Algorithm 6.1: PID control algorithm
Input: Cmax: max power consumer control command
setpoint: setpoint
Kp, Kd0, Kd1, Ki, Kt: PID controller constants
1 P = D = I = 0
2 y = yprev = v = vprev = u = uprev = 0
3 while PIDControllerRunning() do
4 y = GetPowerMonitorV alue() /* Get process variable */
5 P = Kp(setpoint− y) /* Proportional action */
6 D = Kd0D −Kd1(y − yprev) /* Derivative action */
7 I = I +Ki(setpoint− yprev) +Kt(uprev − vprev) /* Integral action */
8 u = v = P + I +D /* Total control command */
9 if v > Cmax then u = Cmax /* Saturated control command (high) */
10 if v < 0 then u = 0 /* Saturated control command (low) */
11 SetPowerConsumerControl(u) /* Update power consumer command */
12 yprev = y, vprev = v, uprev = u /* Store current values */
13 end
The constant-power framework control rate is given by:
fc =
fl
lc
(6.18)
fl is the running frequency of the controller, power monitor and power consumer logic. lc is the
control latency given by:
lc = ls + ladd + 4 (6.19)
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where ls is the power monitor sampling latency and ladd is the power monitor’s adder tree
latency (in clock cycles). The constant factor consists of 1 clock cycle to register the power
monitor reading, 1 clock cycle to register the adder tree output and 2 clock cycles to compute
the PID control signal using DSPs. A new power consumer control command is issued every
h = 1/fc seconds.
6.4.4 Evaluation
Experimental setting
We use an ExpressCard Spartan-6 LX150T FPGA board manufactured by BlueRISC. The
board is modified with a power measurement circuit. The power measurement circuit consists
of a 0.1 ohm shunt resistor inserted in the 1.2V power line after the regulator output capacitors.
The 3.3V and 1.2V switching regulators are replaced with more stable low dropout regulators.
The 1.2V can be adjusted via a variable resistor. We use a Tektronix MSO 2024 oscilloscope
with a 200 MHz bandwidth and a 500 MHz sampling rate for all our measurements. An SMA
connector is soldered across the shunt resistor. The oscilloscope is connected to the board
via an SMA-to-BNC cable. The cable has a characteristic impedance of 50 Ω and is rated
for frequencies up to 12.4 GHz. The low-pass filter of the oscilloscope is set to 150 MHz to
eliminate noise in our measurement circuit.
Case study
We consider a hardware implementation of 512-bit binary left-to-right modular exponentiation
using the square-and-multiply algorithm as shown in Algorithm 6.2. The square and multiply
operations are both performed by the Montgomery multiplier, which makes them hardly dis-
tinguishable. To get a better reading of the power consumption, we implement four 512-bit
modular exponentiation cores on our Spartan-6 LX150T FPGA and set the clock frequency to
5 MHz. All cores are given the same set of inputs in parallel2. The three components of our
framework are implemented alongside the four exponentiation cores. For this experiment, the
2This scenario is rather unrealistic in practice but enables us to obtain a relatively clear signal with our
medium quality measuring equipment (oscilloscope and probes).
152
power monitor uses a grid of 576 1-inverter ROs. The ring oscillators are oscillating at around
350 MHz. The power consumer consists of 231 vertical and horizontal interconnects. The ele-
ments of our framework are all running at 100 MHz. The power monitor sampling latency is set
to ls = 2 clock cycles and the adder tree latency is ladd = 2 clock cycles. Hence the constant-
power framework control rate is fc = 12.5 MHz. Our implementation of the framework takes
11 882 extra LUTs, that is 13% of the area available on the LX150T. To reduce the effects of
noise, we perform each measurement 30 times and report the average power trace.
Algorithm 6.2: Left-to-right binary exponentiation
Input: X, N , E = (en−1, ..., e1, e0)
Output: R = XE mod N
1 R = 1
2 for i = n− 1 downto 0 do
3 R = R2 mod N /* Square */
4 if ei = 1 then
5 R = R.X mod N /* Multiply */
6 end
7 return R
Chosen-message attack
To quantify the effectiveness of our framework, we mount a chosen-message doubling attack
[FV03] against our 512-bit modular exponentiation module. The attack works by detecting
collisions between squaring operations for related inputs X and X2. A collision between a
squaring operation at cycle i + 1 in the power trace of X and a squaring operation at cycle i
in the power trace of X2 occurs only if the key bit ei is 0.
The power traces of the two operations are compared using the Phase Only Correlation
(POC) waveform matching technique presented in [HMA+10, HNI+06]. For two waveforms
f(n) and g(n) where n = −M, ...,M , the cross-phase spectrum RFG(k) is defined as [HNI+06]:
RFG(k) =
F (k)G(k)∣∣∣F (k)G(k)∣∣∣ (6.20)
where F and G are the discrete Fourier transforms of f and g. The POC function rfg(n) is
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defined as the inverse discrete Fourier transform of RFG:
rfg(n) =
1
N
M∑
k=−M
RFG(k)e
j 2pikn
N (6.21)
If the two waveforms are similar minus a given displacement, the POC function presents a
sharp correlation peak at the location of this displacement. The sharpness of the correlation
peak is evaluated using the Peak-to-Sidelobe Ratio PSR = (peak − mean)/std. In our case
PSR = (max − mean)/std, where max is the maximum, mean is the mean and std is the
standard deviation of the POC function. We note PSRi, the PSR obtained for the collision
corresponding to bit ei. More detail about the doubling attack and the POC waveform matching
techniques are given in appendix B.
In a standard attack we would set a threshold for the PSR after performing calibration
attacks with known keys. For each key bit ei, if the PSR is greater than the threshold, we guess
ei = 0 (a collision occurred), otherwise we guess ei = 1. Note that in order to determine the
correct positions of the traces to compare for bit ei, we need to know the correct values of bits
en, ..., ei+1. Hence the attack fails if one bit is guessed incorrectly.
In our experiment, we only perform a few iterations of an attack, knowing the key E we
want to recover. We obtain the 24 PSR values for bits en−8 down to en−31. The waveforms for
en to en−7 are slightly harder to compare due to capacitive effects in the measurement circuit,
which are visible on the waveforms of the first few square/multiply operations. We split the
PSR obtained in two sets:
S0 = {PSRi : ei = 0} (6.22)
S1 = {PSRi : ei = 1} (6.23)
We define the resolution of the attack as follows:
ρ =
min(S0)
max(S1)
(6.24)
ρ is a measure of how easily we can detect a collision. If ρ ≤ 1, we cannot distinguish PSRi
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for a key bit ei = 0 from PSRj for a key bit ej = 1 and the attack fails.
Fig. 6.8 shows the resolution of the attack against the attack bandwidth. A bandwidth
of 150 MHz corresponds to the full oscilloscope signal. Bandwidths from 1 MHz to 100 MHz
are obtained by digitally filtering the oscilloscope signal with a FIR filter of order 1000. For
bandwidths less than 10 MHz, the use of the framework prevents the chosen-message attacks.
However for bandwidths greater than 10 MHz, including the full oscilloscope bandwidth the
attack is made harder but cannot be prevented. This is due to the relatively low 12.5 MHz
control rate fc of the framework. Intuitively, our constant power framework filters out all
frequencies less than the Nyquist frequency fc/2 = 6.25 MHz. The fundamental frequency of
the 5 MHz clock is filtered out, but all its harmonics remain. Enough information is present in
the harmonics to still be able to perform the attack.
Hence, several obstacles have to be overcome to make the constant power framework a
hiding power attack countermeasure. Looking at equations 6.18 and 6.19, we can increase
fc by increasing fl and decreasing ladd and ls. This would be possible using future FPGA
technologies provided that the clock frequency of the crypto-system remains much slower than
fc/2. However, in order to get enough resolution on the power monitor reading, we would need
faster ring oscillators (which would also be available on future FPGA technologies) and/or a
larger number of on chip ROs.
A possible improvement to our constant framework would involve adding noise to the system.
For example we could vary the power consumer command randomly in a range defined by the
current control command calculated by the PID controller. This random change could occur
faster than the control rate and therefore improve the bandwidth in which the countermeasure
is effective.
Another, maybe more realistic approach, would be to implement our framework as a hard
IP block on an FPGA dedicated to cryptography. The controller and the ROs could be made
much faster, at a lower power cost. A fast on-chip ADC could also be considered to replace the
RO-based power monitor.
From this section, we can conclude that designing hiding power attack countermeasures
based on our on-chip power monitoring technique is not easily feasible on current commercial
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Figure 6.8: Resolution of the attack against bandwidth
FPGAs. However, on-chip power monitoring can be used to detect shunt resistor-based power
attacks effectively, as shown in the following section.
6.5 Detecting Power Attacks
6.5.1 Principles
Our second countermeasure involves using on-chip power monitoring in order to detect power
attacks. We still use the measurement method presented in section 6.2. The integration of our
power attack detection framework into a typical crypto-system is shown in Fig. 6.9. A typi-
cal System-on-Chip (SoC) for cryptography consists of several hardware cores communicating
through a system bus. Some cores implement critical cryptographic functions such as RSA,
AES, or random number generation. Other non-critical cores are used to handle generic tasks
such as communication (UART, Ethernet cores, ...), clock generation, etc. Usually a simple
processor core controls the system. Our attack detection logic consists of two main modules:
the power monitor and the attack detector.
The attack detector receives information about the state of each hardware module in the
system. Using the information given by the power monitor and the knowledge of which hardware
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Figure 6.9: Power attack detection framework
modules are running by reading the control bus, the attack detector checks whether the power
consumption of the device stays within a pre-defined range.
6.5.2 Attack detection model
The attack detector has two operating modes: calibration mode and monitoring mode. In
calibration mode, the power characteristics of each hardware core are determined. These power
characteristics depend on the FPGA board on which the system is running, in particular on
the design of the power supply circuit of the board. Hence calibration is FPGA-dependent and
has to be performed for each instance of the hardware cores and for each type of boards on
which the crypto-system is implemented. The different calibration and monitoring stages are
shown in Fig. 6.10.
First pref , the reference power monitor value when the system is idle is determined. In the
idle state, the switching activity of the transistors and therefore the current I and the voltage
drop VTOT are minimum. Here no measurement circuit is present, therefore the voltage drop
only depends on the equivalent resistance of the power rail RNET , and VTOT is equal to VNET .
A low voltage drop leads to a high power monitor value.
Then we determine the minimum reference power monitor value pmin,i of each core i, corre-
sponding to the highest voltage drop. In this step we provide each core with a sample of inputs
representative of the operating conditions of the core. The reference power monitor amplitude
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of core i is:
∆pref,i = pref − pmin,i (6.25)
pref , pmin,i and ∆pref,i are shown in Fig. 6.11. In most cases we can only find approximations
for these values as all combinations of input values of the cores cannot be tested. Hence, we
allow margins on pref and ∆pref,i, respectively mref and mref,i. We define:
p∗ref = pref (1 +mref ) (6.26)
∆p∗ref,i = (p
∗
ref − pmin,i)(1 +mref,i) (6.27)
In monitoring mode, the attack detector is given p∗ref and ∆p
∗
ref,i for each core i. It monitors
the instantaneous power monitor reading p(t) and the instantaneous power amplitude:
∆p(t) = p∗ref − p(t) (6.28)
The attack detector records which hardware modules are currently running by reading their
start and done signals on the control bus.
We assume that at time t, a subset S(t) of the n hardware cores are running. An attack
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flag is raised if:
p(t) > p∗ref or (6.29)
∆p(t) >
∑
i∈S(t)
∆p∗ref,i (6.30)
Equation 6.30 uses the fact that several cores running in parallel should not reach an am-
plitude higher than the sum of their reference amplitudes. This is an upper bound limit. One
could also obtain reference values for every possible combination of cores running in parallel.
However this may not be possible for a crypto-system with a large number of cores.
On one hand, the power amplitude of a core ∆p is a relative value. ∆p is proportional to
the total resistance RTOT on the reference FPGA power rail. As a matter of fact, let us assume
that only core i is running and its switching during a fixed time interval ∆t leads to a variation
of current:
∆Ii = Ii,max − Ii,min (6.31)
If VCCINT is fixed, the maximum and minimum FPGA supply voltages are respectively:
VINT,max = VCCINT −RTOT Ii,min (6.32)
VINT,min = VCCINT −RTOT Ii,max (6.33)
Hence the maximum variation of supply voltage during the operation of core i is:
∆VINT = RTOT∆Ii (6.34)
Using equation 6.7 the variation in oscillation frequency of ring oscillator j is:
∆fRj ≈ kj∆VINT = kjRTOT∆Ii (6.35)
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Hence, if the power monitor consists of m ROs and mref = 0, using equation 6.8 we have:
∆′p = pmax − pmin = 1
fs
m−1∑
j=0
∆fRj ≈
1
fs
m−1∑
j=0
kjRTOT∆Ii (6.36)
Note that if we ignore the margin mref , ∆
′p is equal to the maximum variations of ∆p during
∆t. Hence a change in RTOT leads to a proportional change in ∆p. This result also applies to
∆pref,i. In particular, adding a shunt resistor REXT to the reference device in order to perform a
power attack will lead to ∆p being higher than ∆pref,i at a certain time td, as ∆pref,i have been
obtained on the reference device without shunt resistor. This will be detected by equation 6.30.
On the other hand, the idle reference power monitor value pref and the instantaneous power
monitor reading p(t) are absolute values. The combination of equation 6.29 and equation 6.30
fixes p(t) in a given range. This makes sure that an attacker is not tampering with the supply
voltage of the FPGA.
Fig. 6.12 shows the different operating conditions detected by the attack detector. In the
time frame of this graph, we assume that the number of hardware cores running in parallel is
kept constant. Let us define:
pmin(t) = p
∗
ref −
∑
i∈S(t)
∆p∗ref,i (6.37)
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In normal operating conditions, at time t the power trace p(t) always stays between p∗ref
and pmin(t). If the supply voltage is too high, p raises over p
∗
ref and the attack flag is raised
according to equation 6.29. If either the supply voltage is too low or the supply voltage is at
a normal level but the power rail resistance is too high, p falls below pmin at a time td. Hence
∆p(td) is higher than
∑
i∈S(td) ∆p
∗
ref,i and the attack flag is raised according to equation 6.30.
Depending on the application, different strategies can be adopted when an attack is detected.
The critical cores can be reset to prevent the current power acquisition from being carried on,
the corrupted keys can be revoked and new keys generated, or the keys can be erased from the
cryptographic device, making the device unusable.
The attack detector sampling rate is given by:
fd =
fl
ld
(6.38)
fl is the running frequency of the attack detector and power monitor logic. ld is the attack
detector latency given by:
ld = ls + ladd (6.39)
Recall that ls is the power monitor sampling latency and ladd is the power monitor’s adder tree
latency.
6.5.3 Evaluation of the model
Our experimental setting is based on two Pico E-101 FPGA boards. The Pico E-101 has a
Spartan-6 LX45 FPGA. We modify one of the boards to include a power measurement circuit
as shown in Fig. 6.13. The modification is similar to the one described in section 6.4.4. We use
a Tektronix MSO 2024 oscilloscope with a 200 MHz bandwidth and a 500 MHz sampling rate
for all our measurements.
The power monitor now consists of 128 3-inverter ring oscillators which can be activated
independently. The attack detection logic is running at fl = 100 MHz. The adder tree latency
ladd is set to 2 clock cycles to meet timing requirements. The entire attack detection logic
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1.2V regulation3.3V regulation
5V power connector
Spartan-6 LX45
JTAG port
Figure 6.13: Modified Pico E-101 FPGA board
(attack detector and power monitor) takes 4365 LUTs, that is 16% of the area available on
the LX45. For comparison, standard countermeasures such as masking and WDDL have area
overheads of respectively 20% to 300% [RWS11] and 3 to 10 times [TV04,YS07].
Fig. 6.14 shows the oscillation frequency fRi of each RO i against the FPGA voltage VINT .
REXT is set to 0 and we vary VCCINT . Note that we actually measure (VNET +VINT ). However,
assuming RNET is small, the effect of VNET can be neglected. We select a long power monitor
sampling latency ls of 180 clock cycles. We perform a linear regression on all of the 128 curves
and obtain an average coefficient of determination R2 of 0.997 with a standard deviation of
0.08%. This result shows that equation 6.7 is a relevant approximation of the RO behaviour. It
is also interesting to observe that each RO, even if identically placed and routed, behaves slightly
differently with the supply voltage. As a matter of fact, we measure a standard deviation of
respectively 2.05% and 2.71% on the slopes ki and intersects fi given by the linear regressions.
This deviation is due to both correlated and random variability in the chip manufacturing
process. Note that random variability also happens in between similar ROs implemented on
two different FPGA chips. However, it is reduced by averaging several RO outputs and should
not affect our detection mechanism.
Fig. 6.15 shows the power traces of a 512-bit modular exponentiation core running at 20 MHz
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reading against the resistor value
for different shunt resistor values3. It is obtained with the oscilloscope. The values reported for
REXT in this section are the actual resistance values measured before starting the experiment.
We cannot obtain actual shunt resistance values less than 2 Ω due to the resistance of the wires
and solder in our setting. Before each run, VCCINT is adjusted so that the FPGA is supplied
with the voltage VINT + VNET = 1.2 V when idle. Fig. 6.16 shows the same power traces
obtained with the on-chip power monitor for 16 activated ROs. For this experiment, the power
monitor sampling latency ls is set to 10 clock cycles. Hence, the attack detector sampling rate
is fd = 8.3 MHz. To reduce noise, both the power monitor and oscilloscope traces are averaged
over 20 runs. In both cases the successive multiplication patterns are easily recognisable. The
power traces obtained on-chip are obviously less detailed than the oscilloscope traces, which
are sampled at a 60 times higher frequency. As expected, the amplitude of the power traces
increases with the shunt resistor value. Fig. 6.17 shows the amplitude of the shunt resistor
voltage VEXT against the shunt resistor value REXT . According to our model, we should have:
∆VEXT = REXT∆I (6.40)
However, the linear regression does not fit this equation as it shows a non-negligible positive
intersect of 19.65 mV. Several phenomena not taken into account by our model could explain
3As in section 6.4.4, we use a relatively low clock frequency to obtain a clear signal with our measuring
equipment. However, we expect our attack detection framework to work similarly for cores running at higher
frequencies, which would consume more dynamic power.
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this behaviour. First, when REXT increases, the relative drop in the FPGA voltage VINT during
computation increases. Therefore, the FPGA’s transistors are supplied with a lower voltage
on average, which could cause ∆I = Imax − Imin to drop, violating our hypothesis that ∆I
is constant. Second, internal capacitance of the circuit, which clearly affects the variations of
current, are not taken into account by our model.
Fig. 6.16 also shows the power trace obtained with the power monitor when the shunt resistor
is bypassed (REXT = 0). The successive multiplications patterns can still be distinguished
because of the effect of RNET and the resistance of our bypass circuit. Fig. 6.18 depicts the
amplitude of the power monitor reading against the shunt resistor value. We see that ∆′p is
also affected by the variations of ∆I, which limits the validity of equation 6.36.
The fact that ∆′p and therefore ∆p increase with REXT , even if not proportionally, is enough
to make our attack detector effective as shown in the next section.
6.5.4 Detection capabilities
In this section, we evaluate the detection capabilities of our framework. We consider a crypto-
system with five main cores running at 20 MHz: the power attack detection logic, a 512-bit
RSA encryption core (core number 0), a 128-bit AES core (core number 1) [aes], a Microblaze
processor controlling the different cores and a UART for communication. The UART is only
used to get the RSA and AES inputs from a PC and to send the results back after the com-
putation is finished. Hence it is never running in parallel with the RSA or the AES core. The
processor only waits for an interrupt during an RSA or AES computation and we can therefore
neglect its power consumption during this phase. When the power attack detection logic starts,
we wait for a few thousand clock cycles before starting recording the power variations of the
system. This prevents the attack detector from recording the relatively large power variations
caused by the power monitor start-up. A 128-bit AES encryption finishes in 8 clock cycles
whereas an RSA encryption finishes in between 275 968 and 551 936 clock cycles depending on
the number of ones in the 512-bit key.
We compare the original Pico E-101 board against the modified board with shunt resistors
ranging from 2 Ω to 8 Ω. The original board has no shunt resistor. Moreover the filtering
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capacitors, which are removed in the modified board, limit the power supply variations. The
attack detector sampling rate is still fd = 8.3 MHz. Fig. 6.19 shows stacked histograms of the
distribution of ∆′p = pmax − pmin for 1000 random 512-bit RSA input pairs, using a different
seed for the original and modified board. Not all resistors values can be tested for all ring
oscillator numbers in our current settings. As a matter of fact, for a high shunt resistor value
and a large number of ring oscillators, our regulation circuit cannot compensate for the large
voltage drop when the circuit is idle. The ∆′p distributions of the original board only intersect
with the one of the modified board for a 2-RO detector (not clearly visible in Fig. 6.19). Hence
it should be possible to detect any attack with a shunt resistor above 2 Ω for all other tested RO
number. However, the attack detector only discriminates between the ∆′p distributions of the
different shunt resistor configurations from around 16 ROs. Below this value, the distributions
are entangled due to the low power monitor resolution.
Table 6.1 show the percentage of detected attacks for three different configurations:
1. the original board (nominal VINT + VNET = 1.2 V )
2. the modified board with no shunt resistor but VINT + VNET set above its nominal value
3. the modified board with a shunt resistor REXT = 2.09 Ω
For each configuration and each RO number, we perform 10 000 RSA exponentiations with
random inputs. p∗ref,0 is set to the maximum power monitor value obtained during the cali-
bration of the original board, that is we do not set any margin mref . ∆p
∗
ref,0 is set at equal
distance from the maximum ∆′p obtained on the original board and the minimum ∆′p obtained
for REXT = 2.09 Ω. This is shown in Fig. 6.19. In configuration 3, the voltage VINT + VNET is
manually set when the system is idle so that p(t) is as close as possible to p∗ref . This requires
access to the value of the power monitor, which an attacker would not acquire easily. In practice
an attacker would simply set VINT + VNET to its nominal value when the system is idle. Hence
configuration 3 is a best case scenario in an attacker’s point of view.
We see that configuration 2 is properly detected as high voltage for all numbers of RO
tested with a false-negative rate of 0%. For RSA in configuration 1, we get a maximum false-
positive rate of 3.71%. False-positives are either created by an amplitude of voltage higher
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than expected or by a slight temporary increase in the supply voltage. In configuration 3, we
detect all the attacks for all RO values but 8, for which we have a false-negative rate of 5.7%.
However, the attack is most of the time wrongly detected as high voltage for less than 16 ROs.
This phenomenon is due to a lack of resolution of the power monitor for low RO values, which
results in a noisy power monitor reading. Random noise coming from several sources (electronic
noise, timing errors due to voltage drops) is reduced by increasing the number of ROs the power
monitor reading is accumulated from. In pratice to ensure proper operation of our detection
system in this crypto-system, we would use more than 16 ROs.
Table 6.2 shows the average total power consumption of the system performing the same
512-bit RSA encoding operation for different number of ROs. VCCINT is fixed at 1.39V, REXT =
2.02 Ω and the power consumption is computed as:
PFPGA = (VCCINT − VEXT ) VEXT
REXT
(6.41)
As expected, the power consumption increases with the number of ROs activated. A circuit
with 16 RO and 32 RO attack detectors, which both have very good detection properties,
consume respectively 52% and 71% more power than an unprotected circuit.
Hence, we can conclude that for a power monitor with more than 16 ROs, our attack detector
can detect power attacks on RSA using relatively low shunt resistor values (superior to 2 Ω)
with a false-positive rate less than 4%, a false-negative rate of 0% and a power overhead as low
as 52%. Note that depending on the requirements of the crypto-system, the false-positive rate
could be reduced by increasing ∆p∗ref,0 if we are willing to accept a possibly higher false-negative
rate.
The RSA core has a power pattern that can be easily recognised with our power monitor as
shown in Fig. 6.16. An RSA encryption consumes a relatively large amount of power and takes
a few hundred thousand clock cycles. This is not the case for an AES encryption which only
takes 8 clock cycles and consumes around 5 mW. For a 2.09 Ω shunt resistor, the power monitor
cannot distinguish the AES power patter from the background noise and an attack on the AES
core cannot be effectively detected. This is shown in Fig. 6.20 where the ∆′p distributions on
the modified board cannot be distinguished from the ∆′p distribution on the original board.
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The ”AES” entry of Table 6.1 confirms this observation as we obtain false-negative rates as
high as 99.97%. The next section presents an alternative detection strategy to address this
issue.
6.5.5 Alternative detection strategy
Our alternative detection strategy is based on two properties:
1. If the power supply of the original board is properly filtered, ∆pref,i does not depend
much on ∆Ii.
2. The attack detection logic consumes power that can be measured by the power monitor.
Let us first explain property 1. The measurement model of Fig. 6.1 does not take into
account the capacitance of the supply voltage network. In an attack scenario most filtering ca-
pacitors located after REXT would be removed in order to obtain a clean power trace. However,
the crypto-system is likely to be calibrated on a board with a properly filtered power supply.
A properly filtered power supply has a combination of large, medium and small capacitors be-
tween VCCINT and GND to filter out the noise on VINT . These capacitors also help compensate
for the voltage drops caused by large current transients due to the switching activity of the
chip. Hence for a properly filtered power supply, equations 6.32 to 6.36 do not hold and we can
assume that ∆pref,i does not depend on ∆Ii, that is ∆pref,i is constant for all i. Note that this
does not change the principles behind our attack detector illustrated by Fig. 6.12. As a matter
of fact, equations 6.32 to 6.36 do hold on the modified board where most filtering capacitors
are removed (with the limitations discussed in section 6.5.3).
Property 2 is due to the fact that even if we remove all the filtering capacitors from the
attack board, the board and the power measurement circuit still have an internal capacitance,
which combined with REXT acts as a RC circuit. If the attack detector sampling period is
several times shorter than the time constant of the equivalent RC circuit, the voltage drop
created while powering it on can be measured. Basically, the power monitor measures its own
power consumption, which adds up to the power consumption of the other cores. For the
experiments of the previous section, this effect was ignored by waiting a few clock cycles before
172
 1500
 1520
 1540
 1560
 1580
 1600
 1620
 1640
 1660
 0  0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2
p
t (ms)
Original
REXT =  2.09 Ω
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starting recording the power variations of the system. In this section, we start recording the
power variations of the system as soon as the attack detection starts.
To illustrate these two properties, Fig 6.21 shows the power monitor reading just af-
ter the attack detector logic starts on the original board and on the modified board with
REXT = 2.09 Ω. We see that no voltage drop is observed on the original board whereas a large
voltage drop is observed for the modified board. This observation confirms properties 1 and 2.
The application of the alternative detection strategy to AES is shown in the ”AES+” entry of
Table 6.1. For less than 16 ROs the number of ROs is not large enough to create a significant
start-up drop, hence the attack cannot be reliability detected. For more than 32 ROs, this
strategy enables the attack detector to detect the attacks using a 2.09 Ω shunt resistor with no
false-negatives. Moreover, the false-positive rate on the original board is below 0.4%.
It is interesting to notice that under the assumption that the power supply of the original
board is properly filtered, the power consumption of the attack detector itself can make the
detection possible. Hence a slight variation on this idea would decouple the attack detection
mechanism from the cryptographic cores. This would be achieved by starting and stopping
the attack detector at proper times and only considering the start-up power of the detection
logic. This strategy would reduce the energy overhead of the countermeasure. However, the
intervals between each run of the detector should be short enough so that the attacker cannot
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gain much information before being detected. It should also be non-predictable, so that the
attacker cannot build a mechanism to bypass the measurement circuit when the detector is
running. The intervals could be randomly chosen below a certain threshold.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present a novel approach involving on-chip power monitoring to prevent
power attacks on reconfigurable hardware. Our power monitor circuit is based on a network
of evenly distributed ring-oscillators. Two power attack countermeasures are derived from this
circuit. The first countermeasure is a general framework based on a closed-loop control system
that keeps the power consumption of any FPGA implementation constant. Our implementa-
tion of the framework on a Spartan-6 LX150T takes 11 882 LUTs, that is 13% of the area
available. Using a doubling-attack against 512-bit modular exponentiation as a case study, we
demonstrate experimentally that the framework can prevent attacks performed at a bandwidth
lower than half of its control rate. However using the framework as a hiding countermeasure is
not feasible on current commercial FPGAs due to the limited speed of the control loop. A more
realistic approach would be to implement our framework as a hard IP block on an FPGA ded-
icated to cryptography. The second countermeasure involves detecting the insertion of a shunt
resistor-based power measurement circuit onto a device’s power rail. Our implementation of
the countermeasure on a Spartan-6 LX45 fits in 4 365 LUTs, that is 16% of the area available.
For 512-bit RSA, with less than 71% power overhead we can detect a shunt resistor as low as 2
Ω with a maximum false-positive rate of 0.2% and no false-negatives. Our alternative detection
strategy also enables the detection of power attacks on cores whose power variations are too
small to be directly measured by the power monitor circuit.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis we develop parametric designs for cryptographic applications. Our designs are
especially useful for key generation and encryption in public-key cryptography. The design space
is explored in terms of speed, area, power consumption and security. A technology-independent
parametric model is developed to allow rapid optimisation under speed and area constraints
of a general class of algorithms, which include some of our cryptographic applications. The
security aspects are covered by two new power attack countermeasures based on on-chip power
monitoring.
In chapter 3 we introduce new architectures for Montgomery multiplication and Montgomery
exponentiation. The loop-carried dependency in the Montgomery algorithm prevents a paral-
lel hardware implementation. In order to explore a large design space in terms of speed-area
trade-off, our Montgomery multiplier architecture uses variable pipeline stages and variable
serial replications. We create a modular exponentiation circuit based on our Montgomery mul-
tiplier architecture. Our circuit supports interleaving several exponentiations in the multiplier’s
pipeline in order to overcome the data dependencies in the square-and-multiply exponentiation
algorithm. Our scalable Montgomery multiplier implemented on a Virtex-5 FPGA can achieve
a throughput 4 times higher than the best existing hardware implementation and 13 times
higher than an optimised software implementation. Our multiplier is also more efficient than
existing designs in terms of Latency × Area and Area / Throughput. By interleaving multiple
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exponentiations our exponentiator can run more than 5 times faster than optimised software
and 2 times faster than the best modular exponentiation hardware reported in the literature.
Only designs based on high-radix multipliers are more efficient than our exponentiator in terms
of Time × Area product. Our Montgomery multiplier and exponentiation architectures scale
well with the number of pipeline stages and replications. Hence better performance will be
achieved on upcoming devices such as the Virtex-7, which will be faster and larger.
Chapter 4 generalises the idea used to scale our Montgomery multiplier. We present a
coarse-grained method to automatically map a general class of algorithms consisting of a loop
with loop dependencies carried from one iteration to the next to a parametric hardware design
with pipelining and replication features. A technology-independent parametric model of the
proposed design is developed to capture the variations of area and throughput with the number
of pipeline stages and replications. Our model allows rapid optimisation of design parameters
by a few pre-synthesis operations. We present an optimisation method based on the model
and we evaluate our method on three different applications implemented on a Xilinx Spartan
6 XC6SLX45T FPGA: the Montgomery multiplier, the modular exponentiatior and a integer
square root module. Our model facilitates design space exploration by quickly predicting the
area taken by the designs with less than 5% of error and their maximum frequencies and
throughputs with less than 22% of error. Our optimisation method is up to 96 times faster
than a full search through the design space.
In chapter 5 we present the first hardware architecture for the NIST approved Lucas primal-
ity test and a novel architecture for the Miller-Rabin primality test. This chapter shows how
our Montgomery multiplication and exponentiation circuit, which are needed for public-key
encryption, can be reused for key generation. Our prime tester implementations are limited
by data dependencies and cannot explore the full design space provided by our pipelining and
replication approaches. However, our primality test architectures are still significantly more
energy efficient than software both on FPGAs and ASIC. In fact the FPGA implementation of
the Lucas test is up to 5 times more energy efficient than the software version. The 45 nm ASIC
implementation is 420 times more energy efficient than the software version. The cell count and
the power consumption of our ASIC implementations make them suitable for integration into a
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general purpose CPU or an embedded system whereas our FPGA implementation would more
likely benefit server application. Moreover, if we suppose that an attacker can obtain physi-
cal access to the crypto-system, implementing such cryptographic modules purely in hardware
greatly reduces the vulnerability of a crypto-system when compared to a software implemen-
tation, which is usually run in a multi-tasking operating system. However, without proper
protections cryptographic modules are still likely to be vulnerable to side-channel attacks.
Chapter 6 tackles the security dimension by presenting two novel countermeasures against
power attacks on reconfigurable hardware. Our approach is based on on-chip power monitoring
with a network of ring-oscillators. The first countermeasure is a general framework based on
a closed-loop control system that keeps the power consumption of any FPGA implementation
constant. Our implementation of the framework on a Spartan-6 LX150T takes 11 882 LUTs,
that is 13% of the area available. Using a doubling-attack against 512-bit modular exponenti-
ation as a case study, we demonstrate experimentally that the framework can prevent attacks
performed at a bandwidth lower than half of its control rate. However using the framework as a
hiding countermeasure is not directly feasible on current commercial FPGAs due to the limited
speed of the control loop. The second countermeasure involves detecting the insertion of a
shunt resistor-based power measurement circuit onto a device’s power rail. To our knowledge,
this is the first attempt at detecting power attacks targeting reconfigurable hardware. Our
implementation of the countermeasure on a Spartan-6 LX45 fits in 4 365 LUTs, that is 16% of
the area available. This countermeasure is lightweight and has a relatively low power overhead
compared to existing masking and hiding countermeasures. For 512-bit RSA, with less than
71% power overhead we can detect a shunt resistor as low as 2 Ω with a maximum false-positive
rate of 0.2% and no false-negatives. Our alternative detection strategy also enables the detec-
tion of power attacks on cores whose power variations are too small to be directly measured by
the power monitor circuit.
The key results of this thesis are summarised in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1: Summary of the key results
Research area Results
Parametric
designs for
public-key
encryption
(Chapter 3)
• Montgomery multiplier architecture using variable pipelining and serial
replications:
– 13 times faster on Virtex-5 than optimised software implementation
on Intel Core 2 Duo running at 2.8GHz.
– 4 times faster than the best existing hardware implementation.
– more efficient than existing implementations in terms of Latency ×
Area and Area/Throughput
• Modular exponentiation circuit based on the multiplier:
– 5 times faster on Virtex-5 than the optimised software implementation
on Intel Core 2 Duo running at 2.8GHz.
– 2 times faster then the best existing hardware implementation.
– more efficient than all the radix-2 implementations in terms of Time
× Area product.
Rapid
optimisation
of parametric
designs
(Chapter 4)
• Coarse-grained method to automatically map a general class of algorithms
to a parametric hardware design.
• Model of the proposed design that captures the variations of area and
throughput with the number of pipeline stages and replications:
– area predicted with less than 5% of error.
– frequency and throughput predicted with less than 22% of error.
– up to 96 times faster than a full search through the design space.
Primality
testing
architectures
(Chapter 5)
• Novel architecture for the Miller-Rabin primality test:
– 1.6 times faster than optimised software on Intel Core 2 Duo running
at 2.8GHz.
– 49 times faster than other existing hardware implementations.
– 2.9 times more efficient than existing implementations in terms of
Time × Area product.
• First hardware architecture for the NIST approved Lucas primality test:
– FPGA implementation up to 5 times more energy efficient than opti-
mised software on Intel Xeon W3505 at 2.53 GHz.
– 65 nm ASIC implementation more than 8 times faster than the FPGA
implementation and 39 times more energy efficient.
– 45 nm ASIC implementation 420 times more energy efficient and 4
times faster than optimised software.
Power attack
prevention
and detection
(Chapter 6)
• General framework based on a closed-loop control system that keeps the
power consumption of any FPGA implementation constant:
– 11 882 LUTs, 13% of area available on Spartan-6 LX150T
– prevents attacks performed at a bandwidth lower than half of the
control rate.
• Circuit to detect the insertion of a shunt resistor-based power measurement
circuit onto a device’s power rail:
– first attempt at detecting power attacks targeting reconfigurable hard-
ware.
– 4 365 LUTs, 16% of area available on Spartan-6 LX45.
– less than 71% power overhead on 512-bit RSA.
– shunt resistor as low as 2 Ω detected with a maximum false-positive
rate of 0.2% and 0.4% for 512-bit RSA and 128-bit AES respectively,
and no false-negatives.
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7.2 Future work
The following sections highlight some limitations and present possible future extensions to the
work presented in this thesis. These are also summarised in Table 7.2.
7.2.1 Very low area end of the design space
Our architectures presented in chapters 3 and 5 explore a large design space in terms of speed
and area. However they are not very suitable for small low-end FPGAs as the current architec-
ture of the Montgomery multiplier cannot reach the very low area end of the design space. As a
matter of fact, a basic cell of our Montgomery multiplier already takes more than 11 000 LUTs
as shown in section 3.5. This is due to our choice of a bitwise algorithm for Montgomery multi-
plication (algorithm 3.5) which works on the full lengths of B, N , D, S and C at each iteration,
requiring a large amount of logic. To reduce the logic area, we would have to switch to one
of the multiple-precision blockwise algorithm presented in [KABSK96] and used for instance
in [FL05, OS08, Suz07, CELL10]. In these algorithms the Montgomery product is computed
by processing the inputs word by word in two nested loops, usually leading to smaller logic.
Our optimisation method presented in chapter 4 could also be extended to support blockwise
processing.
7.2.2 Power consumption model
Our coarse-grained optimisation method presented in chapter 4 does not take into account
power consumption. Our model could be extended to take into account power consumption by
using an approach similar to the work presented in [BLC10]. In the Pre-synthesis phase (Fig.
4.3), we could estimate or measure the power of our basic cell and feed it to the model. The
model would then be extended to estimate the power of the entire design based on the power
consumption of a cell. One possibility for FPGAs is to assume that the static power is constant
for a given device and to scale the dynamic power according to the maximum frequency f . Then
we could estimate the dynamic power of the whole design as being proportional to the total
number of basic cells in the design. The throughput optimisation process (equation 4.7) would
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be extended to take into account a given power budget. Another interesting optimisation would
be to minimise the area and the power consumption of the design given a minimum throughput
goal. The static power for FPGAs is high and depends on the size of the chip. Hence such an
optimisation would be equivalent to determining the smallest possible device with enough area
to achieve a given throughput.
7.2.3 Speculative execution of Miller-Rabin tests
The Miller-Rabin architecture could be extended to support running several iterations of dif-
ferent tests simultaneously until a prime is found. This would allow interleaving modular
multiplications from different tests in the Montgomery multiplier pipeline and would improve
the throughput of the design.
7.2.4 Lucas instruction schedule
In chapter 5, the schedule of the Lucas sequence calculator instructions is fixed and may not
be optimal for all the values of the parameters. In future work, we could explore different
schedules and develop models and tools to find the optimum schedule given the bitwidth of the
number under test, the number of replications of the Montgomery multiplier and the pipeline
depths of the different sub-modules.
7.2.5 Other on-chip measurement methods
In chapter 6 we use a uniformly distributed network of ring oscillators to measure on-chip
power. We could investigate local measurement methods by putting the ring oscillators close
to the cryptographic cores. We would also like to study other on-chip measurement methods.
In particular, we expect new generations of FPGAs to have better on-chip power measurement
capabilities. For instance the Virtex-7 FPGA has an 12-bit ADC sampling at 1 MHz with on
chip supply voltages sensors [Xil11a]. Such an ADC could be sufficient to make our attack
detection framework work efficiently.
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7.2.6 Faster constant power control loop
As stated in chapter 6, using the constant power framework as a hiding countermeasure is
not feasible on current commercial FPGAs due to the limited speed of the control loop. A
possible improvement to our constant framework would involve adding noise to the system. We
could vary the power consumer command randomly in a range defined by the current control
command calculated by the PID controller. This random change could occur faster than the
control rate and therefore improve the bandwidth in which the countermeasure is effective.
Future work could also investigate further the possibility of implementing such a framework as
a hard IP block on an FPGA dedicated to cryptography.
7.2.7 Improved attack detection
Our attack detection framework is very efficient at detecting power attacks using a shunt-resistor
based measurement circuit and would also benefit from a better on-chip power monitor. Using
our alternative detection strategy we could investigate further the idea of decoupling the attack
detection mechanism from the cryptographic cores by simultaneously using the power monitor
as a power measurement and a power consumer circuit. Moreover we would also like to test
our framework with shunt resistors smaller than 2 Ω.
However, our attack detection framework cannot detect electromagnetic attacks. Such at-
tacks obtain a power profile of the chip by measuring the leaked electromagnetic radiations
using contactless methods. Possible future work for the attack detection framework could in-
vestigate ways of detecting electromagnetic attacks on-chip. A possible direction is to study
the suitability of on-chip antennas designed with unused FPGA interconnects [TCA11].
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Table 7.2: Summary of limitations of this thesis and possible future work
Research area Limitations and future work
Parametric
designs for
public-key
encryption
(Chapter 3)
• The Montgomery multiplier cannot reach the very low area end of the
design space:
– investigate blockwise algorithms.
Rapid
optimisation
of parametric
designs
(Chapter 4)
• The model does not take into account power consumption:
– extend the model by using an approach similar to [BLC10].
Primality
testing
architectures
(Chapter 5)
• The speed of the Miller-Rabin test is limited by data dependencies:
– add hardware support to execute several iterations of different tests
simultaneously in the multiplier’s pipeline in order to increase through-
put.
• The Lucas calculator instruction schedule is fixed:
– investigate other schedules.
– create methods and tools to find the optimum schedule.
Power attack
prevention
and detection
(Chapter 6)
• The global on-chip network of ring-oscillators may not be the best way of
measuring on-chip power in all the cases:
– investigate local measurement methods by putting the ring oscillators
close to the cryptographic cores.
– investigate on-chip ADC of new generations of FPGAs, especially for
the attack detection framework.
• The constant power framework is not efficient as a hiding countermeasure
on current commercial FPGAs due to the limited speed of the control loop:
– add noise to the system by varying the power consumer command
randomly in a given range.
– study the possibility of implementing such a framework as a hard IP
block in an FPGA dedicated to cryptography.
• An attacker might use shunt resistors smaller than 2 Ω:
– test our attack detection framework with smaller shunt resistors.
• The attack detection framework does not detect electromagnetic attacks:
– investigate on-chip electromagnetic attack detection.
– using a network of on-chip antennas designed with unused FPGA in-
terconnects might be a starting point [TCA11].
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Appendix A
Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID)
Control
This appendix describes in more detail the PID controller principles and the techniques used to
come up with the power controller presented in section 6.4.3. The following sections are mostly
based on [AM08].
A.1 Algorithm
PID control is heavily used in process control. Its simple version is described by the following
equation:
u(t) = K
(
e(t) +
1
Ti
∫ t
0
e(τ)dτ + Td
de(t)
dt
)
(A.1)
e = r − y is the control error, where y is the measured process variable and r is the reference
variable or setpoint. u is the control signal. The control signal is the sum of three terms:
• Ke(t): the proportional (P) term
• K
Ti
∫ t
0
e(τ)dτ : the integral (I) term
• KTdde(t)
dt
: the derivative (D) term
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Figure A.1: Simple PID control loop
The controller parameters are the proportional gain K, the integral time Ti and the derivative
time Td. The integral, proportional and derivative terms are often interpreted as control actions
based on the past, the present and the future.
In the Laplace domain, the PID control equation is written as:
U(s)
E(s)
= K
(
1 +
1
sTi
+ sTd
)
(A.2)
The diagram of the PID control loop is shown in Fig. A.1.
In proportional control (P term only) there is always a steady state error, that is the process
variable does not reach the setpoint in the steady state:
lim
t→∞
e(t) = E > 0 (A.3)
The error decreases when the gain K increases but if the gain is too high the system can become
unstable and oscillate.
Adding the integral term accelerates the movement of the system towards the setpoint and
eliminate the steady state error. The strength of integral action increases with decreasing
integral time Ti. The tendency to oscillations increases when Ti decreases. The integral term
is proportional to accumulated errors from the past and can cause the process variable to
overshoot the setpoint.
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The derivative term slows down the response of the controller and is used to reduce the
overshot due to the integral term. Damping initially increases with Td but decreases again
when Td becomes too large. The derivative term is highly sensitive to noise and can cause the
system to become unstable.
Several techniques are used to improve the simple PID control equation and obtain a good
PID controller. In the following section, we present the three techniques we use in our PID
controller implementation: setpoint weighting, filtering and anti-windup.
A.2 Setpoint weighting
According to equation A.1, a step change in the setpoint r creates an impulse in the control
signal u(t). To avoid large transients in the control signal, derivative action is not applied to
the reference signal. We can also reduce the overshot by letting the proportional action act
only on a fraction of the reference signal. The PID equation therefore becomes:
u(t) = K
(
br(t)− y(t) + 1
Ti
∫ t
0
e(τ)dτ − Tddy(t)
dt
)
(A.4)
b is an additional parameter used to control the overshot created by setpoint changes.
A.3 Filtering
Filtering aims at reducing the sensitivity of the derivative term to noise by limiting the high
frequency gain of the derivative term. We can implement the derivative term as:
D(s) = − sKTd
1 + sTd/N
Y (A.5)
This amounts to filtering the ideal derivative sTd by a first-order system with time constant
Td/N . The gain is now limited to KN . N is usually chosen between 8 and 20 depending on
the application.
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A.4 Anti-windup
In a control system, the actuators have limitations. For example, our power consumer presented
in section 6.4.2 can only consume a finite amount of power which is basically proportional to
the number of horizontal/vertical power consuming wire pairs, also called Cmax in section 6.4.3.
When the control signal reaches the actuator limit, the control saturates and the systems starts
running in open-loop. If an integral action is used, the error will keep on being integrated,
leading to a very large integral term. This phenomenon is called windup and may lead to large
transients in the control system.
A solution to this problem is to use back-calculation. The idea is to create an extra feedback
path when the output saturates in order to dynamically reset the integrator with a constant
Tt. This is shown in Fig. A.2 which integrates all the three technique used to improve the PID
controller. A model of the actuator saturation is used to form an error signal es between the
output of the controller v and the actuator output u. This error signal goes to the input of
the integrator with a gain 1/Tt. When there is no saturation, es is equal to zero and the extra
feedback loop has no effect. When the actuator saturates, the feedback path going through the
sensor is broken because the output of the actuator remains constant. However the feedback
path around the integrator prevents it from winding up. In fact, es compensates for the error
e and v quickly settles outside the saturation limits.
The tracking time Tt should lie in between Td and Ti. In our controller we set Tt =
√
TiTd
as suggested in [AM08].
A.5 Discretisation of the PID control algorithm
The PID control algorithm needs to be discretised in order to be implemented on hardware. We
note h the sampling period. k represents a sampling instant. The proportional term becomes:
P [k] = K(br[k]− y[k]) (A.6)
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Figure A.2: PID control loop with setpoint weighting, filtering and anti-windup
From the integral term with anti-windup:
I(t) = K
1
Ti
∫ t
0
e(τ)dτ +
1
Tt
∫ t
0
es(τ)dτ (A.7)
we derive:
dI
dt
=
K
Ti
e+
1
Tt
es (A.8)
which can be approximated as:
I[k + 1]− I[k]
h
=
K
Ti
e[k] +
1
Tt
es[k] (A.9)
Hence:
I[k + 1] = I[k] +
Kh
Ti
e[k] +
h
Tt
es[k] (A.10)
Converting equation A.5 back to the time domain, we have the following relation for the
199
derivative term:
Td
N
dD
dt
+D = −KTddy
dt
(A.11)
which can be approximated as:
Td
N
D[k]−D[k − 1]
h
+D[k] = −KTdy[k]− y[k − 1]
h
(A.12)
Hence:
D[k] =
Td
Td +Nh
D[k − 1]− KTdN
Td +Nh
(y[k]− y[k − 1]) (A.13)
To summarise, our discrete PID controller is defined by the following set of equations:
P [k] = Kp(br[k]− y[k])
I[k] = I[k − 1] +Ki(r[k − 1]− y[k − 1]) +Kt(u[k − 1]− v[k − 1])
D[k] = Kd0D[k − 1]−Kd1(y[k]− y[k − 1]) (A.14)
v[k] = P [k] + I[k] +D[k]
u[k] = sat(v[k], 0, Cmax)
where:
Kp = K Ki =
Kh
Ti
(A.15)
Kd0 =
Td
Td +Nh
Kd1 =
KTdN
Td +Nh
(A.16)
Kt =
h
Tt
(A.17)
This leads to Algorithm 6.1 presented in section 6.4.3. Note that in our constant power
framework, we do not change the setpoint when the PID controller is running. Hence r[k] =
setpoint is constant and we set b = 1.
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Figure A.3: Comparison of P, PI and PID controllers in our constant power framework
A.6 PID control in our constant framework
Fig. A.3 shows the step response of properly tuned P, PI and PID controllers in our constant
power framework. The PID controller uses set-point weighting, filtering and anti-windup. The
traces are obtained using an implementation of the constant power framework with a power
monitor consisting of 128 3-inverter ROs on the Pico E-101 board described in section 6.5.3.
This is a cut down version of the power monitor presented in section 6.4.4, which has 576
1-inverter ROs.
The P controller does not reach the setpoint due to the steady state error. Adding the
integral action eliminates the steady state error but the PI controller shows a pronounced
overshot. The overshot is reduced by adding the derivative action. However the PID controller
is slightly slower to react to the setpoint change. These behaviours are conformed with the
equations described in the previous section.
Fig. A.4 to A.7 show the beginning of the power trace of a 512-bit RSA computation for
different controller configurations. Without control (Fig. A.4), the start of the computation
as well as the different multiplication patterns are clearly visible. The P controller (Fig. A.5)
reduces the voltage drop due to the RSA computation but the multiplication patterns are
still visible. Using a PI controller (Fig. A.6) makes the start of the computation as well as
201
-336
-334
-332
-330
-328
-326
-324
-322
-320
-318
-316
-0.2  0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
V o
l t a
g e
 ( m
V )
Time (ms)
Figure A.4: RSA power trace without control
-388
-386
-384
-382
-380
-378
-376
-374
-372
-370
-368
-0.2  0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
V o
l t a
g e
 ( m
V )
Time (ms)
Figure A.5: RSA power trace with P controller
-416
-414
-412
-410
-408
-406
-404
-402
-400
-0.2  0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
V o
l t a
g e
 ( m
V )
Time (ms)
Figure A.6: RSA power trace with PI controller
-416
-414
-412
-410
-408
-406
-404
-402
-400
-0.2  0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
V o
l t a
g e
 ( m
V )
Time (ms)
Figure A.7: RSA power trace with PID con-
troller
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the multiplication patterns harder to distinguish. Note that the spike at t = 0 is due to the
trigger from the FPGA that is set specifically for our measurements. In a real-world attack
environment, this trigger would not be present. Adding the derivative action (Fig. A.7) does
not seem to improve on the PI version at first glance. In fact, the noise is slightly amplified
compared to the PI controller. This noise amplification phenomenon could help the attacker
realise that an operation has just started on the device. However, it also makes a prospective
attack harder as more power traces would be needed to reduce noise, so that enough information
can be extracted from this run. This justifies using a PID controller rather than a PI controller
in our constant power framework.
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Appendix B
Power Attacks on Reconfigurable
Hardware
This appendix details two different power attacks that we perform on FPGAs. The first attack
is a doubling attack against RSA which is used to evaluate our constant power framework in
section 6.4.4. The second attack is a differential power attack against DES.
B.1 Comparative power attack against RSA
B.1.1 Principles
Comparative power attacks are a mixture between simple and differential power attacks. The
main idea is to compare two segments of a single or two power traces in order to determine
whether some pairs of intermediate values are the same. This terminology was introduced
in [HMA+10]. In this section we describe our implementation of the doubling attack against
RSA, which is a particular comparative power attack first described in [FV03]. This attack
uses two inputs X and X2 in order to create collisions between adjacent squaring operations
in the left-to-right binary exponentiation algorithm shown in Algorithm 6.2.
According to Algorithm 6.2, at iteration i if the secret exponent bit ei is zero only a squaring
operation is performed. If the secret exponent bit ei is one, a squaring operation followed by a
multiplication operation are performed. We compare the two power traces obtained respectively
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Figure B.1: Doubling attack
for inputs X (trace PX) and X
2 (trace PX2). If the power trace PX at iteration i+1 is identical
to the power trace PX2 at iteration i, the operation performed at iteration i is a squaring and
key bit ei = 0. Otherwise the operation is a multiplication and ei = 1. Fig. B.1 shows an
example of doubling attack for a secret exponent:
E = enen−1en−2en−3en−4en−5... = 100100...
We observe collisions at iterations (n − 1), (n − 2), (n − 4) and (n − 5) corresponding to the
squaring operations.
B.1.2 Phase Only Correlation (POC) waveform matching
Phase Only Correlation (POC) waveform matching is an effective method to compare two
waveforms [HNI+06]. It exhibits much higher discrimination than other matching techniques
based on the correlation function and can evaluate the displacement between two waveforms
created by trigger delays or deliberately introduced random delays.
Let f(n) and g(n) be two waveforms of length 2M + 1 where −M ≤ n ≤ M . F (k) and
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G(k) are the discrete Fourier transforms of f(n) and g(n):
F (k) =
M∑
n=−M
f(n)e−j
2pikn
N (B.1)
G(k) =
M∑
n=−M
g(n)e−j
2pikn
N (B.2)
The cross-phase spectrum RFG(k) is defined as:
RFG(k) =
F (k)G(k)∣∣∣F (k)G(k)∣∣∣ (B.3)
G(k) is the complex conjugate of G(k). The POC function rfg(n) is the inverse discrete Fourier
transform of RFG:
rfg(n) =
1
N
M∑
k=−M
RFG(k)e
j 2pikn
N (B.4)
If the two waveforms are similar minus a given displacement, the POC function gives a distinct
sharp peak located at the displacement δ between the two waveforms.
The sharpness of the correlation peak is evaluated using the Peak-to-Sidelobe Ratio PSR =
(peak−mean)/std. In our case PSR = (max−mean)/std, where max is the maximum, mean
is the mean and std is the standard deviation of the POC function.
B.1.3 Implementation
We implement the attack on an unprotected 512-bit left-to-right binary exponentiation core. A
Python script controls the trigger of the FPGA board and our Tektronix MSO 2024 oscilloscope.
On both our Spartan-6 LX150T and LX45 FPGA boards, the full 512-bit key can be recovered
in less than two days. Most of the time is spent acquiring the power traces. As a matter of
fact, for each acquisition we average 30 power traces in order to reduce the measurement noise.
Each bit requires two power trace subsets: one from PX and one from PX2 . Note that our
oscilloscope does not enable us to extract the subsets from a single acquisition of PX and PX2
with enough resolution to perform the POC matching. Hence to recover the full 512-bit key,
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Figure B.2: Comparison of the POC functions
we actually need two acquisitions per bit, that is 30720 traces.
Fig B.2 compares the POC functions for a key bit of 1, where no collision occurs and a key
bit of 0, where there is a collision between the corresponding square operations in PX and PX2 .
When no collision occurs, there is a small peak at index 0 and the PSR is 22.65. As a matter
of fact, even if the intermediate inputs are different, the traces still present some similarities
as they both correspond to a multiplication operation. In the case of a collision, the peak is
much more pronounced with a PSR 3 times larger than when no collision occurs. Hence the
collisions can be easily detected using the POC function.
B.2 Differential power attack against DES
In this section, we describe the DPA we mount against DES in order to evaluate our modified
FPGA boards. The attack is based on [SOQP04]. The DES algorithm is described in detail in
section 2.2.3.
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B.2.1 Principles
The attack is a ciphertext-only correlation power analysis attack against DES encryption using
the Hamming distance between L15 and L16 (see left part of Fig. 2.7) as the weight model. For
a ciphertext Cm, we have:
{R16, L16} = IP (Cm) (B.5)
where IP is the initial permutation matrix.
We aim at recovering the last 48-bit round key K16. The full 56-bit master key can then
be recovered by inverting the key schedule and performing exhaustive search on the missing 8
bits. K16 = k1...k8 is divided into 8 words of 6 bits. Word kl corresponds to the inputs of S-box
Sl. According to Fig. 2.7 and Fig. 2.9, the output of Sl in the last round can be recovered as a
function of R16 and L15:
Soutl = P
−1(R16 ⊕ L15)[4(l − 1) : 4l − 1] (B.6)
= P−1(R16)[4(l − 1) : 4l − 1]⊕ P−1(L15)[4(l − 1) : 4l − 1] (B.7)
Here the numbers are represented LSB first and A[j : k] denotes the slice of A from bit number
j to bit number k. Soutl can also be written as a function of K16 and R15 = L16:
Soutl = Sl(E(L16)[6(l − 1) : 6l − 1]⊕K16[6(l − 1) : 6l − 1]) (B.8)
= Sl(E(L16)[6(l − 1) : 6l − 1]⊕ kl) (B.9)
Hence we have:
P−1(L15)[4(l − 1) : 4l − 1] = P−1(R16)[4(l − 1) : 4l − 1]⊕ Si(E(L16)[6(l − 1) : 6l − 1]⊕ kl)
(B.10)
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For subkey kl, we define the selection function:
Dl(kl, Cm) = H(P
−1(L15)[4(l − 1) : 4l − 1]⊕ P−1(L16)[4(l − 1) : 4l − 1]) (B.11)
This corresponds to the number of bit flips due to the subkey kl in the register holding L. Note
that the selection function depends on kl and Cm through equations B.10 and B.5.
The subkey kl can take 2
6 = 64 values called key hypotheses. We note hm,i the estimated
power consumption for ciphertext Cm and key hypothesis i. hm,i is therefore:
hm,i = Dl(i, Cm) (B.12)
The dependence of the estimated power consumption in l is not reflected in our notation hm,i
to simplify the readability of the equations.
We capture M different ciphertexts together with the corresponding DES power traces of
length T . We note pm, j the recorder value of the power trace for message m at time j. We
compute the 64× T correlation matrix R with its elements ri,j defined as:
ri,j =
∑M
m=1(hm,i − hi).(pm,j − pj)√∑M
m=1(hm,i − hi)2.
∑M
m=1(pm,j − pj)2
(B.13)
hi is the mean value of the vector hi of estimated power consumptions for all messages under
key hypothesis i. pj is the mean value of the vector pj of recorded power consumptions for
all messages at time j. The most likely value for the secret subkey kl is simply determined by
identifying the row that contains the extreme value of matrix R.
B.2.2 Implementation
We implement the attack on the modified Spartan-6 Pico E-101 board. To simplify the attack
we use 16 DES cores processing the same inputs in parallel. We perform M = 4096 encryptions
with different plaintexts and we store the corresponding ciphertexts. Note that if we wanted
to run an attack on a single DES core, we would require many more ciphertexts for the attack
to be successful. For each encryption, the power trace is averaged over 10 runs in order to
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Figure B.3: Power trace of a DES encryption
reduce noise. The power traces have length T = 4000. Fig. B.3 shows the power trace of a
DES encryption. The first spike in the trace corresponds to the initialisation of the different
registers and the 16 following spikes correspond to the 16 DES rounds.
Fig. B.4 shows the correlation for the 64 key hypotheses on each of the subkeys k1 to k8.
For each subkey, the correlation spike for the correct key hypothesis (in red) can clearly be
distinguished from the correlations for the other key hypotheses (in green). A full 64-bit key
can be recovered in less than 2 days. Like the attack against RSA, most of the time is spent
acquiring waveforms.
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Figure B.4: Result of the DPA attack against DES
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Appendix C
Design Testing
This appendix briefly describes the methodology and tools used to test our Verilog designs.
C.1 Unit testing
All our Verilog modules are individually tested. Our test vectors consist of a series of random
inputs together with the extremes of the input domain (boundary conditions). We write our
testbenches in Python using the MyHDL package [myh]. The Verilog modules are compiled
using Icarus Verilog [ica]. The testbenches and the Verilog modules are connected using the
co-simulation feature of MyHDL.
As an example, Fig. C.1 shows the Verilog code for the carry-save adder used in the Mont-
gomery multiplier. The Verilog code in Fig. C.2 connects the CSA module to the MyHDL
testbench. The testbench can then be written in Python using the MyHDL package as shown
in Fig. C.3. Note that the imported libraries are not shown in this listing. Moreover this code
only tests the CSA module with random input vectors.
C.2 Integration testing
Integration tests on high-level modules follow the same methodology as unit tests. For large
modules, when simulations using Icarus Verilog are too slow, we use Verilator [ver] to convert
our Verilog code to C++ and we write testbenches in C++.
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/∗ csa . v ∗/
module csa (
// Inputs
input [ ’WIDTH−1:0 ] data1 i ,
input [ ’WIDTH−1:0 ] data2 i ,
input [ ’WIDTH−1:0 ] data3 i ,
// Outputs
output reg [ ’WIDTH−1:0 ] r e s u l t o ,
output reg [ ’WIDTH: 0 ] ca r ry o
) ;
// Combinational l o g i c
always @( d a t a 1 i or d a t a 2 i or d a t a 3 i ) begin
r e s u l t o = d a t a 1 i ˆ d a t a 2 i ˆ d a t a 3 i ;
c a r ry o = { ( ( d a t a 1 i & ( d a t a 2 i | d a t a 3 i ) ) | ( d a t a 2 i & d a t a 3 i ) ) , 1 ’ b0 } ;
end
endmodule
Figure C.1: Verilog code for the CSA
/∗ t e s t c s a . v ∗/
module t e s t c s a ;
// Inputs
reg [ ‘WIDTH−1:0 ] d a t a 1 i ;
reg [ ‘WIDTH−1:0 ] d a t a 2 i ;
reg [ ‘WIDTH−1:0 ] d a t a 3 i ;
//Outputs
wire [ ‘WIDTH−1:0 ] r e s u l t o ;
wire [ ‘WIDTH : 0 ] ca r ry o ;
// Pipes to and from MyHDL
i n i t i a l begin
$from myhdl ( data1 i , data2 i , d a t a 3 i ) ;
$to myhdl ( r e s u l t o , c a r ry o ) ;
end
// I n s t a n t i a t e the CSA
csa #(
.WIDTH(‘WIDTH)
) csa1 (
. d a t a 1 i ( d a t a 1 i ) ,
. d a t a 2 i ( d a t a 2 i ) ,
. d a t a 3 i ( d a t a 3 i ) ,
. r e s u l t o ( r e s u l t o ) ,
. c a r ry o ( ca r ry o )
) ;
endmodule
Figure C.2: Wrapper for testing the CSA with MyHDL
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class test CSA ( u n i t t e s t . TestCase ) :
’’’Tests of the CSA module’’’
def csa ( se l f , data1 i , data2 i , data3 i , r e s u l t o , carry o , width ) :
’’’Design under test’’’
# Compile module
os . system (” i v e r i l o g −o csa −DWIDTH=%s csa . v t e s t c s a . v” % width )
# Return co-simulation object
return Cosimulat ion (” vvp −M. −mmyhdl csa , d a t a 1 i=data1 i , d a t a 2 i=data2 i ,\
d a t a 3 i=data3 i , r e s u l t o=r e s u l t o , c a r ry o=car ry o )
def t e s t Re su l tCar ry ( s e l f ) :
’’’Tests that the module CSA gives the expected results’’’
# Testbench
def s t imulus ( width ) :
f o r i in range ( t e s t c s a n b ) :
# Set inputs
d a t a 1 i . next = intbv ( random . randrange (1 ,2∗∗width −1 ,1) ) [ width : ]
d a t a 2 i . next = intbv ( random . randrange (1 ,2∗∗width −1 ,1) ) [ width : ]
d a t a 3 i . next = intbv ( random . randrange (1 ,2∗∗width −1 ,1) ) [ width : ]
# Wait for 1 ns
y i e l d de lay (1 )
# Compute the expected results
r , c = c add ( data1 i , data2 i , data3 i , width )
# Compare to the results of the Verilog module
s e l f . a s s e r tEqua l ( r e s u l t o , r )
s e l f . a s s e r tEqua l ( carry o , c )
print ” Test %i : OK”%( i +1)
# Define signals
d a t a 1 i = S igna l ( intbv ( 0 ) [ width : ] )
d a t a 2 i = S igna l ( intbv ( 0 ) [ width : ] )
d a t a 3 i = S igna l ( intbv ( 0 ) [ width : ] )
r e s u l t o = S igna l ( intbv ( 0 ) [ width : ] )
c a r ry o = S igna l ( intbv ( 0 ) [ width +1 : ] )
# Instantiate DUT
dut = s e l f . c sa ( data1 i , data2 i , data3 i , r e s u l t o , carry o , width )
# Instantiate testbench
check = st imulus ( width )
# Create simulation
sim = Simulat ion ( dut , check )
# Run simulation
sim . run ( qu i e t =1)
Figure C.3: MyHDL testbench for the CSA
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Appendix D
Experimental Parameters
This appendix details the different parameters used for synthesis and place-and-route of our
designs on FPGA and ASIC.
D.1 Xilinx tools options
D.1.1 Virtex-5
Our Virtex-5 FPGA designs are all implemented using Xilinx ISE 14.1. In chapters 3 and 5,
the following synthesis (xst) options are used (parameters not specified below are set to their
default values):
-iuc No
-keep_hierarchy No
-netlist_hierarchy As_Optimized
-rtlview Yes
-glob_opt AllClockNets
-read_cores Yes
-write_timing_constraints No
-cross_clock_analysis No
-hierarchy_separator /
-bus_delimiter <>
-case Maintain
-slice_utilization_ratio 100
-bram_utilization_ratio 100
-dsp_utilization_ratio 100
-rom_style Auto
-auto_bram_packing No
-mux_extract Yes
-resource_sharing Yes
-async_to_sync No
-use_dsp48 Auto
-iobuf Yes
-max_fanout 100000
-bufg 32
-register_duplication Yes
-register_balancing No
-slice_packing Yes
-iob Auto
-equivalent_register_removal Yes
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-opt_mode Speed
-opt_level 1
-power No
-lc Off
-fsm_style LUT
-ram_extract Yes
-ram_style Auto
-rom_extract Yes
-reduce_control_sets Off
-verilog2001 Yes
-fsm_extract Yes -fsm_encoding Auto
-safe_implementation No
-shreg_extract Yes
-shift_extract Yes
-xor_collapse Yes
-mux_style Auto
-decoder_extract Yes
-priority_extract Yes
-slice_utilization_ratio_maxmargin 5
-optimize_primitives No
-use_clock_enable Auto
-use_sync_set Auto
-use_sync_reset Auto
We use the following map options for Virtex-5 FPGAs (the other options are set to their
default values):
-w
-logic_opt off
-ol high
-register_duplication off
-global_opt off
-mt off
-cm area
-ir off
-pr off
-x
-lc off
-power off
and the following place-and-route (par) options:
-ol high -x
In particular the -x option instructs the map and par tools to run in performance evalu-
ation mode. Instead of using external timing constraints, the tool automatically generates
timing constraints for each internal clock separately and adjusts the constraints during execu-
tion [Xil12b, p. 123].
D.1.2 Spartan-6
In chapter 4, for synthesis on Spartan-6 XC6SLX45T, we use XST 13.2 with the following
parameters:
-opt_mode area
-opt_level 1
-use_dsp48 no
-resource_sharing no
-netlist_hierarchy rebuilt
-equivalent_register_removal no
-iobuf NO
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For the Spartan-6 implementations of chapter 6, we use the default parameters provided by
Xilinx Platform Studio 14.1.
D.2 Synopsys tools options
D.2.1 65 nm
For 65 nm, we use Synopsys Design Compiler version G-2012.06-SP2 with the following con-
straints (this example is for a 1 GHz clock):
set CLK_PORT [get_ports clock_i]
set CLK_PERIOD 1.00
set CLK_SKEW 0.1
set RST_PORT [get_ports reset_i]
set MAX_OUTPUT_LOAD [load_of tcbn65gplustc/DFD1/D]
set MAX_AREA 20000000
create_clock -period $CLK_PERIOD -name my_clock $CLK_PORT
set_dont_touch_network my_clock
set_dont_touch $RST_PORT
set_ideal_network $RST_PORT
set_driving_cell -library tcbn65gplustc -lib_cell DFD1 -pin Q\
[remove_from_collection [all_inputs] $CLK_PORT]
set_max_area $MAX_AREA
set_load $MAX_OUTPUT_LOAD [all_outputs]
Setting an area constraint of 20000000 is equivalent to setting no constraint on the area avail-
able. We assume that the inputs and outputs of our designs are connected to D flip-flops. An
example Design Compiler script is as follows:
analyze -format verilog {VERILOG MODULES HERE}
elaborate lucas -architecture verilog -param "PARAMETERS HERE"\
-library WORK -update
uplevel #0 source top-level.tcl
compile -exact_map
report_timing
report_area
write -hierarchy -format verilog -output lucas.v
exit
A corresponding PrimeTime-PX G-2012.06-SP2 script for power analysis is as follows:
set power_enable_analysis TRUE
set target_library "tcbn65gplus_200a/tcbn65gplustc.db"
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set link_library "tcbn65gplus_200a/tcbn65gplustc.db *"
read_db $target_library
read_verilog lucas.v
current_design lucas
link
read_vcd dmp_lucas.vcd -strip_path lucas_tb/lucas -pipe_exec "./simv"
create_clock -name CLK -period 1.00 clock_i
estimate_clock_network_power tcbn65gplustc/BUFFD1
report_power -verbose -include_estimated_clock_network
exit
The VCD simulation file obtained with Synopys VCS G-2012.09 is piped to PrimeTime-PX to
prevent the creation of a multi-gigabyte VCD file on disk. A virtual clock network is created
to improve the power consumption estimations.
D.2.2 45 nm
For 45 nm, we use the following Design Compiler constraints (this example is for a 1.66 GHz
clock) in the top-level.tcl script:
set CLK_PORT [get_ports clock_i]
set CLK_PERIOD 0.60
set CLK_SKEW 0.1
set RST_PORT [get_ports reset_i]
set MAX_OUTPUT_LOAD [load_of tcbn45gsbwptc/DFD1BWP/D]
set MAX_AREA 20000000
create_clock -period $CLK_PERIOD -name my_clock $CLK_PORT
set_dont_touch_network my_clock
set_dont_touch $RST_PORT
set_ideal_network $RST_PORT
set_driving_cell -library tcbn45gsbwptc -lib_cell DFD1BWP -pin Q\
[remove_from_collection [all_inputs] $CLK_PORT]
set_max_area $MAX_AREA
set_load $MAX_OUTPUT_LOAD [all_outputs]
An example Design Compiler script is as follows:
analyze -format verilog {VERILOG MODULES HERE}
elaborate lucas -architecture verilog -param "PARAMETERS HERE"\
-library WORK -update
uplevel #0 source top-level.tcl
compile -exact_map
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report_timing
report_area
write -hierarchy -format verilog -output lucas.v
exit
A corresponding PrimeTime-PX script for power analysis is as follows:
set power_enable_analysis TRUE
set target_library "tcbn45gsbwp_120a/tcbn45gsbwptc.db"
set link_library "tcbn45gsbwp_120a/tcbn45gsbwptc.db *"
read_db $target_library
read_verilog lucas.v
current_design lucas
link
read_vcd dmp_lucas.vcd -strip_path lucas_tb/lucas -pipe_exec "./simv"
create_clock -name CLK -period 0.60 clock_i
estimate_clock_network_power tcbn45gsbwptc/BUFFD0BWP
report_power -verbose -include_estimated_clock_network
exit
D.3 Lucas test input for maximum execution time
The 1024-bit input used for evaluating the maximum execution time of our Lucas prime tester
in chapter 5 is (in base 10):
66864716114567041818190100097151607676212375081139019620825302622553369022913957181545524140612495227072878160317
55748555179105855267615799852643953953600404486361277825958375222445681441713821315021048398484635577488416684555
4396392908089858429102711527099554796063645031974979081949720791490519404343943783
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